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In the context of the current macroeconomic environment there is an expectation of an increase in 
South African non-financial corporate failure, where advance prediction thereof will become even 
more important. A number of South African non-financial corporate failures have occurred following 
the financial crisis. In addition, South Africa experienced a watershed moment with the first default 
on a non-financial corporate bond in 2013. At the same time, with the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) framework there have been significant advances in the quality 
of financial information which should improve its usage in predicting corporate failure. 
This study used the latest sample to date of listed South African non-financial corporates that met the 
definition of failure but limited the universe of financial information to that which was prepared under 
IFRS. At the same time, adjustments were made to the financial data based upon pre-selection of 
independent credit statistic variables most commonly used in ranking relative credit risk for non-
financial corporates. Additionally, equity market price data was introduced into the model to add a 
forward-looking information consideration. This resulted in an eleven variable model where 
differentiation of corporate failure was facilitated through the use of multiple discriminant analysis. 
The initial model resulted in an 82.95% classification rate (overall accuracy rate for correctly 
classifying failed and non-failed firms), but this was further improved by using a three variable model 
comprising Revenue measured in US dollars, Debt/ Market Capitalisation and Debt/EBITDA. The 
inclusion of Debt/Market Capitalisation assured the consideration of forward-looking information but 
also factored distance to default theory employed by market-based models. This model, although with 
a slightly lower classification rate of 80.68% significantly improved the bias of the model to having a 
greater tendency to correctly classify failed firms. This was further validated through splitting the 
original sample in two with in sample and out of sample testing undertaken on each sample. The 
inclusion of outliers in financial data was shown to improve the ability to predict corporate failures. 
The study also concluded that samples using only financial data prepared under IFRS resulted in 
higher classification rates and therefore samples should only rely upon such financial data. 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction to the study 
a) Background to the study 
The need to predict corporate failure well in advance of its occurrence has been a focus for financial 
circles in an industry and academic context dating back to the early 1900’s. In an industry context, 
corporate failure prediction began in 1841 with the formation of The Mercantile Agency in New York 
City. This was the precursor to Dun & Bradstreet, Moody’s Corporation’s previous owner from 1962 
until 1999. Moody’s Corporation was itself only established as the first bond credit rating agency by 
John Moody in 1909. In an academic context, the first mention of corporate failure prediction is 
credited to Smith and Winakor’s (1935) study on changes in financial structures in unsuccessful 
corporations, which created a platform for further academic discourse. 
Greater emphasis on the need to accurately predict corporate failure has become increasingly 
important following the global financial crisis which began in 2008 and continued into 2009 with 
widespread corporate failure and further ripple effects leading to the European sovereign crisis 
beginning in 2010 and running to present day. Similar impetus on the need to predict corporate failure 
has been driven by a number of sizeable corporate failures. These commenced in and around 2000 
with the Enron and WorldCom financial collapses. 
More recently corporate failure prediction has become increasingly important in a South African 
context. This follows the first non-financial corporate bond default in 2013. First Strut (Pty) Ltd could 
not service the coupon payment that fell due on its floating rate note maturing on 5 September 2016. 
The company was put into provisional liquidation on 16 July 2013. This was then followed in 2014 by 
the financial failure of African Bank Investments Limited which led to the imposition of a 10% 
haircut for senior bond holders and a complete write down for preference share and subordinated debt 
holders. Senior bondholders would have likely sustained higher capital losses had it not been for 
South African Reserve Bank intervention. In addition there have been a number of high profile 
liquidations in South Africa recently, most notable of which have been Evraz Highveld Steel and 
Vanduim and Chemical Specialities, which occurred during the course of 2015.  
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b) Key objectives and research questions for the study 
i) Use of latest research knowledge, more uniform data and a larger sample of failed firms 
The study intends building on the most recent international and South African academic and industry 
literature available to date. Applying observations and modelling conclusions drawn, the intention is 
to improve on the quality of South African corporate failure prediction models that have been 
developed to date using multiple discriminant analysis. 
Modelling improvements should be facilitated through using updated data available for failed non-
financial corporates. This will result in a larger sample of failed firms given the occurrence of further 
corporate failures following previous studies. This should improve upon model fit and accuracy 
simultaneously. Small samples of failed firms used in prior South African studies have been identified 
as inhibitors of accuracy for corporate failure prediction models. 
Prior South African corporate failure prediction models that have used multiple discriminant analysis 
have been limited in the extent of their application of market related data. This study will attempt to 
include equity market price movement data to reflect changes in the business risks and conditions that 
investors see, and where they actively dimension these into equity prices. Market data for the purpose 
of this study is limited to listed equity prices, given that most South African corporate debt is unlisted 
and not publically traded. Inclusion of publically traded debt data, had it been available, would have 
likely further added significant explanatory power to the model. 
The benefits of the inclusion equity market data as a variable for assessing corporate failure will be 
discussed in detail when reviewing market-based models. This will also include the economic 
rationale underlying the information content pertaining to default propensity contained in equity 
market prices. Equity prices are by nature forward-looking and fluid, constantly reflecting an 
investor’s assessment of the underlying financial strength and prospects of a business. This will 
provide further discriminatory power for the multiple discriminant analysis in differentiating between 
failed and non-failed firms. 
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Financial corporates, such as banks and financing corporations, are excluded from this study because 
they have different credit characteristics such as higher leverage, different funding and business 
models and are subject to unique financial regulation and regulatory oversight. Also, the South 
African Reserve Bank will often intervene or act as a lender of last resort to protect the integrity of the 
country’s financial system, as was seen recently with African Bank Investments Limited. This can in 
turn distort default parameters and the determination of corporate failure. Corporates, which are not 
government owned, do not benefit from the same level of implicit financial support, as they are not 
deemed to be as systematically important to the economy.  
This study will also use data exclusively prepared under International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Application of IFRS as the basis for preparing their annual financial statements became a 
legal requirement effective 1 January 2005. Although, from 2003 the option for all companies in 
South Africa; listed, unlisted, and private companies, was available to prepare annual financial 
statements under IFRS.  
This study is able to use uniformly consistent financial data under this single set of transparent, 
principle-based and globally comparable accounting standards. Many previous studies, in order to 
develop statistically significant samples, have relied upon a mix of financial data prepared under IFRS 
and Statements of South African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (SA GAAP). 
Comparability of variables across time periods suffered as a result. This in turn ultimately skewed 
various parameters that were used in assessing the propensity for corporate failure. These variations 
that resulted from the analysis often were therefore not unique to a company’s financial risk profile, 
but rather attributed to data variances as a result of differences in the financial reporting. 
This study also recognises the nuanced changes under IFRS from one financial reporting period to the 
next. These have followed from the evolution of the IFRS framework with new guidance introduced 
periodically to align with developments in the corporate landscape that it covers. These differences in 
IFRS over time still pale in comparison to the variation in data that resulted from annual financial 
statements being prepared under two different reporting frameworks, SA GAAP followed by IFRS. 
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Collection of data could prove problematic for a number of reasons. First, many companies often will 
cease filing financial statements as result of or in the run up to their financial failure. Second, given 
the lack of large-scale corporate failure within South Africa, collecting homogenous data will prove 
challenging where both size and business sector are likely to differ in each case. Third, failure for 
some corporates was attributed to accounting scandals, such as Leisurenet. In such instances financial 
data in the run up to failure is unreliable in any case and therefore not effective in reflecting financial 
pressures that the company is under at the time. Although, this can often be overcome through close 
analysis of the financial statements where in the case of Leisurenet, upfronting of revenue could be 
picked up through ballooning of the accounts receivable balance. 
Once a sample of failed non-financial South African corporates have been collected these will then be 
paired with non-failed South African corporates, with a preference first for corporates in the same 
sector and then secondly for the same scale of operations. In creating pairs of non-financial South 
African corporates operating in the same sector this will ensure that similar business risks are captured 
in the independent variables or credit statistics used in the corporate failure prediction model. This 
will then allow for a better aligned assessment of those credit statics that have a higher unique 
contribution to being able to predict corporate failure. This is facilitated by excluding sector specific 
risk as a consideration. 
A limitation of this approach is the challenge of pairing of non-failed and failed non-financial South 
African corporates with equivalent scale of operations. This is a result of the relatively small scale of 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange when compared to large equity markets such as those in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
Although this could often be a differentiator in the model, as larger scale often means greater diversity 
of operations both from a business and geographic perspective, leading to lower corporate failure 
propensity. This may not end up being a limitation to sample selection. 
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ii) Introduction of Moody’s best practices for assessing South African corporate credit risk 
Moody’s Investors Service uses a number of techniques to allow for better credit analysis of non-
financial corporates. These include adjustments to financial statements so that they factor all 
considerations for assessing the credit risk profile for non-financial corporates. Additionally, 
structural elements, which often mask credit risk exposure, are also factored in this analysis. 
Similarly, financial ratios frequently occurring in sixty-three unique non-financial corporate rating 
methodologies will be used. At the same time, an attempt will be made to include forward-looking 
expectations for the evolution of these financial ratios. 
In combination, through inclusion of these techniques used by Moody’s Investors Service model 
predictive power should improve. Previous studies have, in the most part, overlooked or only touched 
the surface when it came to including additional measures used by rating agencies and banks 
providing loans. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
iii) Addition of equity market price movements in variable set 
As part of the variable set that will be used in this study, the percentage change in equity market 
prices over the same period used for financial ratios will also be included along with a Debt/Market 
Capitalisation ratio. These should benefit the accuracy of the model from four perspectives. 
This will add a forward-looking indicator, given that equity valuations will always factor the forward-
looking expectations of investors. 
At the same time equity prices also provide an independent appraisal of business risk reflected 
through the volatility of equity price returns. This also allows for insights into the propensity for 
equity values to fall below net asset value or assets less liabilities. 
Thirdly, equity prices are also an independent check on financial information where auditors could 
overlook some misstatements. Investors in some cases are made privy to accounting concerns before 
they become known and also conduct their own independent analysis as to the reliability and realism 
of financial information provided by companies. This will also factor non-financial information which 
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can be equally important to investors in arriving at a valuation of a company. Examples of these could 
be new legislation that is about to be passed which will benefit a company, or a soon to be concluded 
deal which will enhance the company’s value. Beaver (1968) observed that financial ratios are not the 
only source of information on a company’s solvency. 
Lastly, and in line with the importance identified by Altman (2000) in assessing the value of a 
business once its liabilities have been settled, Altman’s (1968) market value of equity to book value of 
liabilities will also be used. This introduces an alignment to that of market-based models and their 
focus on distance to default analysis. 
Together these considerations introduce both a distance to default, through using a market value of 
equity to book value of liabilities ratio, and propensity to use up distance to default analysis in the 
model, through the inherent volatility that a company faces in its valuation relative to its liabilities 
expressed through the percentage change in equity market prices over the same period used for 
financial ratios. This will be discussed at length in Chapter 3 | e) and f). 
iv) Liquidity analysis as an additional forward-looking predictor of default 
Disclosure around company liquidity has gradually improved overtime. Liquidity is often one of the 
best forward-looking predictors of non-financial corporate default. With adequate liquidity -
companies can often “ride out the storm” and have sufficient time to take the necessary measures to 
keep their business from failing. This headroom is often reflected through cash and cash equivalent 
balances, committed banking facilities, and a long dated staggered debt maturity profile. Together 
these buy time through the ability to erode cash in the short term as remedial steps are taken, without 
the pressure of having to refinance or pay debt maturing, so that the business can be cash flow 
generative in the long-term.  
Remedial actions often required to keep businesses under financial pressure from failing include sale 
of non-core loss making assets or business units, cost cutting measures, delaying or cancellation of 
capital expenditure, reengineering of business processes so that they are returned to being profitable, 
renegotiation of key supplier and customer contracts and closing of loss making operations. This list 
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is certainly not exhaustive, but the key point is that many of these remedial actions take time to 
implement. 
Often businesses have failed because they have simply run out of cash to keep their operations going. 
Given a bit more time, these business would likely have implemented the necessary measures to 
restore their operations back to generating cash flow, and therein be saved from failure. 
Most companies now disclose both committed banking facilities and their draw down allowing for the 
calculation of debt financing availability. Similarly tables for debt maturing in one year, one to two 
years and two to five years, are often provided. 
By using the cash flow statement as well as information from the company’s guidance statement 
around capital expenditure, a sources and uses analysis for the next twelve months can be generated. 
Sources typically include cash and cash equivalents, marketable securities, committed bank facility 
availability along with cash flow from operations. In the interests of prudence it is advisable to apply 
a 25% haircut to marketable securities, as although reflected at fair value, they could be sold for less 
depending on the state of the market. 
These sources of liquidity should then be assessed against forecast uses over the next twelve months 
by the non-financial corporate. This typically includes capital expenditure, normally made available in 
a company’s full year guidance statements, dividend payments and debt repayments. Dividend policy 
can be estimated using the company’s dividend policy, if this is in existence and communicated to the 
market, against forecast full earnings guidance, upon which most dividend policies are based. In the 
case where a company pays out a flat dividend or maintains a progressive dividend policy, prior 
period dividend payments can be used and in the case of the latter grossed up at the progressive rate. 
Debt repayment as mentioned earlier can be calculated from debt maturity tables disclosed by 
companies often under their risk management disclosure note in their audited financial statements. 
The intention of this study will be to generate coverage metrics for use in the multiple discriminant 
analysis model expressed as sources divided by uses. The expectation is that this should always 
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exceed one for non-financial corporates that are not expected to fail within the following twelve 
month period. 
c) Summary, conclusions and interlude 
Corporate failure is multidimensional and often its prediction should consider a number of factors. 
Any analysis should consider both qualitative and quantitative information, which is both forward and 
backward looking. Also of key importance should be the key economic drivers of any business in both 
a micro and macro sense. These should receive equal importance in weighing up the likelihood of a 
corporate failing. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the background to the study along with the key objectives, the rationale 
therein, and research questions. Chapter 2 details Moody’s Investors Service best practices, based on 
what is public knowledge, and the motivation behind various considerations. This overview begins 
with financial statement adjustments that are applied for better alignment in assessing credit risk. It 
then continues onto a discussion on structural considerations in assessing non-financial corporate 
credit risk. This is followed by considerations for including forward-looking information and 
concludes with the use of credit metrics seen to have broad applicability and predictive power across 
sectors. 
Chapter 3 is a literature review introducing studies, which laid the foundation for corporate prediction 
using multiple discriminant analysis. This section also covers the varying definitions of corporate 
failure that have been applied in prior studies and data issues which have been noted at the same time. 
This will cover models developed in the United States and in other countries, comprising both 
developed and developing markets. A separate discussion on research undertaken on South African 
corporate failure prediction has also been included. Furthermore, across the entire discussion both 
accounting and market-based models and their inherent strengths and weaknesses are reviewed. 
Chapter 4 analyses the sample of failed South African non-financial corporates and associated data. 
The initial research design included data with respect to liquidity and forecast information. However, 
this was shown not to be practicable given the lack of uniform financial information provided by non-
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financial South African corporates that were included in the sample. At the same time the most 
common credit statistics used by Moody’s Investors Service along with two equity price based 
metrics are introduced to add forward-looking considerations into the model. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results of multiple discriminant analysis which initially included eleven 
independent credit statistic variables. It was found that revenue, debt/Market Capitalisation and 
debt/EBITDA were the most pervasive discriminators of South African non-financial failure. These 
variables appear in most discriminant functions through the various optimisation runs to improve 
upon the initial research design model, therein demonstrating their unique contribution in 
differentiating between the two groups of failed and non-failed South African non-financial 
corporates. This was further supported by out of sample testing, where the initial sample was split into 
two to create a learning sample and a test sample. At the same time it was also shown that by using 
IFRS based financial information only, that classification rates improved, as opposed to using a 
sample reliant upon financial information prepared under both IFRS and the prior SA GAAP 
standards. 
This study sets out to determine whether South African non-financial corporate prediction models 
using a larger sample of failed firms and using financial information prepared only under IFRS will 
improve classification rates, when compared to previous research. At the same time, additional 
enhancements will be added through adjusting certain financial information to better align its usage to 
that of credit analysis. Lastly, an attempt will be made to introduce an analysis of liquidity and 
forward-looking information, both through using equity price information and financial forecasts, into 
the research model design. Multiple discriminant analysis, the technique of choice and most 
commonly used for corporate failure prediction which is backed by extensive research on its 
application, will be used to facilitate the discrimination between failed and non-failed South African 
non-financial corporates. 
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Chapter 2 | Using Moody’s best practices for assessing corporate credit risk 
a) Rationale 
Practitioner perspectives and insights, which are public knowledge, from covering South African 
corporates as a credit analyst for Moody’s Investors Service in South Africa over the past 5 years will 
be incorporated in developing the model. The modelling approach will set out to capture some of the 
practical considerations based on experience in the non-financial corporate credit environment, which 
should be considered in developing a non-financial corporate failure prediction model but often have 
been overlooked in prior academic studies. This study only makes use of literature, which is made 
publically available by Moody’s Investors Service, and therefore no proprietary or non-public content 
has been used. 
b) Financial statement adjustments for better alignment in assessing credit risk 
This includes making adjustments to financial statements using supporting financial notes to align 
accounting numbers to better reflect the true credit exposures of companies. Wingo and Dillow (2015) 
identified salient financial statement adjustments for the credit analysis of non-financial corporates. 
These adjustments are made to meet three objectives. Firstly, to align accounting principles to more 
faithfully capture underling economics, and secondly, to improve upon the comparability of 
accounting principles. This is more specific to comparing non-financial corporates on a consistent 
basis, where some report under IFRS, and others report under US Generally Accepted Accounting 
(US GAAP). Therefore this is not applicable to this study, which, as discussed earlier, will rely purely 
on data prepared under IFRS. Lastly, these adjustments aim to reflect estimates or assumptions, which 
are more appropriate to credit analysis. The common financial statement adjustments, which are 
applicable and will be used in this study are provided in the table on the following page: 
  
Page | 11 
Adjustment1 Rationale for making adjustment 
Defined benefit pension plans Removes artificial smoothing of pension expense, which is 
allowed under accounting standards and adds any 
underfunded or unfunded pension obligations to debt. Cash 
contributed to the pension trust is also reclassified in the 
cash flow statement. 
Capitalised interest Capitalised interest is treated as an expense and moved to 
operating activities in the cash flow statement from 
investment activities. This better reflects the credit substance 
of the transaction, which otherwise would be underplayed. 
Capitalised development costs Reflected as an operating expense and adjusted out of 
intangible assets while at the same time such investment is 
treated as an operating cash flow. This prevents any 
distortion of the financial risks when calculating financial 
ratios. 
Interest expense related to discounted 
long- term liabilities other than debt 
This reclassifies non-debt like long-term liabilities out of 
interest expense, and instead reflects these as an operating 
expense. This improves the delineation of finance related 
and operating activities in assessing the credit fundamentals 
of a business. 
Hybrid securities Adjusts for hybrid instruments or debt instruments that have 
debt and equity like characteristics, such as Payment-In-
Kind (PIK) instruments, shareholder loans and convertible 
bonds with mandatory conversion or similar equity like 
features. 
Operating leases Operating and off balance sheet finance lease arrangements 
with legal contractual obligations are recognised and added 
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Adjustment1 Rationale for making adjustment 
to debt. At the same time the operating lease/rent expense is 
re-characterised in the income statement to better reflect the 
credit implications following conclusion of such 
transactions. 
Securitizations and factoring 
arrangements adjustments 
Classifies off balance sheet securitisations and factoring 
arrangements as debt where there is not a true sale. This 
occurs when not all risks and rewards are transferred. 
1Where these adjustments have featured more prominently in this study or require further explanation 
as to how they are applied, an extended discussion has been provided. 
In assessing defined benefit obligation exposures when it comes to pension fund obligation, this 
study, in line with the Moody’s Investors Service’s framework, will make the following adjustments 
as set forth on the next page with respect to the Income Statement, Balance Sheet and Cash Flow 
Statement: 
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Balance Sheet » Add to debt any amount that is unfunded or underfunded and remove 
any intangible pension assets or liabilities. 
Income Statement » Reverse all pension costs and recognise service cost- this is the best 
estimate of the cost of operating the plan and is normally reflected as 
percentage of cost of sales, operating expenses and selling, general and 
administrative expenses. 
» Allocate an interest expense to pension related debt based upon the long 
term borrowing rate of the corporate (In this study interest expense as 
percentage of total interest bearing debt will be used where this is 
normally calculated from imputed data relating to the credit rating) 
» Exclude any interest expense above that which is recognised through the 
above calculation along with any gains/losses relating to the plan assets 
as an unusual non-recurring item. 
Cash flow Statement » Contributions to the plan beyond the calculated service costs are moved 
to the financing activities section. There is no adjustment made in 
instances where there is a deficit contribution relative to calculated 
service costs. 
It is worth noting that most pension plans in South Africa are defined contribution plans rather than 
defined benefit plans. However this is not always the case, especially where South African companies 
have expanded internationally and in doing so assumed the pension obligations of companies that 
have been acquired. 
Capitalisation of interest relating to property, plant and equipment (PP&E) is allowed in certain 
circumstances under IFRS. This commingles the operating and financing activities of a business. The 
study will align with the adjustment as set forth by Moody’s Investors Service in decoupling this 
effect, which results in a better representation of the underlying economics for non-financial 
corporates: 
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Balance Sheet » Reduce PP&E by the amount of interest capitalised during the period, 
adjusting for deferred taxes and reducing retained earnings by the after-
tax cost of the additional interest expense recognised in the income 
statement 
Income Statement » Increase interest expense by the amount of interest capitalised and 
reduce applicable tax expense 
Cash Flow Statement » No adjustment required 
Similarly, provided certain criteria are satisfied, capitalisation of development costs are mandatory 
under IFRS, which are seen to be operating costs and should be included in any credit assessment of 
operating performance. Therefore the following adjustments applied by Moody’s Investors Service 
will be applied to this study: 
Balance Sheet » Reduce intangible assets by the cumulative amount of 
development cost, which have been capitalised whilst adjusting 
deferred taxes accordingly. These adjustments are then balanced 
with a reduction of retained earnings by the same amount. 
Income Statement » Operating expenses are increased by the amount capitalised to 
development costs for the period accompanied by respective 
adjustments to depreciation and tax 
Cash Flow Statement » Capitalised development costs are moved from investment 
activities to operating activities 
Under IFRS, companies discount certain liabilities other than debt obligations to present value where 
this unwinding mechanism is treated as an interest expense. This distorts the relationship of interest 
expense and debt of companies and therein interest coverage ratios, which are an input in the credit 
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assessment of any corporate. This study, in line with the approach practiced by Moody’s Investors 
Service, will alter this effect by moving costs associated with the unwinding of these obligations to 
operating expenses. No adjustments are required in the balance sheet or cash flow statement where 
there is no impact. 
In assessing debt instruments, which have both debt and equity like characteristics, Moody’s Investors 
Service, along with this study, will apply its Hybrid Equity Credit assessment framework. A basket 
approach developed by Havlicek, Kessler and Bianchi (2015) is used and has been outlined below: 
Basket Debt Component Equity Component 
A 100% 0% 
B 75% 25% 
C 50% 50% 
D 25% 75% 
E 0% 100% 
For further detail regarding the framework for the categorisation of hybrid instruments into their 
respective baskets please refer to appendix A and B. 
Depending on the basket treatment the following adjustments will be made to the respective financial 
statements which are presented on the next page: 
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Standard adjustments for reclassification to equity for hybrid securities classified as debt 
Balance Sheet Hybrid securities reflected as debt are reclassified as equity (normally under 
preferred stock) in proportion to the equity weighting based upon the hybrid 
basket that is assigned. 
Income Statement Interest expense is reclassified to preferred dividends in proportion to the hybrid 
basket decided upon. 
Cash Flow Statement Interest expense, assuming that it has been reported under operating activities, is 
moved in proportion to its hybrid basket treatment to financing activities. 
Standard adjustments for reclassification to debt for hybrid securities classified as equity 
Balance Sheet Hybrid securities reflected as equity are reclassified as debt (normally under 
subordinated debt) in proportion to the debt weighting based upon the hybrid 
basket that is assigned. 
Income Statement Preferred dividends are reclassified to interest expense in proportion to the hybrid 
basket decided upon. 
Cash Flow Statement Preferred dividends are moved in proportion to their hybrid basket treatment to 
operating activities from financing activities. 
In assessing operating lease obligations, the framework adopted by Moody’s Investor’s Service will 
be used to better reflect this obligation through various adjustments. These include an apportionment 
of the rent expense in the Income Statement of one-third to interest expense and two-thirds to 
depreciation expense. 
At the same time, the greater of a multiple of the rent expense or present value of future lease 
obligations is applied to debt. Multiples are applied based upon the respective sector of a company’s 
operations. For more information on sector multiples that are applied please see Appendix C. 
Discount rates are derived from a company’s long term borrowing rate based on the rating category 
which is then mapped to corresponding bond yields derived from Moody’s Analytics proprietary data. 
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This study will instead use the company’s interest expense as a percentage of interest bearing debt. 
This is due to the limited universe of listed South African corporates rated by Moody’s Investors 
Service and that corresponding bond yield data from Moody’s Analytics is proprietary in nature. The 
adjustment process is summarised below: 
Balance Sheet Debt and fixed assets by an amount that equals the greater of (i) the present value 
of minimum lease commitments, capped at 10x, or (ii) a sector multiple times 
annual rent expense. 
Income Statement Rent expense reclassified to interest and depreciation expense using the following 
calculation, and operating expenses adjusted (or cost of goods sold and selling, 
general & administrative expenses) proportionally: 
» Lease Interest Expense = Lease debt times an intermediate term interest rate 
based on the issuer’s rating (capped at rent expense) 
Lease Depreciation Expense = Rent Expense less Lease Interest Expense 
Cash Flow Statement Lease depreciation expense reclassified from operating cash flow to capital 
expenditures. 
When a company sells any form of receivables forward, Moody’s Investors Service views this as 
being the same as a collateralised borrowing activity. This is commonly referred to as a securitisation 
of assets or factoring. Such activity results in a temporary inflation of a company cash balance, which 
at the same time could be applied to reducing debt, often resulting in credit ratios looking stronger, 
either way, than they actually should be. To align with Moody’s Investors Service’s analytical view 
this study will make the following adjustments to avoid this distortion from occurring which are 
provided on the next page: 
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Balance Sheet The amount sold forward is restored to its respective line item in the asset section 
of the balance sheet and the equivalent amount added to debt 
Income Statement An interest expense is added based upon the non-financial corporate’s short term 
borrowing rate and other operating expenses are increased by the same amount 
Cash Flow Statement Cash inflow from the sale of receivables is moved from operating activities to 
financing activities. Any deficiency or surpluses resulting from collection of the 
receivables going forward are added to operating activities or added to financing 
activities, respectively.   
Further considerations for Moody’s Investors Service in its assessment of non-financial corporates are 
non-reoccurring and unusual items, equity accounted income, and subsidiary investments where there 
are significant minority investors. These considerations often may result in significant variations 
between information derived from the Income Statement and the Cash Flow Statement or the ability 
to control cash flow or capital structure decisions at subsidiary investments where there are significant 
minority investors. This is often primarily due to their accrual or non-cash based nature or a limited 
ability to fully control financial decisions at subsidiary investments where there are significant 
minority investors. 
In most cases Moody’s Investors Service will adjust out non-recurring and unusual items from the 
Income Statement and Cash Flow Statement to avoid distortion of operating performance. Examples 
include assets sales, revaluation of assets, non-operating expenses such as information technology 
upgrades and fines or penalties to name a few. Any transaction that does not constitute normal 
operating activities for a business or is not expected to reasonably occur again in the future, is 
generally treated as unusual or non-reoccurring in nature. This is done so that ratios when calculated, 
offer a better indication of the on-going profitability of the business under what is deemed to be 
normal operating conditions. This gives a better indication of the long-term ability of a business to 
sustainably generate sufficient cash flow to service its debt. Broadly this is done using the following 
approach: 
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Balance Sheet Adjusted when material to any credit analysis 
Income Statement Unusual or non-recurring revenues, gains or costs, are included net of tax to a 
special line item below net profit after tax. This is then excluded from any 
financial ratios using income statement figures. 
Cash Flow Statement Unusual or non-reoccurring cash inflows or outflows are reclassified to a special 
line item under operating activities. This is then excluded from any financial 
ratios using cash flow statement figures. 
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c) Structural considerations and adjustment to better reflect credit risk 
Moody’s Investors Service moves equity accounted income to a line item after earnings before 
interest, tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). This study will do the same. The rationale 
behind this is to allow for better alignment of EBITDA with cash flow generation, while at the same 
time allowing for the income statement to still build up to the non-financial corporate’s reported net 
profit. Equity accounted profits are included under a special line item, after tax, before the corporate’s 
reported net profit. 
Equity accounted income in most cases does not reflect the underlying dividend flows and therefore 
cash received from equity accounted investments. If this were the case, this would have to be 
supported by companies having dividend policies targeting payment of all earnings for each reporting 
period. In the long-term this is unsustainable, as profits need to be reinvested in the business. 
Reinvestment of profits is essential for sustaining and maintaining the quality of current operating 
assets and growing the company’s asset profile to capitalise on growth opportunities. This is 
particularly evident in growth companies, especially those focused on the technology sector, where 
dividends are not paid out in favour of growing the business. These are often directed towards 
continued investment in research and development, as well as, plant, property and equipment to 
ensure that products and service ranges remain competitive. 
Where companies are regular dividend payers, a view can be taken to replace equity accounted 
income with dividends received during the reporting period. This is then also included in the 
calculation of EBITDA. This approach normally relies upon a dividend policy to payout a pre-
specified percentage of earnings that has been agreed by an independent board of company directors. 
In some instances historical dividend payout ratios can also be used. Notwithstanding that dividend 
policies can be changed, albeit with a degree of rigmarole, reliance purely on dividend history offers 
less certainty of dividends being paid in the future. 
Where there is a realistic expectation that dividends will be received from respective associate 
investments it makes sense to include dividend flows in the calculation of EBITDA as an indication of 
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on-going cash flow to companies. This is based on the premise that positive earnings continue to be 
reported. Equity accounting reporting with respect to the cash flow statement and balance sheet are 
still seen to be representative of the credit picture faced by the company. South African non-financial 
corporate examples, where Moody’s Investors Service has elected to include dividends received in 
place of equity accounted income, include Naspers Limited. 
On 14 May 2015 Naspers had a 34% investment in Tencent and 30% investment in Mail.ru group. 
Both companies represent significant investments for Naspers and generate material cash flow for the 
company through dividend payments. They both have operations with a core focus on internet 
services, which have required significant investment in technology and marketing to grow their 
offerings to the market. Excluding once-off special dividends, dividend payments remain low as a 
proportion of earnings, due to reinvestment of the earnings. Notwithstanding this consideration, given 
the percentage of total share capital held in Tencent and Mail.ru group, Naspers would also unlikely 
be successful in forcing a continual or even just a once-off 100% dividend declaration of earnings. 
This again supports the notion of not recognising equity accounted profits in their entirety. This is due 
to equity accounted profits often being loosely linked to the underlying cash flows that are ultimately 
received from these investments. 
Despite no formal dividend payout ratio policy, given the materiality of these investments for 
Naspers’ credit profile, a decision was taken to substitute equity accounted income for dividends 
received. This better aligned EBITDA with the cash that was received from dividends flowing from 
these investments. This also recognised alignment with the true cash flow potential of the business 
that can differ vastly from reported equity accounted profits. If reported equity accounted profits had 
been included in EBITDA this would have resulted in a significantly inflated number which was 
representative of cash flowing to Naspers that was not under its control. 
Moody’s Investors Service will closely examine subsidiary investments where there are significant 
minority holding which decrease the ability of the controlling company to fully control cash flows and 
capital structure decisions. Under IFRS, subsidiary investments controlled by the parent company are 
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consolidated across all of its three financial statements. This gives the financial picture that subsidiary 
investments are effectively one and the same in the context of the organisational structure of the 
controlling parent company. 
There are a number of shortcomings in this approach when it comes to credit analysis. Firstly, this 
ostensibly assumes the controlling parent company is part and parcel of revenue and expenses and all 
cash flow movements, which is not the case. This results from combining the income statement and 
cash flow of subsidiary investments line item by line item with that of the controlling parent company, 
excluding any intergroup transactions, which may occur. In reality the controlling parent company is 
limited in the extent to which it can look to the cash flow of its subsidiary investment as a full 
dividend declaration of earnings. Any cash flow movement beyond this is unlikely, as this would 
circumvent corporate governance considerations. This would be seen as a breach of fiduciary duties 
by the board of directors, who, at all times, have to act in the best interests of the subsidiary 
investment company. The presence of significant minority investment holders will also put up barriers 
to such an occurrence.  
At the same time, there are limitations with respect to the controlling parent company’s ability to 
influence investment and capital structure. Oversight of assets is limited to the management team 
overseeing the operations of the subsidiary investment. The liability and equity composition of the 
subsidiary investment company also falls under the discretion and determination of the same team. 
The only situations where some degree of influence could be exerted would be at the time when 
executive officers are reappointed, where they could be replaced with a more parent company friendly 
representation, notwithstanding that this would need to be done in consensus with the significant 
minority investment holders and in line with fiduciary duties. 
Therefore in forming a true credit picture the analysis should then strip out all effects of a 
combination of all subsidiary investments in the controlling parent company’s income statement and 
cash flow statement, only including equity accounted income in the income statement and dividends 
received in the cash flow statement. For the aforementioned reasons, it also does not make sense to 
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simply consolidate the balance sheet structure of the subsidiary investment into that of the controlling 
parent company, given the limited control that can be exerted in this regard. Such examples of where 
this analysis has been applied include Steinhoff International Holdings N.V. and MTN Group 
Limited. 
Steinhoff in their initial asset swap transaction concluded in 2013 with KAP Industrial Holdings 
Limited and JD Group Limited, obtained controlling equity stakes in both listed investments. Under 
IFRS these investments were consolidated. However, both investments had significant minority 
shareholders, representing around 40% of the total listed share capital, independently for both 
companies. Moody’s Investors Service was of the view that there was limited influence, which could 
be exerted over these investments’ cash flows and capital structure. At best Steinhoff could only use 
its influence to bring about a 100% declaration of earnings in any one given period. 
Moody’s Investors Service followed up analytically with this view by fully deconsolidating these two 
investments from the financial statements. They were then limited in their recognition to something 
that came close to an equity accounting approach. In line with this adjusted approach the following 
were reflected: (1) equity accounted profits/losses in the income statement, (2) investment value in the 
balance sheet recognised as the share in the listed valuation at reporting date whilst applying a 25% 
haircut in the interests of conservatism and recognising equity market volatility; and (3) dividends 
received in the cash flow statement. This aligned with the view that, at best, EBITDA could benefit 
from a 100% dividend declaration of earnings and that the value attributed to the investment, 
notwithstanding any control premium and in interest of conservatism, would below the market 
valuation at the reporting date. At the same time given the amount of subsidiary debt exposure it did 
not make sense to fully consolidate this either. 
MTN presented similar analytical challenges. A unique analytical approach was adopted given that 
the primary debt raising entity is MTN Group Limited rather than the ultimate parent and reporting 
entity, MTN Holdings Limited. This at the same time recognised MTN’s geographic diversity of 
operations. MTN’s portfolio of operations comprise a number of subsidiary investments with the 
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presence of minority investors, which are often required by the markets where it operates. The 
inclusion of minority investors often meets indigenisation or government ownership requirements 
imposed by telecom regulators. As such, and with a similar rationale to Steinhoff but extended to cash 
flow repatriation requirements, consolidation of subsidiary investments was deemed not to be 
representative of the underlying cash flow supporting the business along with financial statement 
exposures. 
MTN’s funding model is focused on raising debt at operating subsidiary levels with no recourse back 
to the South African entity on the strength of the balance sheet of these operating subsidiaries. MTN 
Group Limited in turn funded the initial investments from these markets along with continued funding 
of South African operations. 
Under this situation Moody’s Investors Service elected to focus purely on MTN Group Limited on a 
standalone company financial statement basis and then recognise dividend and management fee flows 
to the company from its various subsidiary investments. This was seen to be more representative of 
the actual ‘true’ credit profile of MTN Group Limited, not only in terms of its debt obligations but 
also the cash flow dynamics underpinning the ability to service this debt. 
This study will also introduce factors, which Moody’s Investors Service considers when incorporating 
any credit uplift or credit pressures that may not be immediately evident when looking at a company 
on a standalone basis. This includes government ownership, which Moody’s Investors Service 
captures under Government-Related Issuers methodology developed by Wilson, A., Coley, W., 
Lemay, Y., Marion, S., Benedicte, A. and Ferrer-Vidal, S. (2014) along with any accompanying 
implicit or explicit assumptions.  
In the case of non-financial corporates that are government owned, they either benefit from a 
demonstrated track record of credit support, or a sovereign that is reliant upon the corporate entity to 
meet its own strategic objectives or to contribute cash to the government. 
In the case where there is credit support being offered, the credit profile on a standalone basis does not 
fully represent the credit strength of the entity. Under such instances there is an assumption that were 
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the non-financial corporate to come under any unforeseen financial pressure, that the sovereign would 
step in with an appropriately measured cash injection or provision of guarantees to debt holders. 
These non-financial corporates are often strategic in nature for the government. The impact of their 
financial failure would have broader, often dire, economic consequences for the sovereign or country. 
Hence, the need to provide financial support, if required. Under these circumstances it is not in the 
sovereign’s interest to allow such a corporate to go into financial failure. 
This equally can work the other way. Some non-financial corporates owned by governments may be 
tasked with meeting broader social objectives. This can range from targeting capital expenditure on 
certain strategic regions or sectors to charging its customers below market rates. In turn, this can often 
result in a credit profile, which otherwise would have been assessed as being strong on a standalone 
basis, being viewed more weakly. This is due to the resulting drag effect on the corporate that follows 
from government interference in its day to day functioning. Similarly, a government, which is heavily 
reliant on dividend flows from a corporate, can also place pressure on its standalone credit profile. By 
having high dividend payout requirements this leads to a weaker overall assessment of financial 
strength. Lastly, government ownership can also result in weaker governance oversight. This occurs 
when the board is primarily comprised of government officials, which in some instance leads to less 
scrutiny than had the corporate been in private hands. This can also lead to the company being run 
under social considerations rather than for profit considerations. 
It is worth noting that given the current universe of South African corporate failures there are no 
government related non-financial corporates, which have failed. These entities are also not publically 
listed, so this would limit usage in the context of this study’s independent credit statistic variables. 
However, the above considerations are worth noting for future studies where the universe may have 
changed. South African government owned non-financial corporates, such as Eskom SOC Ltd and 
Transnet SOC Ltd, continue to be significant debt capital market issuers in South Africa. To overlook 
this consideration, would be to ignore a large portion of the debt capital market, to which these state 
owned companies continue to contribute. 
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However, this consideration aside, this analytical framework should not be overlooked in the context 
of the non-financial corporate being part of a broader organisational structure. In such instances 
financial support received and provided should always be considered in assessing the credit strength 
of an entity. 
Some corporates may benefit from guarantees being extended to their debt often from an entity with a 
stronger financial profile. This occurs whereby the extension of a guarantee by another entity provides 
credit enhancement to the entity benefiting from the guarantee. This can be both upstream in nature, 
commonly from operating subsidiaries, and downstream in nature, from parent entities or 
shareholders. These are also important considerations in the earlier discussion of investment 
subsidiaries with significant minority shareholders. It is worth noting that it is rare but not uncommon 
for a parent to guarantee debt of non-wholly owned subsidiaries. Similarly, the same applies to 
investment subsidiary with significant minority shareholders guaranteeing the debt of a parent. In both 
situations it makes sense then not to decouple the credit profiles of these entities given their 
interlinkage. 
Therefore the financial risks borne by investment subsidiaries with significant minority shareholders 
should be reflected in the credit assessment of the parent, which has extended the guarantees. This is a 
simple assessment as it then makes sense to align with the IFRS consolidated approach. Similarly, risk 
exposures of investment subsidiaries with significant minority shareholders extending upstream 
guarantees to a parent, should similarly reflect the financial risks of the parent. This occurs often 
when the parent is a shell entity with investments in cash generating operating subsidiaries and 
associates. This is a slightly more complex analytical setup and often involves adding parent 
guaranteed debt to the debt of the operating subsidiaries. This however also considers the likelihood 
of the guarantee being called upon as well as the relative strength and exposure of each operating 
subsidiaries, providing debt guarantees. 
Examples of downstream guarantee arrangements include Steinhoff International Holdings N.V. prior 
guarantee of legacy debt, which KAP Industrial Holdings Limited assumed as part of an asset swap 
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transaction recognised by Moody’s Investors Service (2011). An example of an upstream guarantee 
would include Sibanye Gold Limited’s prior guarantee of Gold Fields Limited’s US$1 billion senior 
unsecured bond the impact of which was dimensioned by Rowlings (2015). The guarantees resulted 
from the unbundling of Sibanye Gold from Gold Fields, which was then separately listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Sibanye Gold has previously formed part of the restricted group 
guaranteeing Gold Fields’ debt and therefore had to continue to do so under the terms of the bond 
indenture. Sibanye Gold was subsequently removed as a guarantor in March 2015 as part of a consent 
and solicitation offer. 
This study in developing a multiple discriminant analysis model will also attempt to control for these 
unique credit considerations, which can often lead to an improvement in corporate failure prediction 
power offered by financial ratios being tied to the true credit profile of a corporate when these 
qualitative considerations are reflected. 
d) Incorporation of forward-looking expectations in assessing robustness of credit strength 
Moody’s Investors Service benefits from the provision of company forecasts on a confidential non-
public basis which provides analysts with the ability to assess the evolution of a company’s credit 
profile factoring their expected financial performance and business plans. These are often sensitised, 
depending on the degree of conservatism that management builds into their financial forecasting. A 
conservative approach to financial forecasts ensures the robustness of ratings through business cycles. 
At the same time this also builds-in cushioning for performance misses and overshooting on costs or 
capital expenditures against expectation. This forward-looking information is critical in determining 
any deterioration in a company’s financial strength in advance of its occurrence. 
Although such information will not be made available for this study, given Moody’s Investors Service 
confidentiality practices, a work-around approach will be explored. Most companies now provide 
regular full year trading guidance, which is updated at each financial reporting date and includes 
financial year-end expectations for key metrics applicable to the business. For example, miners will 
often provide guidance on revenue, costs and capital expenditure based upon their view of production, 
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prevailing commodity prices, currency exchange rates and reserves which rely upon technical reports 
prepared by independent mining consulting firms. This information, when available, will be used as a 
proxy to generate forward-looking expectations to be used as additional data points for variables 
included in the multiple discriminant model to determine if this improves accuracy. 
These key indicators, when combined, will ultimately determine free cash flow generation, which is 
calculated using cash flow from operations minus dividends and capital expenditure. Negative free 
cash flow will have to be funded through depletion of cash balances, raising of debt through bond 
issuance or drawing on bank facilities or, if shareholders agree, an issuance of equity. Similarly, these 
will also determine the evolution of banking covenant levels, which if imposed and breached, will 
result in banking facility lines being cancelled, which will put a company under liquidity pressure. 
The strength of a company’s liquidity position often provides one of the best early warning signs of 
failure. Without sufficient cash to fund its operations, a company cannot survive. Using guidance, 
when made available, an additional overlay for the multiple discriminant model will be considered 
which factors expected liquidity sources versus uses over the next twelve months. Most management 
commentary now includes a specific discussion of the company’s liquidity position allowing for this 
analysis to be undertaken as part of the study. 
By including forwarding looking equity prices, expectations of variable evolution, and a twelve-
month view on liquidity, this model specification is expected to improve the accuracy in predicting 
corporate failure. Most prior South African corporate failure models developed using multiple 
discriminant analysis have relied upon historical financial statement data, which provides limited 
information on the future financial strength of a company. 
e) Use of credit metrics with strong explanatory power and adaptability across sectors 
Moody’s Investors Service’s non-financial corporate rating methodologies, spanning sixty-three 
unique non-financial corporate sectors, will be used to develop an initial sample of credit metrics. 
Credit metrics occurring most frequently will be included in the initial sample of variables that will be 
used in the multiple discriminant analysis model. This will ensure the inclusion of variables, which 
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are more broad-based in nature and capture movements in the credit strength of companies regardless 
of the nature or sector of their operations. 
Qualitative inputs will also be considered for inclusion in the initial sample of variables. Factors such 
as quality of management, financial policy and competitive strength are often determinants for the 
range of responses available to companies in protecting their credit profiles when adverse or 
challenging operating or financial conditions present themselves. These are often subjective in nature 
and derived through forming a consensus view amongst rating analysts. However, they provide 
valuable insights into behavioural characteristics often glossed over in corporate failure analysis, 
which only focuses on quantitative considerations. Moody’s Investors Service under such instances 
normally makes use of a pre-agreed grid, which is used as a guide in assigning a risk score to various 
qualitative factors. A similar approach will be used in this study. 
At the same time, often the sector in which a company operates will determine their financial risk 
profile. Companies that operate in more cyclical sectors or sectors that are transitory in nature, such as 
technology companies, are subject to a greater degree of business risk. This study will also attempt to 
include a qualitative risk input, based upon the company’s business profile, to control for business risk 
Together these qualitative inputs often offer alternative, but equally import, inputs into assessing 
corporate failure when combined with quantitative considerations.  
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Chapter 3 | Literature on corporate failure prediction 
The chapter will discuss the various definitions and interpretations of corporate failure that have been 
applied to studies undertaken in South Africa and internationally. At the same time some of the data 
issues experienced by researchers in the field of corporate failure prediction will be highlighted. 
The focus will then shift to a summary of accounting-based corporate failure prediction research 
undertaken in the United States, which continues to be a leader in this field. This will be followed by 
studies undertaken outside of the United States split into developed and developing markets. 
In addition, market-based models for corporate failure prediction will be surveyed and the theory 
underlying their development explained. Their application and accuracy will then be compared to that 
of accounting-based models. 
Having considered international studies, a full discussion will follow on South African research to 
date carried out on market-based models and accounting-based models used in corporate failure 
prediction. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion on multiple discriminant analysis and financial research 
applications. 
a) Definition of corporate failure 
Varying definitions of corporate failure have been applied to studies over time. Beaver (1966) defined 
a group of failed companies as those that defaulted on a loan obligation or missed preferred dividend 
payments in addition to any form of bankruptcy or insolvency problems. Altman (1968) decided to 
limit his bankrupt group in his sample of companies to manufacturers that filed a bankruptcy petition 
under the United States’ Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act. Deakin (1972) opted for a 
categorisation as companies which had experienced bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidation. Later 
Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) broadened Altman’s original definition of corporate failure 
to include bond defaults and non-payment of dividends. 
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Taffler and Tisshaw (1977), in a study of English companies, defined failure as firms entering 
receivership, voluntary liquidation imposed by creditors, compulsory winding up order by a court of 
law or steps taken by government to avoid financial collapse. In a study of Brazilian companies, 
Altman, Baidya and Ribeiro-Dias (1979) defined corporate failure as filing for liquidation, 
undertaking legal reorganisations and indicating ‘out of court manifestations of serious problems’. Ta 
and Seah (1981) in their study identified failed firms as those that were either in receivership, 
voluntary liquidation or in a court winding up procedure. In an Australian context, Castagna and 
Matolcsy (1982) defined corporate failure as the occurrence of an appointment of a liquidator or 
receiver. 
Bhatia (1988) aligned the definition of corporate failure with that which is stipulated by the Industrial 
Development Bank of India in their classification criteria of ‘sick’ firms. These were limited to firms 
that had two years of cash losses or a had experienced continual erosion of net worth of around 50% 
or defaulted on debt servicing four times in succession. These also included firms that had made 
irregular use of credit lines on a persistent basis or were one to two years of tax payments in arrears. 
In an international context Altman and Narayanan (1997) broadly recognised corporate failure as 
constituting either a bankruptcy filing, bond default, bank loan default, delisting or, government 
intervention via special financing to avoid failure or liquidation. This was based upon their review of 
corporate failure prediction model studies across a number of countries. 
An observation made by Altman and Narayanan (1997) relates to the importance of the sample’s cut-
off date identified for corporate failure events occurring. This gained prominence when it came to 
Type II errors (incorrectly classifying a non-failed firm as being financially distressed), where some 
of these firms did fail at a later time. This was attributed to healthy firm’s data in essence being 
censored because all that could be said was that the firm was healthy at the time the data was 
collected. 
In a South African context Court, Radloff and van der Walt (1999) described corporate failure as 
those companies that were forced to delist from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) due to poor 
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financial performance leading to liquidation. Bruwer and Hamman (2006), interpreted failure as a 
company that “will not survive in its existing structure, and therefore encompasses a delisting or a 
major structural change”. Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and Hamman (2009) applied the same definition of 
corporate failure in their study. 
With the introduction of the new South African Companies Act financially distressed companies were 
defined in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 by the Parliament of the Republic of South 
Africa (2008)and the Companies Amendment Act No. 3 of 2011 Section 128 by Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa. (2011). These were defined as companies, which were expected to become 
insolvent within six months, or being reasonably unlikely to pay all of their debts as they became due 
and payable within the immediately ensuing six months. At the same time companies under the act in 
financial distress are required to either (1) enter into business rescue proceedings; (2) liquidate; or (3) 
compromise with creditors. If the company elects to proceed with the first option it is placed under 
temporary supervision of the court. This provides for relief against its creditors until such time that a 
business rescue plan has been devised. 
This in many respects is similar to the United States’ Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code enacted by the 
U.S. House of Representatives (1978) commonly referred to as a "reorganisation" bankruptcy. Under 
the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code corporates are also given protection from creditors. Proceedings are 
similarly overseen by the courts, where a reorganisation plan has to be presented and accepted. 
Through alignment of the processes for managing corporate failure between South Africa and the 
United States, there is rationale that United States research should be applicable and comparable in 
this respect. However, it is worth noting that there are nuances, which cannot be ignored, most notable 
of which is the fundamental difference in legal systems. South Africa follows a common law 
approach to its bankruptcy proceeding whereas the United States adheres to civil law. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 3 | d) as part of the overview of international studies on corporate failure 
prediction. 
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In a South African practical setting Dywer and Wang (2010) in their creation of Moody’s Analytics 
RiskCalc v3.2, South Africa did not define corporate failure but rather defined default. The meaning 
of default was extended to also include missed payments and other credit events. There was also 
recognition that there is debate arising from the process of assigning an appropriate definition of 
default, which has arisen for the process of developing the Basel Capital Accord. In this instance 
RiskCalc chose to conform to the criteria for default, which is prevalent in most advanced economies 
in the world. This was characterised as payments that are 90 days past due, bankruptcy or liquidation, 
and placement on an internal non-accrual list. This was further extended to any write-downs resulting 
from unlikely payment, charged-off loans, facilities which had been called, special provisions or 
restructured debt. 
In another related Moody’s Analytics study Sun, Munves and Hamilton (2012) in their explanation of 
the Expected Default Frequency (EDF™) model defined default as including the failure to make 
scheduled principal or interest payments, bankruptcy, administration, receivership, or their legal 
equivalent. This also encompassed any form of distressed debt restructuring and/or government 
bailouts enacted to prevent a credit event such as a default on debt obligations. 
Emery (2015) in Moody’s Investors Service’s Rating Symbols and Definitions constitutes debt default 
as occurrence of any one of four events. The first being missed or delayed payment of a legally 
contracted interest or principal payment as defined in credit agreements or a bond indenture, but not 
including missed payments which occurs within a contractually allowed grace period. The second 
being bankruptcy filing or legal insolvency by a debt obligor meaning future contractually-obligated 
debt service payments will either be delayed or missed. The third being distressed exchange whereby 
(1) the obligor offers creditors a new or restructured debt instrument, securities package or cash or 
assets that would amount to a diminished financial obligation relative to the original obligation; and 
(2) the exchange allows the obligor to avoid bankruptcy or a default on payments in future. The fourth 
being change in payment terms of credit agreement or bond indenture imposed by a sovereign 
resulting in a diminished financial obligation e.g. forced currency re-denomination (imposed by a 
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debtor, themselves or their sovereign or any forced change of the original promise such as indexation 
or maturity). 
This definition excluded technical defaults arising from maximum leverage or minimum debt 
coverage covenants with lenders being violated, unless the obligor fails to remedy the violation or 
honour any resulting acceleration in payment of debt. This would also exclude payments owed on 
debt obligations which are missed purely due to a technical or administrative error and are (1) not 
related to the obligor’s ability or willingness to make debt repayments; and (2) are remedied in a very 
short-order (typically one to two business days). Lastly based on select facts and circumstances, 
missed payments on financial contracts or claims could also be excluded if their validity is legally 
disputed. 
b) Data issues 
As Altman and Narayanan (1997) identified, good data was often hard to come by in their survey of 
corporate failure prediction model studies undertaken across the world. Data on failed firms was often 
difficult to collect in smaller economies of some developed countries and in the case of most 
developing countries. 
The sample of South African corporate failures faces similar challenges where many failures are 
limited to small private companies. This means that financial data is not easily accessible and not 
subject to the same degree of rigour in its preparation and scrutiny. Most of these companies are not 
regulated and their financial statements are not subject to the same degree of detailed audit 
examination as listed companies, notwithstanding that they are often not audited by top tier 
accounting firms. 
Fosu (2013) highlighted that given the conservative nature of financial management in the South 
African corporate arena, many companies are predominantly equity financed. This preference to fund 
companies through equity instead of debt lowers the likelihood of a company finding itself in a 
situation of financial distress. As result, this also leads to a lack of large-scale defaults in the South 
African corporate sector. 
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Altman and Narayanan (1997) observed that the size of the sample used and the sources of data are 
critical in assessing the statistical reliance which can be placed upon results. This is a further 
limitation when it comes to replication or extension studies based upon prior foundation studies. This 
also presents challenges when it comes to the randomness and size requirements for any statistical 
analysis along with the confidence of the conclusions that are reached. 
c) Research on accounting-based models for corporate failure prediction in the United States 
The first prominent academic attempt to develop a corporate failure prediction model can be 
attributed to accounting researcher, Beaver (1967). This model used a univariate analysis of financial 
ratios matching failed and non-failed companies which demonstrated the ability to predict corporate 
failure up to five years in advance of failure occurring. This set the stage for further multivariate 
approaches.  
Altman’s (1968) application of multiple discriminant analysis followed using a similar methodology 
to that of Beaver’s (1967) univariate approach. The expectation was that the introduction of a 
multivariate framework would result in greater statistical significance than the technique of sequential 
comparisons. 
Altman’s (1968) model was referred to as the Z-Score model which correctly predicted 94 per cent of 
the initial sample as having failed. Out of sample testing had an even higher 96 per cent classification, 
where the upward bias was supported by the initial sample test upward bias normally present not 
having manifested in the investigation and/or the initial model not being optimised. The initial sample 
comprised sixty-six US manufacturing corporations with two a priori groupings of thirty-three failed 
and thirty-three non-failed companies. Non-failed companies were paired with failed companies and 
chosen on a stratified random basis. This recognised that this group was not completely homogenous 
due to industry and size differences. Firms were stratified according to industry and their size, with 
total assets size restricted to US$1-US$25 million. Similarly small firms were excluded (under US$1 
million in total assets) as were large asset-size firms exceeding $25 million to match that of the 
sample of failed firms. 
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Deakin (1972) used the same fourteen variables that Beaver analysed but instead applied a 
multivariate discriminant model. Profitability, liquidity and solvency ratios were the most significant 
indicators of corporate failure. A further evolution of the Z-Score model by Altman, Haldeman and 
Narayanan (1977), brought about the introduction of the ZETA® model. This introduced several 
enhancements to the original approach most notable of which was the incorporation of developments 
around business failure and refinements in the utilisation of discriminant statistical techniques. In 
addition, the ZETA® model also settled on the use of seven ratios whereas the Z-Score model relied 
upon five ratios. 
The ZETA® model recognised the change in financial profile and size of business failures. Most prior 
studies models had used relatively small firms in their samples, which were not representative of the 
population to which they would be applied. Furthermore, these studies also tended to concentrate on 
manufacturers or specific industries. With appropriate analytical adjustments to make company 
financial data comparable across different industries this would allow for better alignment to that of 
the population. 
The ZETA® model introduced various adjustments to inputs in the financials in line with a similar 
approach adopted by credit rating agencies to better reflect the credit fundamentals of each company. 
These included (1) the capitalisation of leases; (2) the inclusion of reserves in equity; (3) minority 
interests and other liabilities on the balance sheet netted off against other assets; and (4) the 
consolidation of captive finance companies and other non-consolidated subsidiaries. The ZETA® 
model enhanced the accuracy of predicting corporate failure to 96.2% versus the Z-Score model’s 
93.9%. It is worth noting that the incremental benefit of the ZETA® model versus the Z and Z’’ 
models is not significant, which add credibility to the Z and Z’’ models being used in the study. 
Altman (1993) then developed the Z’’ model. This model substituted book value of equity for market 
value first to derive what was referred to as the Z’ model, which in turn then allowed the model to 
also be used for private companies. This resulted in a slightly lower accuracy for predicting 
bankruptcy of 91% versus the original model’s 94%. The Z’’ model went on to remove the asset 
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turnover ratio (sales/total assets) from the Z’ model to allow for more wide spread applicability to 
corporates across industries by removing this manufacturing focused ratio. A summary table of the 
ratios used in each of Altman’s models is provided below: 
 Z Score Model ZETA® Model (proprietary hence no weightings) 


























𝑋4 𝑀𝑉2  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑉3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠
 











𝑋6   𝐵𝑉3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝐵𝑉3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)
 
N/A 
𝑋7   𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 N/A 
 Z’ Model Z’’ Model 






















𝑋4 𝐵𝑉3  𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝐵𝑉3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠
 







0.998   
1Earnings Before Interest and Tax; 2Market Value; 3Book Value; 4Standard Error; ⁵Sample Standard 
Deviation; where 𝑍 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝑋𝑖 with Z>0 being classified as non-failed and Z<0 as failed 
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d) Research on accounting-based models for corporate failure prediction outside of the United 
States 
The studies included in this review are limited to markets that share broad similarities to the South 
African corporate sector. Markets with similar corporate legal frameworks and accounting standards 
have been included in this study given that their findings are seen to be more applicable and 
transferable to South African corporate failure prediction. This is the case in many respects for other 
former English colonies such as Australia, Canada, India and Singapore, which have their corporate 
legal foundations originating from English common law. Although South Africa’s legal system 
comprises aspects of both English common law and Roman Dutch civil law, as a general rule 
company law follows that of the English legal system. Most major lending agreements and therefore 
liquidation proceedings generally fall under English common law. 
The applicable legal framework can have significant bearing on both the definition and declaration of 
corporate failure. The University of California at Berkeley, School of Law (2010) identifies the main 
theoretical differences between common law and civil law as follows: common law is generally 
uncodified (not rule based), where there is reliance rather on precedent, and civil law as codified (rule 
based), where there is a reliance rather on prescribed framework for dealing with all legal matters. 
Roman Dutch civil law has limited bearing on contractual law in South Africa with lending 
agreements normally conforming to an English commercial legal agreement template. Brazil and 
Mexico have legal systems that align with civil law which has its origins in Roman law. 
Although all of these markets now conform to IFRS, many seminal studies were undertaken in these 
markets prior to the introduction of IFRS. Each market mostly had their own set of financial reporting 
standards and framework which they applied. 
Today, the United States is the only notable exception for following a different set of accounting 
standards to IFRS, namely US GAAP. Although it is worth mentioning that there continues to be an 
increasing convergence between these two sets of accounting standards. 
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PwC (2014) does however point out that although IFRS is required in the case of listed Canadian 
firms for their interim and annual financial statements; however for companies with United States 
listings US GAAP continues to be acceptable. 
Altman and Narayanan (1997) outline the main characteristics observable for developed country 
models. Most notable is that failure prediction studies have a long history and that corporate failure 
data is more readily available. Furthermore failure was easier to identify because of the existence of 
clearly defined bankruptcy laws and banking infrastructure. Government intervention is also 
somewhat less but not non-existent. Economies were viewed as being subject to a greater degree of 
privatisation and less state interference. However, regulatory oversight for companies is more 
sophisticated, onerous and transparent, therefore making the circumstances under which corporate 
failure could occur more predictable. 
The above factors are notably absent from developing country models. Similarly, developing 
countries have not yet evolved to the same degree of economic liberalisation. Governments still 
provide protection against failure and are seen to be more interventionist in their approach. This does 
not mean that in the case of developed economies this behaviour is completely absent, only a lot rarer 
in its occurrence. 
i) Studies undertaken in developed markets 
Australia | Common law legal system | IFRS compliant 
Castagna and Matolcsy (1982) using twenty-one failed industrial companies (which would have been 
larger with the inclusion of mining companies) from 1963 to 1977 developed a corporate failure 
model using discriminant analysis. Prior studies by Castagna and Matolcsy (1978 and 1979) had 
reduced the number of variables used to ten, which were then used in linear and quadratic 
classification models. Based on Lachenbruch’s (1967) validation tests the linear model was shown to 
be best at classifying failed firms. However, the same could not be said for classifying non-failed 
firms. Similarly, a stepwise procedure showed the ten-variable model was better than a proposed five-
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variable model. Actual classification rates were not stated nor were out of sample tests undertaken 
given size limitations. 
Izan (1984) and Altman and Izan (1983) using a larger sample of fifty failed firms developed a model 
along the lines of Alman’s (1968) initial model. Type I errors or incorrectly classifying a failed 
company as healthy and Type II errors or incorrectly classifying a non-failed firm as being financially 
distressed were also discussed. Type I accuracy prior to default was 94.1% for one year, 75% for two 
years and 63.5% for three years. Type II accuracy was 89.6% for one year, 89.6% for two years and 
85.4% for three years. The final model uses the following variables from ten initial candidate 
variables: 
𝑍𝐴 = 0.53(𝑋1) − 0.44(𝑋2) − 0.25(𝑋3) + 0.24(𝑋4) + 0.23(𝑋5) 
Where: 
𝑍𝐴 = 𝐴𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
𝑋1 =



















When applied to a small hold out sample comprising ten firms the following Type I results were 
observed: 100% for one year, 70% for two years and 40% for three years. In absence of reporting of 
Type II accuracy the overall accuracy of the model cannot be ascertained. However, it was concluded 
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that the predictive power was sufficiently strong to be applied to a cross-section of firms and 
industries. 
Canada | Common law legal system | IFRS compliant, US listed firms can report under US GAAP 
Knight (1979), as with many other Canadian studies faced the challenge of a predominantly small 
business population. This inherently limits the ability to assimilate a statistically sufficient number of 
corporate failures and publically available data on those firms. As part of the study a large number of 
small business failures were analysed, complemented by interviews with key persons involved. The 
focus of the research was to establish why small businesses fail and in doing so suggest an approach 
as to how corporate failure could be prevented. This was against the backdrop of a rising number of 
failed small businesses in Canada. 
A discriminant analysis model was developed comprising seventy-two failed small firms with average 
annual sales and assets of about US$100,000. Results from the five variable models showed low 
classification rates. From the original leaning sample of thirty-six failed and thirty-six non-failed 
firms only 64% were correctly classified. Similarly from the remaining test sample of firms only 54% 
were correctly classified. It was concluded that the discriminant analysis was not successful. This was 
most likely explained by the industry effects, where inclusion of multiple industries often contributes 
to estimation problems. 
Altman and Lavallee (1981) examined fifty-four publically traded firms split equally between failed 
and non-failed firms. A ten year period spanning 1970 to 1979 was used with an average tangible 
asset size for failed firms of US$12.6 million one reporting date prior to failure leading to an average 
lag of sixteen months. The sample included both manufacturers and retail-wholesalers; however 
sufficient financial information was not available to adjust for operating leases. Non-failed firms were 
stratified based upon industry, size and data period with average assets of US$15.6 million. Asset 
scale was similar to that of Altman’s earlier United States studies for the 1950s and 1960s. 
  
Page | 42 
Classification rates were higher when combining manufacturing and retailing firms but a single model 
for both sectors was not advocated. Manufacturers’ classification was also adversely impacted when 
the model contained industry sensitive variables. The following model resulted based on a forward 
stepwise procedure: 
𝑍𝑐 = −1.626 + 0.234(𝑋1) − 0.531(𝑋2) + 1.002(𝑋3) + 0.972(𝑋4) + 0.612(𝑋5) 
Where: 


















𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
 
The model presented an overall classification rate of 83.3%. Applying Lachenbruch’s (1967) test 
replications on prior years, data prior year accuracies were 73% for Year 2, 53% for Year 3 and 30% 
for year 4. The model was deemed to be accurate at predicating failure up to two financial reporting 
periods in advance. There were parallels with Altman’s (1968) model with regards to data quality and 
diversity of industries represented in the sample. 
Simultaneously various simulations on prior probabilities of group membership and costs of error 
were undertaken. Type I errors could be eliminated whereas Type II errors were unacceptably high 
and vice versa when Type II errors were eliminated. At the same time, the modelled results were 
compared to Joy and Tollefson’s (1975) naïve classification strategy. This approach showed that the 
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model was more efficient with lower expected costs than the naïve approach of assigning all 
observations to a non-bankrupt category. It was also noted that most failed firms were retailers and 
most non-failed firms were manufacturers. The following variable misclassified failed retailers with 
high sales turnover and misclassified manufacturers with low sales turnover: 
𝑋5 =
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
 
However, omitting this from the model did not improve classification rates, rather, it made them 
worse. Further areas for improvement were identified as introducing operating lease adjustments, and 
in time construction of a model using a larger sample of failed firms, assuming their greater frequency 
of occurrence. 
England | Common law legal system | IFRS compliant 
Taffler (1976) approached corporate failure primarily from a security analysis perspective. This was 
adapted through further studies by Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) and Taffler and Houston (1980). 
Primarily its applications were identified for auditors in assessing the going concern assumption for 
financial reporting. In addition it also could be used in assisting liquidators and receivers assuming 
judicial responsibility for failed firms. 
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Taffler and Tisshaw (1977) used linear discriminant analysis on a sample of forty-six failed and forty-
six financially sound non-listed manufacturing companies from 1969 to 1975. These were paired by 
size and industry. From an initial sample of eighty different ratios, only four measure were selected 













» 𝑁𝑜 − 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 
No-credit interval is the duration which the company can continue to fund its operations without 
support of short-term financing. This was calculated as follows: 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠−𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
, where 
operating costs excluded depreciation. This was seen to have similar characteristics to the acid test 
ratio. 
The model yielded a correct classification rate of 97% versus Taffler’s (1976) 96%, one year prior to 
failure. This differed significantly to the assessment of the going concern assumption by auditors of 
22%. It was also recognised that 15% to 20% of firms that displayed a profile which was similar to 
failed companies, did in fact fail. 
Taffler (1976) established accuracies of 70%, 61% and 35% for two years, three years and four years 
prior to failure, respectively. Although the steep decline in accuracy as the sample date moved further 
away from default, a one-year disinvestment horizon was deemed to be adequately sufficient. 
Additional observations made were that many failed firms were kept afloat as a result of government 
intervention. The value attached to financial reports by accountants was low but overlooked the 
enhanced information content through a combination of various parts of this financial information. A 
multivariate approach to financial analysis was recommended. 
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Taffler (1982) presented a revised failure discriminant model using principal component analysis 
concentrating on a smaller sample of twenty-three failed companies from 1968 to 1973 and forty-five 
non-failed firms. From 150 variables, five were selected: 
» 















» 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
No weights were provided for the variables above. Prior probability and cost-of-error estimates were 
included. It was concluded that the model was best applied in an operational context as a means of 
short listing firms which might experience financial distress. Furthermore, actions or behaviour by 
creditors and financial institutions were key determinants thereafter of actual bankruptcy. 
Marais (1979) as part of a study undertaken by the Bank of England tested several previously 
published United States and United Kingdom models using univariate and multivariate approaches, 














𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
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Although the 1
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 appears to be unusual this was supposed to introduce a scaling 
consideration for the discriminant function to consider, where the inverse of gross total assets was 
aimed at reducing the size of figures included. 
Discussion around the accuracy of classification was limited to the results being deemed satisfactory. 
Firm scores below a certain cut-off point were categorised as indicating future problems, and a Z 
score was identified to be a sophisticated screening device. 
Earl and Marais (1982) expanded upon this analysis. Classification results of 93%, 87% and 84% 
three years prior to failure were reported. Cash flow data was seen to improve upon accuracy with 
cash flow to current liabilities being the most successful discriminator. 
Ireland | Common law legal system | IFRS compliant 
Cahill (1981) analysed eleven listed failed firms from 1970 to 1980 with three primary issues 
explored. Firstly, variables showing significant deterioration in advance of failure were identified. 
Secondly, adverse opinions from auditor reports on the going concern assumption were considered 
along with other unique considerations which could be attributed to failure. 
Variables were identified that aligned with the first point deviating from their aggregate one year prior 
to failure. However, this was not as prominent two years prior to failure. 
Only one audit report expressed uncertainty surrounding going concern, with five less serious 
qualifications present in other failed-firm reports. This was mainly attributed to auditor reluctance to 
raise going concern issues and Irish accounting conventions of the time. It was felt that variable 
deterioration should have been a red flag for auditors where it was difficult to envisage that was 
overlooked. 
Debt financed acquisitions and expansion along with mergers were seen to be key ingredients for 
corporate failure. Several failed firms continued to pay dividends one year prior to their failure, with 
one firm paying unsecured creditors after failure. 
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Singapore | Common law legal system | Singapore Financial Reporting Standards aligned with IFRS 
Ta and Seah (1981) considered twenty-four financial ratios for use in the discriminant analysis. 
Twenty-two failed firms where identified from 1975 to 1983. These were then matched with twenty-
one non failed-firms, with only commercial and industrial firms considered. Mean asset size of the 















𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
 
The model achieved the following results: 















One year 77.3% 93.5% 86.8% 75% 90.5% 86.2% 
Two years    62.5% 85.7% 79.3% 
 
ii) Studies undertaken in developing markets 
Brazil | Civil law legal system | IFRS compliant 
Altman, Baidya and Ribeiro-Dias (1979) used twenty-three failed firms from January 1975 to June 
1977, which spanned textiles, furniture, pulp and paper, retail stores, plastics, metallurgy and other 
sectors. These were included with thirty-five non-failed firms. Average asset size ranged between 
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US$25-30 million. Wherever possible privately owned Brazilian firms were used to avoid skewness 
arising from the inclusion of multinationals and government owned firms. 
Altman’s (1968) original model was used with the modification of 𝑋2 and 𝑋4 variables. For 𝑋2 the 
following was calculated given that there was no Brazilian equivalent of retained earnings in their 
financial reporting at the time: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Given that most Brazilian firms are privately held, often with a majority ownership held by a single 
family, market value of ownership could not be calculated. For 𝑋4 book value of equity was used in 
place of market value of equity. 
Two models were derived. The first model excluded 𝑋1 given that the stepwise program showed that 
it did not have any explanatory power. The second model also excluded 𝑋2. This was excluded 
because, as previously indicated, it was difficult to calculate given the disclosure practices of 
Brazilian financial reporting and also that it was seen to be similar to 𝑋4. The models were specified 
as follows: 
𝑍1 = 1.44 + 4.03(𝑋2) + 2.25(𝑋3) + 0.14(𝑋4) + 0.42(𝑋5) 
𝑍2 = 1.84 − 0.51(𝑋1) + 6.23(𝑋3) + 0.71(𝑋4) + 0.56(𝑋5) 
The reader is referred to the section c) Research on accounting-based models for corporate failure 
prediction in the United States in this section for a detailed account of Altman’s (1968) model along 
with variable definitions. 
Both models had a critical cut-off score of zero i.e. a score above zero indicated non-failure, a score 
below, failure. 
Results of both models were mostly identical for one-year prediction. Type I errors were 13% and 
Type II errors were 11.4%. Overall classification accuracy was 88% with the first model performing 
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slightly better two and three years out. Further tests were undertaken on a hold out sample, which 
showed high levels of accuracy. Accuracy also remained unchanged after applying the Lachenbruch 
(1967) tests. Additional advance accuracy tests showed classification rates of 84.2% for two years and 
77.8% for three years. Extension of the model discussion and its application included its ability to 
offer limited early assistance to avoid at all costs significant government assistance further down the 
line. 
India | Common law legal system | IFRS compliant 
Bhatia (1988) examined a sample of eighteen failed and eighteen non-failed firms in India. These 
were matched according to the type of product and gross fixed assets, comprising firms for the 
cement, electrical, engineering, glass, paper and steel industries. The model employed the following 
variables: 
» 


























𝑥 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 
Type I accuracy was 87.1% and Type II accuracy was 86.6%. An out of sample test on twenty-eight 
failed and twenty non-failed firms validated the model’s accuracy and applicability. 
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Mexico| Civil law legal system | IFRS compliant 
With the growing prevalence of emerging market corporate bonds, Altman (1995) introduced an 
emerging market bond scoring system which relied upon the Z’’ score model. The resulting Z’’ score 
output was used with certain adjustments made to align the corporate failure prediction outcome with 
those characteristics unique to emerging markets. Altman (2005) later examined the applicability of 
the model in the context of its application to Mexican corporates as well as allowing for outcomes to 
be compared to that of credit ratings provided by the big three rating agencies, Fitch Ratings, 
Moody’s Investors Service and Standard and Poor’s. The emerging market bond scoring system 
adhered to the following 6- step process in its application: 
1) Calculated an EM Z’’ Score and a bond equivalent rating compared to the United States bond 
market 
2) Adjusted the Bond Equivalent Rating for foreign currency revaluation vulnerability 
» High vulnerability= -1 rating class (3 notches) 
» Neutral vulnerability= -1 notch 
» Low vulnerability= no change 
3) Adjusted the Bond Equivalent Rating for industry specific risk particular to the emerging 
market not prevalent in the same industry in the United States  
» ±-1 or 2 notches 
4) Adjusted the Bond Equivalent Rating for competitive positioning 
» Dominant company in the industry= +1 notch 
» Average company in industry= no change 
» Poor competitive position= -1 notch 
5) Assessed the impact of special collateral and guarantees on the Bond Equivalent Rating 
» Upgrade particular debt issue if there are legal guarantees extended by a higher credit 
quality guarantor or the existence of special collateral 
6) Assessed the corporate yield spread between similar bonds in the United States versus the 
United States sovereign. This was then compared to the yield spreads of similar bonds issued 
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by the United States sovereign versus the emerging market sovereign. Both resulting 
differences, if any, were then added. 
» If the outcome on the Z’’ model is BBB and similar quality bonds in the United 
States are trading at 1% over United States treasuries (assumed yield of 4.5%) and 
comparable duration of the emerging market sovereign treasuries are trading 2% over 
United States treasuries, then the required yield would be 7.5% or 1%+4.5%+2% 
» If the actual yield is greater than the calculated yield of 7.5% then the bond issue 
would be considered attractively valued by the market 
In its application to Mexican corporates both in a pre and post Mexican peso crisis period, the model 
showed encouraging results. The outcomes often aligned with the credit rating assigned and in some 
cases provided the credit rating outcome in advance of a credit rating agency taking a rating action 
based on a recent development. This therefore gave the EM Z’’ Score model the added advantage of 
being both forward-looking and offering the ability to profit from this forward-looking view in the 
case of fixed income traders and investment managers. Profits could be made or value protected by 
taking a beneficial position in advance of a rating agency action. This could be done either 
shorting/selling in the case of an anticipated credit rating downgrade or going long/buying the bond 
issue in the case of an anticipated credit rating upgrade. 
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e) Market-based models for corporate failure prediction for international markets 
The first and most widely recognised market based model, the Expected Default Frequency (EDF™), 
model was introduced by KMV Corporation, which was acquired by Moody’s Corporation in 2002. 
The EDF™ model has been an industry leading Probability of Default (PD) model since it was 
introduced in the early 1990s. The EDF model determines the default probabilities by directly 
modelling the evolution of the economic variables driving defaults. The model takes a similar focus to 
credit risk as fundamental credit analysis but also considers market-based valuation of the economic 
drivers. This adds an additional enhancement to pure fundamental techniques by adding in financial 
market information, which ensures up to date estimates of risk and value for companies. This also 
increases the advance warning of potential defaults given the forward-looking nature of such 
information. This compares favourably to historical looking data used primarily in fundamental based 
models. 
 
Source: Moody’s Analytics 
The model focuses on two key areas that drive a company’s risk of default (1) financial risk; and (2) 
economic risk. 
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As Sun, Munves and Hamilton (2012) outline, EDF is a measure used to assess the probability that a 
company will default over a specified period of time, typically one year. Merton (1974) led the 
pioneering development of the EDF model which belongs to a class of structural risk model. 
Under the EDF model approach common equity is deemed to be the only loss-absorbing layer of the 
company’s capital structure. Any other capital structures which have losses imposed on them are seen 
to trigger a default. In other words, any obligations that are senior to common equity subject to broken 
promises are considered a default. Government bailouts are assessed within a framework of whether a 
default would have certainly occurred without government intervention. This considers unique cases, 
such as the financial crisis, where some banks were required to accept ‘bailout funds’ but were not in 
any risk at the time that they would default. This is further extended under this model to include 
instances where the market value of assets or the value of ongoing business falls below the liabilities 
payable or the default point. 
Default often follows from liabilities exceeding assets. This provides a conceptual starting point for 
the EDF model. The EDF model attempts to determine the probability that a company’s liabilities 
exceed its assets. There are a number of shortcomings with a pure balance sheet approach to 
determining default risk. The first obstacle is determining a market related value for assets. Under 
IFRS most assets are reflected at historic acquisition cost or book value less accumulated depreciation 
and impairments, if there are any. This often does not align with the net realisable value that the asset 
would sell for or its future cash flow generation ability. 
Some assets will generate less cash flow than was forecast at the time they were purchased. Such an 
example would be assets purchased for the United States automotive industry in the 1970’s, which 
saw a steady decline in demand in years following this period. Many assets stood idle or were not 
functioning at their full capacity. This lead to the present value of future cash flow generation 
potential being below the amount originally paid for the asset. Asset impairment requirements have 
gone a long way to addressing differences in historical asset value and market asset value. There are 
limitations in that they are still dependent on a judgment call by companies and their auditors. Both 
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parties exert a certain degree of subjectivity and interpretation as to when and by how much an asset 
should be impaired. 
The greater risk to developing an accurate corporate failure prediction model often is on the upside to 
asset valuations. Historic cost approaches to valuing assets often do not take into account the goodwill 
and intangible properties of assets. Such an example would be the secret formula used by Coca Cola, 
which underestimates the future cash flow potential of this asset and degree of market share protection 
that it affords the company. 
Projected value of a firm’s asset potential often does not align with its reported value under 
accounting standards. Another shortcoming is that financial reports are at best prepared on a quarterly 
basis and are based on historical information and not forward-looking information. This often means 
that corporate failure prediction relying upon this data will signal default risk when it is already too 
late. 
The value of a company can be estimated by markets, which is seen to be a better alternative. These 
are forward-looking, demonstrate efficiency at assimilating information, and capture the collective 
wisdom of many investors. The market value for various assets is not always readily available as there 
may not be public markets for these assets. Another challenge is where a public market for similar 
assets exists it is often difficult to match these assets. This means finding assets that are equivalent in 
age and specification, which is often impossible, to allow for a valuation based on comparatives. 
Supply demand factors present at the time of sale of other similar assets are also likely to differ in the 
future resulting in propensity for differences in valuation. However, if the company is publically 
traded we can indirectly infer the market value attached to the assets. 
A company’s equity and its assets are valued in the same way. The present value of future cash flows 
generated by the assets is the company’s asset value. The present value of the portion of total cash 
flows received by equity holders after the company’s debts have been settled is the company’s equity 
value. In this way there is an indirect link between a company’s equity value, which can be measured 
through public valuations, and its asset value, which cannot. Again this is also an imperfect solution 
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as not all companies have publically available equity valuations. It is often straight forward to 
determine the market value of debt so adding this to the value of equity attributed by equity capital 
markets allows for the market value of assets to be imputed. 
In assessing default risk, the likelihood that a company’s liabilities exceed that of its assets needs to 
be determined. This becomes a function of two primary factors (1) the difference in market value 
between assets and liabilities, as previously mentioned; and (2) the volatility of a company’s assets. 
The greater the volatility of a company’s assets, the greater the risk of extreme movements in asset 
values and the greater the default risk given the potential for assets to be valued less than liabilities. 
Companies in sectors with more stable operating environments, such as utilities, pharmaceuticals and 
defence, exhibit lower asset volatility compared to less stable operating environments such as the 
technology and mining sectors. The same challenge is faced with regards to determining asset 
volatility. Asset volatility is often not directly observable, given that the market values of assets over 
time required to calculate this, are also often not available. 
Where market values for equity are available these often offer the best proxy for a company’s default 
risk. Forward-looking expectations of a company’s financial longevity are reflected through these 
market valuations which investors influence through their views on valuation of the equity price. A 
liquid equity market which ensures that current and future expectations are always reflective in the 
prevailing price. This at the same time reflects the volatility of company’s underling business 
conditions, their financial strength and the impact of both the current and expected future 
macroeconomic environment on fundamentals. 
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Source: Moody’s Analytics 
Building upon this contextual foundation, the EDF model needs to derive the probability that the 
market value of assets will fall below its liabilities. This allows for an assessment for the probability 
of default in the future for a company. This is a function of two factors. The first being the difference 
between the market value of a company’s assets and the book value of its liabilities. The second being 
the volatility of the company’s assets. 
This is bundled into three component inputs in calculating a company’s EDF credit measure (1) the 
current market value of the company or the market value of assets; (2) the level of the company’s 
obligations or its default point; and (3) the vulnerability of the market value of the company’s assets 
to change significantly referred to as asset volatility. 
Given that the above inputs are constantly current, objective non-judgmental variables, EDF credit 
measures have consistently outperformed the rating agencies in distinguishing between defaulting and 
non-defaulting companies according to Moody’s Analytics (2011). Not only that, they have proven to 
be a consistent leading indicator of agency rating upgrades and downgrades. 
By way of demonstrating the application of the EDF model, two companies are selected. The first, 
Johnson &Johnson, is fundamentally strong and in a defensive pharmaceutical business sector. The 





Assets are at book 
value 
Cash flows go to (1) debt 
holders; and (2) to equity 
holders 
Is there a better way than 
Book Value to determine 




first claim on cash 
flows. 
 
They are at book 
value 
BV of Assets- BV of 
Liabilities. 
Share price 




A company’s stock price 
changes because the 
market’s assessment of the 
asset’s future cash flow 
changes. We can see the 
former, but not the latter 
Going from equity value 
and equity volatility to 
asset value and asset 
volatility 
Assets 
The greater the 
cash flow 
generative power 
of the assets, the 
more they’re 
worth, and the 








Market Value-Based Balance Sheet 
Page | 57 
second, RadioShack, is weak and in a cyclical electronics retail business sector. As of April 2012 the 
two inputs were calculated for both companies: 




1 year EDF measure 0.01% 3.58% 
Default Point (DP)  US$39 bn US$1.042 bn 
Market Value of Assets (MVA) US$236 bn US$1.834 bn 
Market Value Leverage (DP/MVA) 17% 57% 
Asset Volatility 11% 24% 
 
As shown below there are three key inputs which are used to determine Johnson & Johnson’s default 
in one year’s time, being (1) the estimated market value of Johnson &Johnson assets; (2) its default 
point; and (3) asset volatility. The last variable, which has not been calculated is estimated through the 
assumption that Johnson & Johnson’s equity returns are normally distributed. 
-
 
Source: Moody’s Analytics 
Based on the assumption that returns are normally distributed, the probability of default is defined as 
the area under the standard normal distribution (denoted Φ) as follows: 
Probability of Default = Pr(MVA < 𝐷𝑃) = Φ[MVA < 𝐷𝑃] 
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As shown graphically above, it would take a six standard deviation move for the market value of 
Johnson & Johnson’s assets to fall below their default point. Johnson & Johnson’s Distance to Default 
(DD) would be classified as 6 under the EDF model. The probability attached to default over the next 
year would be essentially 0% or (1-99.9999998027%)/2. 
The company’s actual default probability would be a lot higher for two reasons (1) the DD has a long 
and fat right tail compared to the normal distribution i.e. a normal distribution of corporate default 
does not hold; and (2) since defaults are a rare occurrence for high credit quality companies, such as 
Johnson & Johnson (Aaa stable since 15 September 1987) it is difficult to calibrate and calculate an 
exact default rate beyond a certain DD level. This means that the normal distribution underestimates 
the probability of default especially for high-credit quality companies. This underestimation is 
adjusted by empirical mapping. This is achieved by using a distribution of corporate defaults reliant 
upon historical data. 
 
Source: Moody’s Analytics 
Considering companies with low credit quality such as RadioShack (In Default), the default risk 
between that of the EDF model (3.58%) and the normal distribution (2%) narrows. RadioShack has a 
DD of 2, driven by a narrow gap between the market value of assets and its default point. 
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Moody’s Analytics’ public company EDF™ model demonstrates strong empirical evidence of 
forecasting default in timely manner and providing sufficient advance warning: 
EDF Evolution of North American Corporates vs. Companies Defaulted 2008-2010 
 
Source: Moody’s Analytics 
As clearly shown above the EDF model demonstrates strong predictive power for signalling a default 
well in advance of its occurrence. The above chart compares the median EDF for North American 
Corporates and those that defaulted between 2008 and 2010 representing the first, second and third 
quartile of all observations in this sample. 
As mentioned previously, EDF models are an extension of basic structural credit risk models that 
build upon those developed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Although these models 
rely on assumptions, which are both unrealistic and problematic, they provide a good underpinning 
for basic theory to develop the EDF model. 
The basic structural credit risk model assumes that the market value of a company’s assets evolves 
according to the following stochastic process: 
(1) dA = μAdt + σAAdW 
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where μ is the expected growth rate of the company’s asset value, σA is the asset volatility, and W 
represents a standard Brownian motion mathematical model process based upon particle theory. For 
simplicity, a time horizon of one year is assumed. Annual log asset value is normally distributed as 
assumed by the geometric Brownian motion. Geometric Brownian motion is used to describe the 
change in asset values over time or dA. The drift term, μAd, describes the expected growth rate μ of 
asset value over a short time interval dt; the volatility term, σAAdW, describes the uncertainty 
associated with the path travelled by asset value – the “instantaneous” volatility of the asset return 
over the short interval dt is σA2. 






A normal distribution of the market value of assets is assumed. It also implies that if the value of the 
necessary inputs is known then calculating the probability is a straightforward process. The Φ[x – 
E(y)] / σ(y)] expresses the probability that a normally distributed variable (y) falls below a given 
value, call it x, is exactly equal to where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution. The 
relevant value of x is the log of the default point, lnX, where the focus is on the likelihood that a 
company’s asset value (A) falls below its default point in the next year, Pr (lnA1 < lnX). This is 
determined from the company’s book value of liabilities. Plugging these quantities into the 
cumulative normal distribution gives: 











The negative of the quantity inside the brackets is what is defined as the DD. The EDF model uses 
this term to express standard deviations. Using this definition the notation can be considerably 
simplified: 
(4) probability of default = Φ[−DD] 
For ease of exposition, under some innocuous assumptions the second term can be ignored of the 
numerator of the DD definition to arrive at a simpler expression for DD 
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(5) DD = lnA0−lnX
σA
 
From the above it is evident that the DD is a count of standard deviations which encapsulates the 
aforementioned three key inputs (1) market value of assets; (2) default point; and (3) asset volatility. 
Put another way, the numerator of the DD captures the company’s financial leverage whereas the 
denominator captures the business risk. Therefore, the DD for a firm is the difference between the 
expected asset value of a company and the default point, standardised by the company’s business risk. 
DD combines all these inputs into a single stationary statistic, which provides a rank ordering of 
default risk. The area under the normal distribution below the default point is used to calculate the 
probability of default under the structural model approach. 
Converting this into a structural credit risk model again requires some contextualisation. Going back 
to using capital markets to determine asset value, equity holders in companies are perceived to have a 
walk away option. If the value of the firm is lower than its liabilities, shareholders can walkway from 
the company. They have limited liability protection and can let the creditors assume ownership. 
This is analogous to a home loan. The home is not owned until the loan is fully paid and the title 
transferred by the bank. This is similar to equity holder’s option on a company with the addition of 
their limited liability protection. As the home loan is repaid, similar to that of the debt in a company, 
default risk reduces. 
This is similar to a call option, where the debt owed by the company is the same as the strike price for 
equity holders. When a company is funded purely with equity and a zero coupon bond with a face 
value of X, this can then be incorporated under an application of the Black Scholes option pricing 
model. This connects an observable equity value to an unobservable asset value and asset volatility. 
Denoting E as the value of equity, expected growth rate of assets as μ and the time horizon as T, the 
following formula is arrived at: 
(6) E = A0 Φ(d1) − erTXΦ(d2) 
where: 










, d2 = d1 − σA√T 
This demonstrates that a company’s equity value (E) is a factor of its asset value, directly, and its 
asset’s d1volatility, indirectly through a normal distribution. The twist in this application of the Black 
Scholes model comes in that the value of the underlying option, the equity value, is a known 
parameter. The unknown parameters are instead the asset value and its volatility. This can be solved 
for backwards using the known input, option price and volatility, to arrive at an implied asset value 
and its volatility. In addition to having related firm equity value to asset value in (6), Ito’s lemma can 







These two functional relationships (6) and (8) allow for the determination of A and σA from the 
values of E and σE which are observable from the public firm’s equity prices. Estimates of A and σA 
are then used in formula (5) which allows for the calculation of the probability of default under a 
basic structural credit risk model using a normal distribution’s assumption of DD. 
The EDF model transcends what some practitioners view as a summary of equity market movements. 
It transforms equity market data into credit relevant data (1) market leverage; and (2) asset volatility. 
Debt levels have a dual impact on the model through the calculation of the default point and how 
equity values and equity volatilities are translated into asset values and volatilities as demonstrated in 
formula’s (6) and (8). 
The correlation between equity values and firm credit quality weakens as credit quality strengthens. 
This is referred to as the “deleveraging process” as credit quality strengthens the equity value 
becomes less and less driven the by credit parameters of the EDF model. In other words default risk 
becomes less of a concern for investors where other drivers begin to weigh more prominently in 
moving equity valuations. 
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Sun, Munves and Hamilton (2012) note that dirms with better equity returns can exhibit higher default 
risk than firms with average equity returns. Firms with extremely poor equity performance do have 
higher EDFs and default rates. This shows that equity returns are not always consistent with EDFs. 
This is demonstrated through empirical data provided in the table below: 
EDFs and Default Rates of Portfolios’ Sorted on Six-Month Stock Returns, North American 
Corporates, 2001-2009 
 
Average Return % Average EDF % Median EDF % Default Rate % 
Lowest Return -0.51 14.5 11.33 9.24 
2 -0.26 5.16 2.04 2.07 
3 -0.15 3.18 0.8 1.1 
4 -0.07 2.25 0.42 0.66 
5 -0.01 1.85 0.28 0.51 
6 0.06 1.68 0.24 0.4 
7 0.13 1.56 0.22 0.41 
8 0.21 1.66 0.26 0.39 
9 0.36 2.09 0.38 0.51 
Highest Return 0.87 3.81 0.92 0.77 
f) Multiple discriminant analysis 
Multiple discriminant analysis is a statistical technique used to classify observations into a number of 
a priori groupings, which are dependent upon the individual characteristics associated with each 
observation in the samples of each grouping. Durbach (2008) explains that these groups are referred 
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to as a priori in nature as their classification is already known prior to development of the multiple 
discriminant analysis model. Similarly these grouping are normally qualitative in nature i.e. 
male/female and failed/non failed. 
The model will require specification or labelling of the groups upfront, which can consist of two or 
more groups. Once established, delineating characteristics, which are decided upon by the modeller, 
are then collected for each observation. As outlined by Tinsley and Steven (2000) and Rees (1995) 
multiple discriminant analysis attempts then to derive a linear formula applying a weighting to each 
characteristic allowing for the differentiation of each observation according to their respective 
grouping and therein maximizing the distinction between groups. 
Multiple discriminant analysis considers the entire profile of characteristics associated with each 
observation as well as the interaction of these characteristics and in doing so decides which 
characteristics are the best discriminators. In addition, space dimensionality is reduced as result of the 
application of multiple discriminant analysis. This is defined as the number of independent variables 
of G-1 dimension(s), where G is the number of a priori groups. 
Grimm and Yarnold, (1994) indicate that the independent variables are referred to as canonical 
variables. In the case of an a priori grouping comprising of failed and non-failed corporates the 
analysis is transformed into only one dimension. The resulting discriminant function is of the 
following form: 
𝑍 = 𝑣1𝑥1+𝑣2𝑥2+𝑣3𝑥3+⋯𝑣𝑛𝑥𝑛 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑣1, 𝑣2, … 𝑣𝑛=𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
              𝑥1, 𝑥2, … 𝑥𝑛=𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
The resulting model will then define cut-off ranges, that depending on the range into which an 
observation falls, their grouping will be determined. This defined cut-off range in some cases will also 
include an area referred to as a ‘grey zone’ or a zone of ignorance where the observation does not 
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necessarily conform to any particular grouping. In some cases the model will also specify a constant, 
but this is mostly dependent on the software modelling application used. 
Tinsley and Stevens (2000) identify three conditions will need to be satisfied in order for the results of 
the multiple discriminant analysis models to be relied upon (1) independence of observations; (2) 
multivariate normality and (3) homogeneity of covariance matrices. In addition, Tinsley and Stevens 
(2000) concluded that any violation of these assumptions will lead to inflated Type I errors or 
incorrectly classifying failed companies as non-failed. Furthermore, Brown and Tinsley (1983) 
recommended that the minimum total sample size required should be equal to approximately ten times 
the number of variables used in the model. Tinsley and Stevens (2000) however were of the view that 
the sample multiple should be closer to twenty times the number of variables used in the model. 
Grimm and Yarnold (1994) through using a test derived by Box (1949) and applying this to Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayanan’s (1977) ZETA® model demonstrated that this resulted in a different 
variance and covariance for the variables. In this instance Altman had transferred variables with 
skewed distributions. Grimm and Yarnold (1994) explain that this was done by applying natural 
logarithmic transformation through the analysis of their histograms while keeping variables of an 
approximately symmetric distribution in their original form.  
Fisher (1936) was the first to apply multiple discriminant analysis in a practical setting. Since then 
multiple discriminant analysis has been extended to application in a number of fields, where its 
primary use was first towards biological and behavioural sciences. Its first application in the field of 
finance was to consumer credit evaluation by Durand (1941) and later Myers and Forgy (1963) as 
well as to investment classification by Walter (1959) and later Smith (1965). Altman, Eisenbeis and 
Sinkey (1981) further demonstrated multiple discriminant analysis’ application to a number of 
financial areas. 
Watson and Keasey (1991) identified a shortcoming of multiple discriminant analysis in its 
application to corporate failure. They identified that the relative costs associated with both types of 
misclassification errors, Type I errors (incorrectly classifying a failed company as healthy) and Type 
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II errors (incorrectly classifying a non-failed firm as being financially distressed), were treated as 
being equal. 
In a real world setting this is unlikely to be the case where losses on loans to failed clients almost 
always exceed profits that are forgone on not making an identical loan amount to non-failed clients. 
Nevertheless, they did conclude that one of the greatest advantages of a multiple discriminant analysis 
model is that it does not focus on the significance of individual variables but rather the significance of 
the entire profile of individual variables. This enhances the predictive accuracy of the model. 
Further shortcomings of multiple discriminant analysis were identified by Grice and Ingram (2001) 
who pointed out an upward bias in holdout sample accuracy rates relative to the initial ‘training’ 
sample. The initial sample theoretically would be expected to more likely result in higher accuracy 
rates as the model has been tailored to fit this original sample of observations. 
Altman and Narayanan (1997) in their survey of corporate failure models studies identified multiple 
discriminant analysis as most popular statistical technique. This was based upon statistical techniques 
used by researchers spanning a number of difference countries. Multiple discriminant analysis was 
seen to be the de facto standard for comparison of distress prediction models. Where authors had 
opted for a different statistical technique these were almost always compared with the results under a 
multiple discriminant analysis approach. In all such cases multiple discriminant analysis results 
compared favourably when compared to other statistical techniques. 
g) Accounting-based corporate failure prediction models versus market-based models 
Mensah (1984) highlights the sample specific nature of accounting-specific models, where ratios and 
their corresponding weightings are derived. This requires periodic redevelopment to ensure that the 
ratios selected and the weightings attached remain relevant. 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) identify the following weaknesses in using accounting-based models: 
» Future prediction ability is limited due to the reliance on historical backward looking data 
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» Market values of assets often differ starkly compared to reported accounting values 
» Interpretive elements of financial accounting standards opens up numbers for manipulation 
Market-based models counter these shortcomings through offering: 
» Reliance on market information which ensures forward-looking information that considers an 
extensive universe of variables and considerations 
» Market information is less likely to be manipulated 
» Market information has a greater alignment with cash flows, where valuation is essentially the 
present value of future dividends and value of the firm, and therefore reflects cash generation 
ability 
» Models are not sample dependent and do not need to be continuously recalibrated 
However as Saunders and Allen (2002) point out, market models require a number of assumptions 
such as: 
» Normality of stock returns 
» All debt being seen as the same. There is no differentiation between different types of debt and 
the firm’s debt is deemed to comprise a single zero coupon bond 
» Measurement of asset value and volatility is required, both of which are unobservable 
The empirical test of market models have received a mixed response. Kealhofer (2003) and Odera, 
Dacorogna, Jung (2002) suggest that such models outperform and are more timely than credit ratings. 
Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundestedt (2004) conclude that market-based corporate failure models 
provide more information when compared to accounting-ratio-based models noting the latter’s poor 
performance. 
Juxtaposed to this Campbell, Hilsher, and Szilagyi (2006) see market-based models after controlling 
for other variables as offering little forecasting power. Reisz and Perlich (2007) found Altman’s 
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(1969) Z-Score model to be marginally better over a one year period at predicting corporate failure 
when compared to more complex KMV-type barrier option models, which had better predictive 
abilities three to ten years out. 
Barth, Beaver, Hand and Landsman (2005) found that equity values can be accurately predicted using 
financial statement data, both of a non-accrual i.e. cash flow data and accrual nature i.e. income 
statement data. This means that accounting-based models ostensibly are already including a market-
based element which can be used to accurately assess credit risk and distance to default. 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) compared results using Taffler’s (1984) Z-Score model against market-
based models over a seventeen year period spanning 1985 to 2001 using Receiving-Operator-
Characteristic curves and information content tests. The same framework as Stein (2005) was used 
along with that which was used by Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006). The study was however 
extended to consider differences in market share, revenues and profitability of banks using competing 
models and the error differences in misclassification costs. 
The main conclusions from the study that were drawn are as follows: 
» The Z-Score model was more accurate, but the resulting difference was not statistically significant 
» Banks using a Z-Score model would realise significantly higher risk adjusted revenues, profits, 
return on capital employed and return on risk adjusted capital 
» Both models provided significant information about failure, but with neither model subsuming the 
other 
Traditional accounting-ratio based models were therefore shown to be better allocators of capital 
when it came to bank lending taking into account loan pricing and misclassification costs. It was 
further concluded that Hillegeist, Keating, Cram and Lundestedt (2004) findings were mainly as result 
of poor performing comparator models rather than the superior predictive capabilities of option-
pricing models. 
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Agarwal and Taffler (2008) in summary observed that corporate failure does not occur abruptly and is 
normally a culmination of a number of years of deteriorating operating performance or balance sheet 
strength. Companies with strong balance sheets supported by profitable operations are unlikely to fail 
suddenly, without warning due to a change in operating conditions. It was also highlighted that loan 
covenants are based on accounting ratios and that their breach is normally the first indication of 
corporate failure. Furthermore, the Altman model included the market value of equity as one of the 
variables in determining the Z score. 
h) South African research on corporate failure prediction 
There have been numerous academic attempts to recalibrate Altman’s Z score model to both a listed 
and unlisted universe of corporate failures. One of the potential shortcomings has been the dearth of 
large-scale South African corporate failures in a listed setting,  which have lead many studies to 
focus on unlisted corporate failures. Public data for these unlisted corporates is limited and is not 
subject to the same level of scrutiny by investors and regulators compared to listed companies. This 
has narrowed the context of application of such models. This is predicated by there being a more 
focused sample, which is unlikely to see large-scale defaults of benchmark size typically which are 
defined as debt instruments in excess of US$500 million. This also limits sample focus to private and 
mainly bank placed debt, rather than listed debt. 
A pioneering study by De la Rey (1981) using a similar approach to that of the Z Score model 
achieved a 96% classification rate in correctly classifying failed companies one year prior to failure. 
This model was based on twenty-six failed companies, with corporate failure occurring between 1972 
and 1979. These were then paired with non-failed South African listed companies. The final model 
relied upon eight variables which were deemed to be significant from an initial set of twenty five 
variables. 
Further applications using a multivariate approach included the commercially developed model by 
Clarke, Hamman and Van der Smit (1991) for privately owned industrial operations. Their model 
relied upon twenty-nine corporates that failed or experienced financial distress between 1985 and 
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1990 and forty-three non-failed corporates. Five variables from an initial thirteen variables were 
statistically significant. The model correctly classified 85% of failed companies correctly four years in 
advance of their failure. A hold out sample yielded a similar degree of accuracy with predictive 
accuracy for failed companies of 78%; 74%; 75% and 77% for years one; two; three; and four, 
respectively. 
Court, Radloff and van der Walt (1999) instead of applying the common Bayes-Fisher discriminant 
analysis approach, opted for a two-stage model. Twenty-one failed and nineteen non-failed companies 
taken from 1974 to 1985 were used to develop a dichotomous model, which attempted to predict 
corporate failure one year and two years in advance of this occurring. The first stage used 
macroeconomic variables in an attempt to explain the variability of business failure using regression 
analysis. Total advances from the banking sector when lagged for two periods or months appeared to 
be an adequate discriminator. The second stage used twenty financial and non-financial variables 
along with a Bayes-Fisher discriminant analysis approach where six variables were decided upon for 
the dichotomous model. Using various cut-off scores the highest yielding classification rate led to 
76% and 78% of failed and non-failed companies, respectively, being correctly predicted. 
More recent studies included Bruwer and Hamman’s (2006) study, which identified and addressed 
various shortcomings of previous South African studies along with applying international research 
techniques and learning from findings by researchers. There were a number of key observations that 
were made by the study. 
The use of cash flow ratios along with certain accrual ratios and not simply a trial and error approach 
avoided brute empiricism. This is when independent variables are selected not based on a theoretical 
model underlying failure, but for reasons such as popularity as explained by Hossarri & Rahman 
(2005). 
Furthermore, Bruwer and Hamman (2006) decided not to limit failure to bankruptcy but any condition 
where the company could not exist in the future which included delisting and major structural changes 
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measured by four ratios: (1) total liabilities/equity; (2) total debt/cash; (3) accounts 
receivable/revenues; and (4) total assets/current assets. 
Additionally, a grey area in between failed and non-failed companies was included in developing the 
model through inclusion of corporates that were not necessarily clearly confined to either of these two 
a priori groupings. 
Contrary to many previous studies, an entire population was used rather than limiting the sample to 
sample of paired non-failed and failed corporates. This accounted for the different number of 
observations when it came to failed and non-failed companies. However, the sample was limited to 
industrial corporates listed between June 1997 to May 2002. 
There was also a greater focus by the study on out of sample testing rather than the predictive 
accuracy when applied to the learning sample. This was supported by the view that this approach 
would provide a truer indication of model accuracy and applicability in a real world setting. 
Lastly, consideration was given to economic cycles as suggested by Cybinski (2001) and Mensah 
(1984). This accommodated for growth and recessionary periods through using three distinct 
populations. These were based on where the majority of the months in the past financial year were 
ascribed to and grouped according to the following periods (1) recessionary and growth; (2) recession; 
and (3) growth. 
Using the solutions above based on international studies a classification model was developed for the 
classification of failed and non-failed industrial companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange between 1995 and 2002. Three populations where used for failed and non-failed financial 
years from June 1997 to May 2002 including (1) both a recessionary and a growth phase; (2) a 
recession phase; and (3) a growth phase. 
A different statistical approach was used. This model instead relied upon recursive partitioning or also 
known as decision or classification tree analysis. This was due to the classification being based on the 
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ability to be graphically explained. Through using this approach more widely relevant outcomes were 
seen to result. 
Fifteen independent variables were selected, where eleven of these variables demonstrated the ability 
to statistically significantly differentiate between failed and non-failed companies for both 
recessionary and growth phases. This was shown by using the Kruskal-Wallis test, given that the 
Lilliefors test indicated non normality of the independent variables. For the recession phase only five 
independent variables indicated a statistically significant difference and for the growth phase eight 
variables were identified. 
Three credit statistics were found to be the best discriminators for prediction of corporate failure 
across all three populations (1) total assets; (2) cash flow from operating activities divided by sales for 
the last financial year end reporting period; and (3) cash flow from operating activities divided by 
sales from last financial year end reporting period as well as the cumulative three financial year end 
reporting periods preceding this. 
Classification rates for the study were not as high as some previous South African studies that had 
been conducted. This study resulted in corporate failure prediction accuracy of 66% and classification 
accuracy of 70%. However, it is worth noting that many of the previous studies had numerous 
inherent shortcoming, as outlined earlier, which are likely to have contributed to inflated accuracy 
rates. These previous studies were not truly reflective of their model’s potential in a ‘real world’ 
application. Classification rates were also below those on average for international studies: 
Country Authors (Year) Statistical Technique Classification Rate 
Australia Izan (1984) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
100% one year prior to default; 70% 
two years prior to default; and 40% 
three years prior to default 




88% one year prior to default; 84.2% 
two years prior to default; and 77.8% 
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Country Authors (Year) Statistical Technique Classification Rate 
Dias (1979) three years prior to default 
Canada Knight (1979) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
54% one year prior to default 




83.3% one year prior to default 
England Taffler (1976) Linear discriminant 
analysis 
96% one year prior to default; 70% two 
years prior to default; 61% three years 
prior to default; and 35% four years 
prior to default 




97% one year prior to default 




93% one year prior to default; 87% two 
years prior to default; and 84% three 
years prior to default 
England Taffler (1983) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 






Model 1/Model 2: 73-75/65-70% one 
year prior to default; 60-67/57-65% two 
years prior to default; and 50-52% three 





87% one year prior to default 
Germany Beermann Linear discriminant 91.5% one year prior to default; 81.0% 
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Country Authors (Year) Statistical Technique Classification Rate 
(1976) analysis two years prior to default; 71.4% three 
years prior to default; and 61.9% four 
years prior to default 
Germany Weinrich (1978) Linear discriminant 
analysis 
89.0% two years prior to default; 84.3% 
three years prior to default; and 78.1% 
four years prior to default 




88.9% one year prior to default; 82.2% 
two years prior to default; 75.6% three 
years prior to default; and 73.3% four 
years prior to default 




model; probit analysis; 
logit analysis and 
multiple discriminant 
analysis 
Linear probability model 91.7%; probit 
analysis 85%; logit analysis 86.7% and 
multiple discriminant analysis 91.7%. 
Italy Altman, Marco, 
Varetto (1994) 
Multiple discriminant 
analysis and neural 
networks 
Multiple discriminant analysis/neural 
networks: 96.5/95.3% one year prior to 
default; and 86.4/86.2% three years 
prior to default 
Japan Ko (1982) Discriminant model 
using factor analysis 
82.9% one year prior to default 
Korea Altman, Kim 
and Eom (1995) 
Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
Model 1/Model 2: 97.1/96.6% one year 
prior to default; 88.2/85.2% two years 
prior to default; 69.7/71.4% three years 
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Country Authors (Year) Statistical Technique Classification Rate 
prior to default; 50/40% four years 
prior to default ; and 68.8/75% five 





70% to 80% one year prior to default 










84% one year prior to default 
Spain Briones, Marín, 
Cuerto (1988) 
Linear & multiple 
discriminant analysis 
Linear/multiple discriminant analysis: 
90/80% one years prior to default; 
75/80% two years prior to default; 
75/75% three years prior to default; 
75/75% four years prior to default; and 
80/75% five years prior to default 
USA Altman (1968) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
Z Score Model: 96% one year prior to 
default; and 79% two years prior to 
default 
USA Edmister (1972) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
90% 
USA Deakin (1972) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
86% one year prior to default; 90% two 
years prior to default; and 81% three 
years prior to default 
USA Blum (1974) Multiple discriminant 93-95% one year prior to default; 80% 
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Country Authors (Year) Statistical Technique Classification Rate 
analysis two years prior to default; and 70% 
three -five years prior to default 
USA Altman (1977) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
Zeta Model: >90% one year prior to 
default; 70% five years prior to default 




87% one year prior to default; 85% two 
years prior to default; and 78% three 
years prior to default 
USA Altman (2000) Multiple discriminant 
analysis 
Revised Z Score Model: 90.9% one 
year prior to default 
Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and Hamman (2009), built on the approach of Bruwer and Hamman, but 
instead subdivided their data according to years before failure rather than economic phases. In 
addition, the concept of Normalised Cost of Failure (NCF) was introduced to adequately capture the 
effect of the number of Type I errors (incorrectly classifying a failed company as healthy) and Type II 
errors (incorrectly classifying a non-failed firm as being financially distressed). NCF is calculated by 
adding an additional weighting to the number of Type I errors and then adding this to the number of 
Type II errors as follows: 
𝑁𝐶𝐹 = 𝑊1𝑋 (∑(𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠)) + ∑(𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠) 
Zavgren (1985) attempted to quantify this weighting to accurately depict the loss that a lending 
institution would occur in the case of a Type I error. This was established relative to a Type II error 
where the lending institution would forgo the profit, which would have been generated from making 
the loan. The appropriate weighting or cost ratio of Type I to Type II errors was calculated as being in 
the range of 20:1 to 38:1. Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) in their analysis of small regional 
banks in the United States found that the cost ratio of Type I errors was thirty-five times greater than 
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Type II errors. Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and Hamman used the upper limit of this weighting of 38:1 
given the severe implications for an economy arising from misplaced loan activity. 
Various predictive statistical techniques were considered such as (1) multiple discriminant analysis; 
(2) recursive partitioning; (3) logit analysis and (4) neural networks. Application of each predictive 
statistical technique yielded different results. Multiple discriminant analysis and recursive partitioning 
were shown to have the lowest NCF but also the lowest classification accuracies. Logit analysis and 
neural networks had the highest classification rates but also the highest NCF. The table below 
summarises the outcome for each predicative technique examined in the study: 
Predictive technique applied Classification rate 
(Averaged over 4 Years) 
NCF  
(Lower scores more favourable) 
Multiple discriminant analysis 68.0% 1042.5 
Recursive partitioning 83.5% 1232.5 
Logit analysis 83.5% 1503.3 
Neural networks 84.8% 1361 
Multiple discriminant analysis had the highest classification rate for correctly predicting failed 
companies at 35.9%. The study’s recursive partitioning model resulted in a higher classification rate 
of 77.1% when compared to the Bruwer and Hamman (2006) combined model’s 65.9%. However, the 
model was not as effective at predicting failed companies at 20.5% compared to Bruwer and Hamman 
(2006) combined model’s 66.9%. This could suggest that perhaps the former models use of economic 
phases was better suited to corporate failure prediction than the traditional subdivision of the data into 
years before failure as shown in the table on the next page: 
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  MDA LA RP NN(Ff) 
  N N N N 
Failed correctly predicted 14,5 1,0 8,8 2,0 
Type I error 26,0 39,5 31,8 35,8 
Type II error 54,5 2,3 26,0 2,5 
Non-failed correctly predicted 156,3 208,5 184,8 211,0 
Total 251,3 251,3 251,3 251,3 
Incorrectly predicted in total 80,5 41,8 57,8 38,3 
Correctly predicted in total 170,8 209,5 193,5 213,0 
NCF (38:1) 1042.5 1503,3 1232,5 1 361,0 
  % % % % 
% of failed companies correctly predicted 35.9 2,6 20,5 4,6 
% of non-failed companies correctly predicted 74,1 98,9 87,7 98,8 
% of total incorrectly predicted 32,0 16,5 22,9 15,2 
% of total correctly predicted 68,0 83.5 77,1 84.8 
However, when NCF was introduced into the Bruwer and Hamman (2006) model it was found that 
the NCF per observation was higher at 4.9 versus this model’s 5.2. Therefore it was concluded that 
subdivision of data into years before failure was deemed to result in a better quality model as opposed 
to by economic phase. This is illustrated in the table on the next page for average predictive accuracy 
for each different technique: 
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This study  Steyn-Bruwer & Hamman 
 




n N  
Growt
h N 
Failed correctly predicted 
8,8 95 48 36 
Type I error  
31,8 47 31 27 
Type II error  
26,0 75 24 28 
Non-failed correctly predicted 
184,8 141 88 76 
Total  
251,3 358 191 167 
Incorrectly predicted in total  
57,8 122 55 55 
Correctly predicted in total  
193,5 236 136 112 
Proportion of “failed” to “non-
failed” (%) 
16,1 39,7 41,4 37,7 
NCF (38:1)  
1 232,5  1 861,0  1 202,0 1 054,0  
NCF per observation  
4,9 5,2 6,3 6,3 
% of failed companies correctly 
predicted 
20,5 66,9 60,8 57,1 
% of non-failed companies 
correctly predicted  
87,7 65,3 78,6 73,1 
% of total incorrectly predicted  
22,9 34,1 28,8 32,9 
% of total correctly predicted  
77,1 65,9 71,2 67,1 
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Correia (2010) applied both the Z-score and revised Z’’ (Emerging Market) models to South Africa’s 
Alternative Exchange (AltX) listed companies in 2009. 
The AltX is a subsection of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and was introduced as an 
alternative market for small to medium size companies that did not meet the qualifying criteria for a 
JSE mainboard listing. This also means that companies that list themselves on the AltX are subject to 
less onerous listing requirements. 
In obtaining an AltX listing a company must have (1) share capital of at least ZAR2 million; (2) a 
public shareholder holding of a minimum of 10% of each class of equity security and public 
shareholders numbering at least 100; (3) directors having completed the AltX Directors Induction 
Programme or make arrangements to the satisfaction of the JSE to complete it; (4) an executive 
financial director appointed and satisfaction of the audit committee of the applicant issuer with 
submission confirmation in writing to the JSE that the financial director has the appropriate expertise 
and experience to fulfil his/her role; and (4) was required to produce a profit forecast for the 
remainder of the financial year during which the company will list and one full financial year 
thereafter; (5) auditors or attorneys holding 50% of the shareholding of each director and the 
Designated Adviser in trust in such applicant issuer from the date of listing, and a certificate to that 
effect lodged with the JSE by the issuers auditors or attorneys; and (6) at least 3 directors, or 25% of 
the directors being non-executive. 
Companies wishing to list on the JSE mainboard must have a subscribed capital of at least ZAR25 
million; (2) not less than 25 million equity shares in issue; and (3) 20% of each class of equity 
securities shall be held by the public. 
Additional requirements also include a satisfactory audited profit history for the preceding three 
financial years, the last of which reported an audited profit of at least ZAR8 million before taxation 
and after taking account of the headline earnings adjustment on a pre-tax basis. The company must 
also be carrying on as its main activity independent business which is supported by its historic 
revenue earning history. This can be carried out either by itself or through one or more of its 
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subsidiaries, where it has control over a majority of its assets. Furthermore, if it is a company with a 
majority of its assets invested in securities of other companies listed on the JSE it must satisfy the 
criteria for listing for investment entities. 
Lastly a JSE mainboard listing also requires that the number of the public shareholders in respect of 
listed securities shall number at least (1) 300 for equity securities; (2) fifty for preference shares; or 
twenty-five for debentures. Investment entities, mineral companies and property companies that are 
listed on the Main Board have certain modified criteria for listing. 
Correia (2010) concluded that there were significant differences that resulted from the application of 
the Z-score and Z’’ models to companies listed on the AltX. The Z’’ model indicated that 78% of 
companies on the AltX exhibited low default characteristics, where only 11% indicated signs of 
financial distress in the next few years. The Z-score model presented a different picture where only 
51% of companies exhibited low default characteristics, and where 19% indicated signs of financial 
distress in the next few years. 
A revision was made whereby the market value of equity replaced the book value of equity by using 
market values three months after the financial year-end reporting date of each company. This resulted 
in 74% of AltX companies exhibiting low default characteristics, where only 6% showed signs of 
financial distress in the next few years. This pointed to a possible overreaction of the market during 
the financial crisis between 2008 and 2009. AltX companies were also shown to demonstrate low 
levels of financial leverage. It was also noted that a significant depreciation in equity values, which 
often can force a delisting, is not always a sure sign of impending corporate failure. 
Coelho (2014) extended this study to include companies listed on the Alt-X for the period from 2008 
to 2012 through application of both Altman’s (1968) Z-Score model and Altman’s (2005) Emerging 
Market Scoring (EMS) Model using Altman’s (1993) Z″ model. It was found that Altman’s Z-Score 
was better at predicting corporate failure when compared to Altman’s Z″ model. Altman’s Z-Score’s 
provided classification rates of 60% and 50%, one and two year’s prior to corporate failure, 
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respectively. Whereas, Altman’s Z″ model only classified corporate failure correctly with 17% for 
both one year and two years prior to this occurring. 
This was unexpected given that Altman’s Z’’ model had been specifically adapted for use in emerging 
markets. This was attributed to the omission of market value of equity in the variables used where 
book value of equity to book value of debt was used instead. The rationale behind this was that 
Altman (1993) was of the view that market value could be skewed given the lack of liquidity in many 
emerging stock exchanges. This meant that equity prices were often detached from the fundamental 
value of a company given that they were not as actively traded. 
Earnings before interest and taxation over total assets explained most of the decline in solvency for 
Alt X listed corporates. Similarly to Correia (2009) it was concluded that these corporates had low 
levels of financial leverage and consequently were not subject to a high likelihood of failure. This was 
supported by positive contributions to both Altman’s Z-Score and Altman’s Z″ model by the market 
value of equity to debt and book value of equity to debt variables, respectively. 
EMS bond equivalent ratings calculated for these Alt X corporates showed that 76% mapped to 
investment grade equivalent ratings in 2008 compared to only 52% in 2012. At the same time in 2008 
approximately 30% of these companies would have mapped to AAA bond equivalent ratings 
compared to 15% in 2012. What was not mentioned was that this showed yet another shortcoming in 
the EMS model. None of these corporates in real world setting would have achieved AAA ratings due 
the sovereign foreign and local currency ceiling considerations. Lastly, companies mapping to D had 
increased from 5% to 10 % over the period. 
The study omitted Moody’s Investors Service ratings on the basis that the bond ratings were 
fundamentally comparable; with only Standard & Poor’s bond ratings being used instead. This is not 
the case as technically the ratings between these agencies differ on an ideological basis. Fitch and 
Standard & Poor’s ratings only reflect probability of default in their assessment of credit risk. 
Moody’s Investors Service’s ratings on the other hand reflect loss given default. This is calculated as 
the probability of default multiplied by the expected loss. 
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The study also went further to examine the financial strength of those companies that had delisted 
over the period. One year prior to delisting as result of either being privatised or acquired, 33% of 
these companies had a high probability of corporate failure. 
Commercial focused studies in South African corporate failure by Moody’s Analytics, a subsidiary of 
Moody’s Corporation, led to the development of a South African version of its RiskCalc™ 
application. The application relies upon the EDF™ model as discussed previously in Chapter 3 | e) 
Market-based models for corporate failure prediction for international markets. Dwyer and Wang 
(2010) adapted the EDF™ model to measure default risk for South African private companies, which 
was developed using a sample comprising financial statements and defaults for local companies. Their 
derivation of the model also made certain exclusions with regards to specific companies. 
Small companies were excluded. This was defined as companies with net sales less than ZAR250 000, 
adjusted for inflation using a 2000 base year. Finance was often seen to be linked to the finances of 
key individuals, which were deemed not to be reflective of middle market models. This also omitted 
the impact of the provision of personal sureties, which if included, would lead to debt ratios being 
higher. 
Financial institutions were also excluded given that they exhibited higher leverage than a typical 
company and were also subject to different regulation and capital requirements. 
Public sector and not for profit institutions were excluded on the basis that government run 
institutions are influenced by the state or municipalities willingness to allow them to fail, where 
financial results are also not comparable to private companies. Financial reporting for non-profit 
companies differs from the financial reporting of traditional companies thus meaning that financial 
ratios are not comparable. 
Lastly start-up companies were also excluded due to the volatility of their financial results during 
early year’s resulting in a poor reflection of the underlying creditworthiness of the company. 
Page | 84 
This led to sample data comprising over 51 000 companies, 1000 defaults and 16 200 financial reports 
from 1997 to 2009. Variable selection commenced with a long list of potential variables that could be 
employed with nine variables included in the final model by adhering to the five criteria. This 
included (1) availability of the variable; (2) clear definition of inputs with no ambiguity; (3) variable 
being intuitive; (4) variable being able to predict default; and (5) uncorrelated with other variables. 
These variables were then transformed into interim probabilities of defaults using non-parametric 
techniques. A probit model was then used to estimate the weightings of the financial statement 
variables, which were also combined with industry variables. A non-parametric final transformation 
was created to convert the probit model score into an actual EDF credit measure. 
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This led to inclusion of the following nine variables with the associated weightings per category: 
Category  Variable (Ratio) 
Activity 21.79% 
» Inventories







Debt Coverage 7.90% » Cash Flow
Financial Charges
 
Growth  8.87% » Sales(t)
Sales(t−1)
− 1 














Size 3.98% » Real Total Assets 
The model also introduced credit cycle adjustment, which accounted for systemic risk namely the 
general credit cycle in the economy. This was designed to factor the current position of the credit 
cycle into the estimate of default for a company. This was specifically selected as being a forward-
looking indicator of default risk. In order to quantify this systemic risk Moody’s Analytics uses 
Distance to Default or DD. This was discussed in detail in Chapter 3 | e). These signals are extracted 
from the stock market performance of individual public companies. The application is then extended 
to private companies by comparing the outcomes of public companies in the industry versus the 
historical average for the industry. If the DD exceeds the average, the EDF for the private company is 
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adjusted upwards. If the DD is below the average, the EDF model for the private company is adjusted 
downwards. In the case where a private company does not conform to a particular industry 
represented by the universe of South African public companies, then an aggregation of all South 
African public companies is resorted to. In addition it was found that the DD factor increases with 
Annual GDP Growth in South Africa. 
The study’s predictive capacity was separated into two sets of results (1) Financial Statement Only 
(FSO) mode which excluded the systemic credit cycle adjustment factor; and (2) Credit Cycle 
Adjustment (CCA) mode which combined the FSO mode with the systemic credit cycle adjustment 
factor. The five year model accuracy ratio for the FSO mode was 41.64%, whereas the CCA mode 
was 45.83%. This compared favourably with the Z-score accuracy ratio of only 27.59% over the same 
period. All results were significant at a 95% confidence level. Making certain industry adjustments 
improved accuracy further with the FSO mode improving to 48.21% from 46.93% based on a one 
year model accuracy ratio. This also resulted in the aforementioned 41.64% accuracy over a five year 
period. 
Similarly, on an industry by industry basis, the CCA mode generally resulted in lower EDF where 
EDF’s were lower for (1) Agriculture; (2) Construction; (3) Mining, Transportation, Utilities and 
Natural Resources (4) Services; (5) Trade; and (6) Miscellaneous. This points to the FSO mode 
perhaps being too aggressive in terms of its quantification of EDF. The impact of this could lead to 
certain creditworthy companies not being offered credit. This would lead to lending institutions 
forgoing profit through interest income, which could be generated from a loan being made to the 
company. 
Over a one-year time horizon the model was shown to be most accurate at predicting failure in the 
Consumer Products category (55.6%) and least accurate at predicting failure in the Communication Hi 
Tech (33.32%) category. Over a five-year time horizon, the model was most accurate at predicting 
failure in the Trade industry (45.12%) and least accurate at predicting failure in the Construction 
industry (27.62%). Also worth noting is that over a one year horizon as company size increased, so 
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predictive power increased in a linear fashion. This relationship was not evident when relating 
company size to predictive power over a five-year time horizon. 
Holman, Van Breeda and Correia (2011) applied the Merton (1974) model to calculate default 
probabilities for the top 42 non-financial firms listed on the JSE. The model was developed by using 
Moody’s KMV model white papers as a guide. Theoretical default probabilities were determined 
under a base-case and a worst-case scenario. It was found that South African companies on the whole 
had low default probabilities. This was attributed to the low inherent financial leverage of South 
African corporates. 
At the same time the paper suggested a weak correlation between Merton’s default probabilities and 
ratings issued by rating agencies. However there was a fundamental error made in this analysis. A 
differentiation between national scale ratings and global scale ratings was missed. This meant that for 
some companies, national scale ratings were used, whilst for other companies global scale ratings 
were used. The risk assessment for these two ratings table can differ widely depending on the country. 
National Scale Ratings are a rank ordering of credit risk on a domestic basis. This means that in this 
assessment of credit risk, ratings factor risk relative to the sovereign rating, which normally will carry 
a Aaa rating given that it is supposed to have the lowest credit risk. This is explained by the notion 
that a sovereign should under most circumstances have the highest credit quality and be the last to 
default under any set of conditions. This is because the sovereign has the ability to raise taxes or 
nationalise assets in order to raise funds to meet its debt commitments. National scale ratings are 
mapped across from Global Scale Ratings (see appendix D). This will mean that a National Scale 
Rating will in most cases differ to that of their Global Scale Rating as per the rating agencies 
methodology with regards to mapping. 
Freedman (2015) explains further that a change in a National Scale Rating does not indicate a 
difference in credit risk, but rather a change in the unit of measurement. He likened this to moving 
from Fahrenheit to Celsius. It was further explained that National Scale Ratings are used to also 
provide a greater degree of differentiation than may be available under Global Scale Ratings. This is 
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particularly apparent in countries with low Global Scale Ratings. Low local and foreign currency 
sovereign ceilings or sovereign ratings often can result in compression of ratings for domestic issuers. 
This is eliminated through increasing the rank ordering of domestic issuer’s credit risk using a country 
specific scale from Aaa down, where the sovereign for reasons explained earlier will always be rated 
at this level as having the strongest domestic creditworthiness. 
Global Scale Ratings, on the other hand are, as the name suggests, globally comparable. This credit 
assessment not only takes into account the credit profile of an issuer on an individual basis but also 
how it compares to the global universe of rated issuers. Therefore this allows for a globally consistent 
comparison of credit risk for all issuers. 
Holman, Van Breda and Correia (2011) however used a combination of Nation Scale Ratings and 
Global Scale Ratings in their comparison of default probabilities under Merton’s (1974) model and 
ratings assigned by Moody’s Investors Service or Fitch. This meant that under this analysis National 
Scale Ratings were deemed to be equivalent to Global Scale Ratings in their assessment of credit risk. 
As explained earlier, this is not the case in practice. A parallel could be drawn by viewing Fahrenheit 
and Celsius as equivalent on a temperature scale. This meant that some of the conclusions drawn 
between the linkages between default probabilities under Merton’s (1974) model and ratings assigned 
by either Moody’s Investors Service or Fitch are not technically correct. 
However, in defence of the findings by Holman, Van Breda and Correia (2011), Merton’s (1974) 
model becomes less accurate at differentiating between risk the further way a company moves away 
from default expressed by an increasing distance to default. This in many respect is explained by the 
same relationship observed by Sun, Munves and Hamilton (2012) with respect to default rates and the 
EDF model, which is based upon Merton’s (1974) model. 
Furthermore, as with Coelho’s (2014) study the same technical error was made in the assumption that 
Fitch and Moody’s Investors Service ratings were equivalent. Fitch’s rating scale, like that of 
Standard and Poor’s only assesses probability of default. Moody’s Investors Service’s rating scale 
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however reflects loss given default or the probability of default multiplied by the expected loss given 
default.  
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Chapter 4 | Analysis of key data and the methodological approach 
This chapter will start with the definition of corporate failure that will be applied to non-financial 
South African corporates in this study. This then leads into how the sample of those non-financial 
South African corporates will be collected through applying this filter for defining corporate failure. 
Following sample construction, credit statistics or independent variables are then identified for use in 
the model. This process is based upon their prevalence in Moody’s Investors Service’s sixty-three 
non-financial corporate rating methodologies. This is also expanded to include market-based metrics 
seen to be useful for the prediction of corporate failure. 
The process for collecting data required for credit statistics for each observation included in the initial 
sample is then discussed. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the final sample selection, model design and application of 
the multiple discriminant analysis. 
a) Definition of corporate failure 
The considerations applied in screening the universe of listed non-financial South African corporates 
for an event of financial distress resulting in ultimate failure required the satisfaction of three primary 
criteria. Firstly, non-financial South African corporate failure by definition was deemed to include an 
application made for business rescue under Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act no.71 of 
2008 or where there was a specific resolution issued by a corporate to begin liquidation proceedings 
due to financial distress or insolvency. Secondly, defined corporate failure was extended to South 
African non-financial corporates which had experienced a creditor enforcing security interests by 
legal right. This included where there was formal recognition and confirmation of a default on interest 
or principal payments, without remediation. Lastly, any form of debt restructuring event whereby a 
creditor received a diminished financial obligation relative to the original obligation or was 
economically disadvantaged, was construed as corporate failure. 
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Instances where there was an occurrence of a rights issue or other shareholder capital injection event, 
such as a shareholder loan, to avoid impeding corporate failure where reviewed. It was concluded that 
this would not be treated as a credit event given that creditors were not negatively impacted. The 
likelihood of occurrence of corporate failure should be considered in the broader context of the 
financial strength of shareholders or a parent against long term value potential of a corporate. Recent 
examples of such occurrence include Super Group Limited, where a rights issue was orchestrated by 
fund manager Allan Gray, one of the largest shareholders in the company, to protect equity value 
long-term. Similarly, state pension fund custodian, the Public Investment Corporation, was the key 
supporter of Lonmin Plc’s rights issue. This was done with an aim to safeguard miners’ jobs and the 
contribution of platinum production to South Africa’s overall gross domestic product. In both cases 
rights issues avoided impending financial failure for corporates. The value proposition and the 
strategic nature of a company to its shareholders should therefore not be overlooked as part of any 
corporate failure analysis exercise. 
b) Identification of South African non-financial corporate failures 
Only listed corporates were considered given the need for access to public and independently audited 
financial information coupled with the preference for the inclusion of equity market data as outlined 
in Chapter 1 | b) iii). A combined approach was applied to the detection of failed non-financial South 
African corporates. 
The first data source comprised all delisted and suspended corporates from the JSE. Stock Exchange 
News Service announcements together with financial filings were then reviewed for each delisted or 
suspended corporate seeking any mention or reference to the aforementioned criteria for corporate 
failure. 
Secondly, a search of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Stock Exchange News Service was 
undertaken for announcements containing any reference to business rescue, liquidation, restructuring, 
default or the qualification of an audit opinion on the basis of a corporates inability to continue as a 
going concern. This then allowed for the incorporation of corporates that remained listed despite 
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having fulfilled the criteria for corporate failure. Such examples could have included an early 
resolution amongst creditors and the corporate, which then allowed for a corporate to continue as a 
listed going concern. Similarly, there could be instances where the corporate continues as a listed 
entity under business rescue protection. This would occur when the business rescue practitioners 
appointed view the benefits of maintaining a listing as outweighing the associated listing costs. 
Lastly, and for the same reasons mentioned earlier for widening the sample to include all firms 
regardless of their listing status, the same search string was run through reputable news providers for 
both current and past Johannesburg listed entities available via a Bloomberg terminal, Reuters, Dow 
Jones and Google News. At the same time, financial corporates such as Saambou Holdings Ltd were 
excluded, for the reasons mentioned in Chapter 1 | b) i). This resulted in a sample comprising eighty 
failed firms with the approximate date of corporate failure by definition spanning from April 2007 to 
December 2015. A full listing of this initial sample of failed firms is provided in Appendix L. 
The sample of failed South African non-financial corporates collected were then paired with 
corporates with similar business profiles and where practicable, scale of operations. This process 
involved using a Bloomberg terminal and through the company information tab comparing each 
company to peers provided and filtered to South Africa only. Certain non-Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange peers were included by Bloomberg on the basis of material operational exposure to South 
Africa. Examples included non-financial corporates such as Petra Diamond Limited, a peer initially 
identified for Afgem Ltd which also was a South African focused diamond miner. Petra generates 
most of its cash flow from its Finsch and Cullinan diamond mines in South Africa, but is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. These non-financial corporates were not included as peers given the 
preference to limit the sample to only those corporates listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
This at the same time ensured consistency of comparison when it came to the use of equity price data 
and the need for uniformity. Often certain broad drivers, which influence listings on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange would not have the same impact on those corporates listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. This approach avoided any nuanced effects possibly skewing equity price data that was 
used. 
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c) Credit statistic selection 
The entire distribution of quantitative ratios was collected for all Moody’s Investors Service non-
financial corporate rating methodologies, which span sixty-three sectors. Moody’s Investors Service 
non-financial corporate rating methodologies comprise both quantitative and qualitative inputs, which 
together result in an overall score providing what is referred to as a grid indicated rating. This is used 
as a guide by rating analysts in their determination of a non-financial corporate’s overall rating. This 
is considered whilst amongst other factors, most notably liquidity, forward-looking expectations, 
sovereign credit risk exposures, legal priority of claim with regards to the debt structure and 
regulatory and litigation risk to which a non-financial corporate is exposed. By way of example, 
Moody’s Investors Service’s Building Materials Industry Rating Methodology (2014) grid has been 
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In selecting financial ratios, or what Moody’s Investors Service refers to as credit statistics, the entire 
universe of quantitative ratios used in Moody’s Investors Service sixty-three non-financial corporate 
rating methodologies were surveyed and counted for their frequency of usage. A frequency or count 
cut-off of ten (representing around 10% of total ratios used and therefore deemed material) was 
applied resulting in an initial sample of nine credit statistics set out below that would be considered 
for usage in the multiple discriminant analysis model: 
.
 
Debt to Earnings before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) is the most common 
credit statistic, which Moody’s Investors Service uses in their assessment of relative creditworthiness 
of non-financial corporates. This is not surprising given the wide use of this financial risk metric by 
the credit community. Based on first-hand experience as a credit analyst it has been observed that 
most banks notably include debt to EBITDA in most of their maintenance covenant compliance tests 
contained in loan agreements. This is the same for EBIT/ Interest Expense. 
Most lenders have two essential considerations when extending loans to non-financial corporates. 
Short-term, the focus is on interest coverage and the ability to provide a return on loans advanced by 
lenders represented by EBIT/Interest Expense and long term, the focus is on financial leverage and 
the ability to ultimately repay principal, gauged through Debt to EBITDA. 
The remaining credit statistics ostensibly assess the same, but with a greater focus on cash flow based 
metrics from the cash flow statement rather than accrual based metrics from the income statement. 
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The latter often is more easily manipulated through a misguided interpretation of IFRS accounting 
standards. 
In addition, and in line with the aforementioned rationale in Chapter 1 | b) iii), debt/ market 
capitalisation was added to provide linkage of the model to that of market-based models. Furthermore, 
the percentage change in equity price over the prior year reporting period was added to reflect 
financial risk dimensioned by the equity capital markets. 
Although intended as a consideration with regards to liquidity analysis (Chapter 1 | b) iv)) and 
incorporation of forward-looking expectations (Chapter 2 | d)), both were ultimately excluded on the 
basis of non-uniform disclosure across the non-financial corporates surveyed in the sample outlined in 
section c of this chapter. 
Only a handful of failed non-financial corporates provided information on available committed bank 
facilities. This therefore limited the ability to form an accurate view on liquidity sources at their 
disposal. At the same time there was also limited information if any at all on bank covenants to which 
that the corporates were subjected to. This constrained the ability to assess the robustness of bank 
facility availability. 
When it came to forward-looking statements made by the company which could be used in assessing 
the future operating cash flow generation capacity, there was limited information provided in most 
cases which was largely qualitative in nature. Only certain companies in certain sectors provided such 
disclosure, such as miners. 
On the liquidity side there was also limited disclosure. There was limited delineation when it came to 
debt maturity profiles. The same applied to sufficiency of information required for forecast financial 
year capital expenditure spend along with any other expected cash outflows for the corporates. This 
therefore inhibited the ability to undertake a liquidity uses and sources analysis exercise. 
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At the same time this also limited the ability to attempt to generate forward-looking expectations for 
independent credit statistic variables. However, it is hoped through the inclusion of equity price 
information, forward-looking expectations to some degree will be factored in the model. 
However, what was observed is that forward-looking statements seem to be improving with regards to 
the granularity of detail provided by a number of corporates. 
i) Debt / EBITDA 
This is an indicator of debt serviceability and leverage and is commonly used as a proxy for 
comparative financial strength. EBITDA comprises Pretax Income + Interest + Amortization of 
Intangibles + Depreciation + Non-Recurring Expenses/(Gains). In line with the approach outlined in 
Chapter 2 | c) income from equity accounted entities was excluded. Exceptions were made if equity 
accounted income was attributed to equity accounted entities considered to be an integral part of the 
company’s income generating operations and sufficiently backed by cash distributions closely 
approximating that of equity accounted income levels. In instances where equity accounted entities 
were regular dividend payers, but paid out a low proportion of net income, equity accounted income 
was replaced with dividends received. 
Debt is classified using the balance sheet as Short-term Debt + Current portion of Long-term Debt + 
Long-term Debt, net of its current portion, + any resulting liabilities for capital leases, if not already 
included in Debt, as per the approach outlined in Chapter 2 | b) with respect to the capitalisation of 
operating leases. Gross debt is generally preferred in assessing ‘debt capacity’ or the ability to repay 
and service debt levels. Although cash balances, should not be ignored, there is often a certain 
proportion which should be attributed to keeping a corporate’s day to day operations going or what 
sometime is referred to as ‘keeping the lights on’. Therefore it cannot be assumed that the entire 
amount of cash balances can be deployed to debt reduction. It is difficult to estimate without insight 
from the company what level of cash, with a degree of safety margin, is required to meet the day-to-
day cash flow needs of the company. It is expected that most companies will try to optimise cash 
levels as much as they possibly can. This reduces negative carry or the loss of earnings due to lower 
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interest income on cash balances relative to higher interest charges on debt balances. Therefore it is 
fair to assume that in most instances, where there are certain exceptions such as prefunding of capital 
expenditure, debt will be reduced with surplus cash balances as far as is reasonably possible. Taking 
this into account, looking at debt serviceability through net debt as opposed to gross debt, is in the 
most part viewed sceptically, as this is not deemed to be representative of the ‘true’ financial leverage 
of a company. 
This ratio serves as a useful proxy for a non-financial corporate’s inherent financial strength. 
ii) Revenue 
Revenue provides useful information content on a number of credit characteristic traits for non-
financial corporates. Scale of revenue often will capture geographical and operational diversification 
along with financial resources available to the corporate entity. The larger the firm, the broader the 
extent of its operations and locations along with its access to financing both from the equity and credit 
markets, where it is likely to be seen as being more reputable and recognisable. A larger scale of 
revenue often can also reflect a more extensive customer base, along with potentially purchasing 
power and price leadership, which are often linked to market share. 
Scale of revenue can also often be seen as a representation of the age of the firm including the number 
of business cycles it has successfully navigated and learnt from in the process, therein also 
demonstrating resilience. 
Revenue was converted into US dollars using the average translation rate over the reporting period. 
This is in line with the approach that Moody’s Investors Service uses on a global basis, to ensure 
comparability of scale. This also at the same time introduced a currency effect for consideration by 
the Multiple Discriminant Analysis model. This is an import consideration in the context of non-
financial corporate failure prediction in a South African context, where the inherent volatility of the 
South African rand can in itself have a part to play in the propensity for financial distress. 
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Import or export businesses, or business reliant on inputs that are denominated in foreign currency, 
can often find themselves under pressure if the South African rand moves the wrong direction for the 
company. Such examples include industrial companies and miners, where their businesses become 
less competitive in a global context if the South African rand appreciates relative to key currency 
exposures, as their cost bases are no longer globally competitive. Similarly, businesses reliant upon 
inputs denominated in foreign currency, such as domestically focused airlines that have not entered 
into any foreign currency hedging arrangements on their jet fuel, can face financial pressure if the 
South African rand depreciates. These non-financial corporates may not be able to pass on cost push 
inflation experienced from inputs by the businesses, such as jet fuel, to end customers, in this case 
passengers. 
iii) EBIT / Interest Expense 
The same approach that was applied to EBITDA for equity accounted income from equity accounted 
entities is also applied to Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT). EBIT is calculated as Pretax 
Income+ Interest + Non-Recurring Expenses/(Gains). Interest Expense is defined as Gross Interest 
Expense per the Income Statement. This provides an indication of a company’s ability to pay interest. 
iv) FCF / Debt 
Through using the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flow, Free cash flow is calculated as follows: 
Cash Flow From Operations (CFO) − Capital Expenditures − Common Dividends − Preferred 
Dividends − Minority Dividends. Debt is per the definition provided under Debt/EBITDA. 
v) FFO / Debt 
By using the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flow, Funds From Operations (FFO) is defined as 
follows: Cash flow from operations before changes in working capital and changes in other short-term 
and long-term operating assets and liabilities. Debt is as per the classification given under 
Debt/EBITDA.  
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vi) RCF / Debt 
Retained Cash Flow (RCF) is calculated using the Consolidated Statement of Cash Flow as follows: 
FFO, as defined above, − Common Dividends − Preferred Dividends − Minority Dividends. Debt is 
calculated in line with the definition for Debt/EBITDA. 
vii) Debt / Book Equity 
Book Capitalisation is defined by Moody’s Investors Service from the balance sheet as follows: 
Short-term Debt + Gross Long-term Debt, + Deferred Taxes + Minority Interest + Book Equity. This 
is seen to be an extension of Capital Employed. Debt is as per the definition provided in 
Debt/EBITDA. 
Due to Deferred Taxes not being disclosed as a separate line item for some corporates, it was decided 
that Book Equity instead of Book Capitalisation would be used. 
viii) RCF / Net Debt 
RCF is as defined under RCF to Debt, whereas Net Debt is Debt, as defined under Debt/EBITDA, 
less unrestricted cash balances. 
ix) Percentage EBIT Margin 
The EBIT margin is calculated by dividing earnings before interest, and taxes by net sales. This 
provides an indication of a non-financial corporate’s profitability. 
x) Debt/ Market Capitalisation 
Debt is as per the definition provided in Debt/EBITDA. Market capitalisation is defined as  # of 
Shares x Market Price at the financial reporting date. Debt/Market Capitalisation brings market model 
theory in terms of distance to default as explained in Chapter 3 | e) for consideration in application in 
the multiple discriminant analysis model. 
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xi) Equity price return over the prior year 
Market Price at the financial reporting date divided by the Market Price at the financial reporting date 
minus 1. Data should be screened for volatility attributed to share splits or share buy backs which 
could mask the rationale for share movements. The impact of dividends on share price should not be 
removed as they ultimately also have a liquidity impact that is attached to the company which should 
be considered in overall credit analysis. 
d) Independent variable data collection 
Data required for calculation of the eleven variables to be used in the Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
Model was sourced from a combination of annual reports, sourced from financial filings, and financial 
information provided through a Bloomberg terminal. This was then cross compared through adjusted 
financial data sourced from FactSet, a proprietary software application used by Moody’s Investors 
Service, which provides both financial statement and market data. Data was collected on an annual 
reporting basis, given that some firms had not prepared interim reports. Financial data obtained from 
interim financial statements was deemed to have a lower degree of integrity and reliability of 
information provided. This was predicated by their review by independent auditors. This is different 
too annual financial statements, which are audited and subject to a comprehensive review process. 
Hence, only financial information provided on an annual basis was used. 
Financial data was collected for two data points for each paired failed and non-failed South African 
non-financial corporates. The first data point included the latest financial data that was provided by 
the failed South African non-financial corporate, ahead of its corporate failure as defined in section b 
of this chapter. This was then matched to the same accompanying data point for the non-failed firm. 
This allowed for the comparability of failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates on 
a like for like basis. This at the same time then gave due consideration to the same economic cycles 
and business conditions that corporates with an overlapping business profile would experience. 
Bruwer and Hamman (2006), attempted to control for economic cycles. However in the case of this 
study, variables of each paired failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporate would 
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ostensibly capture the impact of economic cycles. As such, to factor economic cycles would be double 
accounting given that this would already be incorporated in the information content of the 
independent variables. Similarly, controlling for economic cycles would in effect be removing the 
differentiating power offered through the independent variables. 
Furthermore, considering economic cycles could also be counter intuitive for some sectors. 
Performance for some corporates may prove stronger in recessionary economic cycles when 
compared to growth economic cycles. Examples of these could be retailers with lower price points 
and low cost airlines, where both generally benefit in a weaker economic climate as consumers are 
forced to down trade when it comes to their consumer expenditure patterns. Therefore, controlling for 
economic cycles would be not be representative of credit fundamentals, where credit metrics could be 
either weakened or strengthened, depending on the corporate, in either up or down economic cycle. 
Ultimately, the discriminant function derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model should 
instead focus on prediction based on credit metric movements, rather than economic cycles. Credit 
metrics would in any case take this into account, no matter what sector or economic environment a 
corporate finds itself in. 
The second data point was the financial information provided a year prior to the first data point. 
e) Sample selection of failed South African non-financial corporates 
From the initial sample of eighty failed South African non-financial corporates this was reduced to 
forty-four corporates through application of the research design. Firstly data, as discussed in Chapter 
1 | b) i), from South African non-financial corporates that met the definition of corporate failure were 
only included if their annual financial reporting had been prepared under IFRS. This resulted in a 
reduction of the initial sample to sixty-one failed South African non-financial corporates. A second 
round of exclusion was based upon the inclusion of only those firms where there was sufficient 
financial disclosure to make necessary adjustments as were outlined Chapter 2 | b). This should be 
used to realign financial metrics to provide the necessary information required for a true obligation 
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reflection and assessment in their credit metrics. This led to a final sample of forty-four failed South 
African non-financial corporates paired with their appropriate non-failed peer. 
The greatest concentration of South African non-financial corporates failures in the sample data 
comprised construction companies followed jointly by building materials and mining companies. This 
can in part most likely be explained by the slowdown in construction following the financial crisis. 
This followed from reduced bank lending for property developments and the tapering off of FIFA 
World Cup 2010 linked infrastructure spending. Mining related failure was in part explained by a 
softening of commodity prices, specifically gold and platinum prices, followed subsequently by a 
decline in base metals prices. 
 
The inherent shortcoming of applying the research design constraints to the original sample is a 












































Page | 101 
Although this will still be attempted through a halving of the sample, the applicability of such testing 
may be lowered to some extent given that the relatively small sample size comprising only twenty-
two failed firms paired with twenty-two non-failed firms. This split will also be varied through 
considering the first twenty-two failed firms for the learning sample, with the remaining twenty-two 
failed firms used for the test sample, and vice versa. 
The sector distribution for the first twenty-two failed firms was as follows with Building Materials, 
Construction and IT Service sectors evenly weighted with highest corporate failure observations: 
 
The sector distribution for the first twenty-two failed firms was as follows with the Construction 
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Another limitation will be the reliability of financial information, which is open to accounting 
manipulation or fraudulent activity, which cannot be controlled for in the model. The hope though is 
that in some instances, where such activity has occurred that this could potentially be reflected 
through movements in equity prices. Some market participants are likely to have picked up on such 
activity in advance of it being formally announced to the market. They would then reflect such 
information in their valuation and in turn, in the equity price of the corporate. 
Through using a second data point, which preceded the prior year data point, some firms were further 
excluded in the interest of consistency of cross sampling, on the basis of either not having adopted 
IFRS or not having sufficient disclosure necessary to make the necessary adjustments as were 
outlined in Chapter 2 | b). 
Therefore in the interests of maintaining a sufficient sample size, only the latest financial data point 
provided before failure was used. This aligns with the general credit rule that most corporate failure 
should be identified and navigated twelve months out in line with Moody’s Investors Service (2016) 
ratings’ time horizons and the focus on twelve-month default rates. This was also seen by Taffler 
(1976) to be an adequate period to divest or limit loan losses. In most cases the latest financial data 
point still gave more time than twelve months from the date non-financial South African corporates 
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met the definition of corporate failure as discussed earlier in section a) of this chapter. This is in line 
with a Moody’s Investors Service credit policy post mortem assessment for default prediction, where 
ratings should signal a high probability of default one year in advance of a default occurring. 
f) Multiple discriminant analysis model design and inputs 
StatSoft, Inc’s Statistica data analysis software system Version 12 was used to run the discriminant 
analysis model. All data comprising eighty-eight combined and unique peer-matched failed and non-
failed South African non-financial corporates along with their corresponding financial data that had 
been gathered for each of the eleven variables identified in section c of this chapter were imported 
into Statistica. This resulted in twelve columns of data, including a final column identifying the South 
African non-financial corporates as either failed or non-failed, and eighty-eight rows. Statistica 
automatically incorporates column labels in a separate non-counted row at the top of the sheet. 
The failed/non-failed column was selected as the grouping variable with the eleven independent credit 
statistic variables selected to be included in the independent variable list. Stepwise analysis was 
selected, with a forward stepwise analysis specified. 
The model had a critical cut-off score of zero i.e. a score above zero indicated non-failure, a score 
below, failure. 
The limitation of multiple discriminant analysis and the sample that it will use in developing a 
discriminant function, is that the results are completely sample dependent. It is worth noting that this 
may influence the outcomes of this study in a number of ways. 
Firstly, there may be a degree of distortion with regards to observations that occurred during the 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. This may lead to the discriminant function being distorted to some 
extent for increase financial risks that are remote, but not impossible. This may prove to be beneficial 
in structuring the model towards being more conservative in its assessment of risk and its 
consideration for the occurrence of outlying events. 
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Secondly, the period that followed the financial crisis reflects the effects of easing monetary policy 
leading to a positively skewed risk distribution. With the longer term view of removing quantitative 
easing this may result in consequences that may not be fully factored by a discriminant function 
developed for different economic conditions. 
This change in economic conditions is already apparent with the growing degree of volatility 
witnessed in financial markets and corporate fundamentals as the world economy moves from the 
‘new normal’ to the ‘new abnormal’. This new era is expected to be characterised by an expectation 
of negative short term interest rates in many economies and depressed asset valuations. 
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g) Treatment of outliers 
Both Bruwer and Hamman’s (2006) and Sun, Munves and Hamilton (2012) highlighted that the 
nature of financial data often means that it does not conform to a normal distribution. This is as a 
result of a higher than expected concentration of outliers or extreme events. Under a normal 
distribution the probability of outlying financial data is low, but in reality this is often a lot higher. 
This leads to fatter tails due to a greater number of outlying observations resulting, which more 
closely aligns with that of a Student's t-distribution of observations which accommodates for a higher 
propensity for the occurrence of extreme observations. 
There is a general preference for excluding outliers in a sample before running a multiple discriminant 
analysis. In the case of this sample an attempt will be made to not to exclude paired-firms on the basis 
of any one independent credit statistic variable observation being considered to be an outlier. 
The exclusion of outliers in essence would be a decoupling of the model from real world possibilities, 
where extreme financial data can exist for anyone of a number of reasons, excluding no debt, a low 
interest expense, negative equity or relatively high debt or low EBIT generation. It can be expected 
that there will be a greater number of extreme observations for independent credit statistic variables 
when it comes to failed firms. This can be expected as volatility of financial data often represents an 
elevated level of financial risk providing early indication for the increased propensity for corporate 
failure. This often not only indicative of financial leverage but in many cases operating leverage too. 
To overlook this consideration would not be reflective of the true ingredients that often can lead to 
corporate failure. Adjusting the sample for a cleaner and perhaps more palatable picture of 
independent credit statistic variables would not be respecting the proposed research design outlined to 
meet the research objectives. This could be seen as making the sample fit the modelling rather than 
attempting to see if the modelling itself can fit the sample which ultimately is the research objective. 
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By attempting to run the multiple discriminant model on a sample comprising a range of different 
observations it is hoped that the resulting discriminant function will be more robust when it comes to 
the classification of corporate failure.  
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Chapter 5 | Empirical findings of the study and a discussion of the results 
This chapter will commence with an examination of the descriptive statistics relating to the sample 
used in the multiple discriminant analysis. This will include reviewing the correlation between the 
various independent credit statistic variables used for discrimination of the data used in the sample. 
Any intercorrelation existing between any two independent credit statistic variables will also be 
identified. At the same time this will be extended to a graphical analysis to include scatter plots to 
demonstrate any pre-existing linear relationships between two independent credit statistic variables. 
This will then be followed by a review of the sample means to assess which independent credit 
statistic variables appear to show the greatest degree of variation between failed and non-failed firms.  
This analysis of variation will be extended to the generation of both histograms and box and whisker 
plots. At the same time these will also provide insights into any outlying data points as well as the 
distribution of data and how closely they conform to a normal distribution. 
There is consideration given to outliers in some observations for independent credit statistic variables 
in the sample and how these should be addressed and their implications for multiple discriminant 
analysis. 
This will flow into a review of the multiple discriminant analysis outputs. Firstly, independent credit 
statistic variables not included in the model will be discussed along with the potential motivations for 
their exclusion. This will entail examination of the resulting discriminant function, its ability to 
classify corporate failure, and its application to the initial sample. Additionally, an attempt will be 
made to refine the model, if possible. 
Lastly, the multiple discriminant analysis will extend to a splitting of the initial sample. This will done 
firstly by splitting into a learning sample, comprising the first forty-four paired non-failed and failed 
non-financial South African corporates. The resulting discriminant function will then be  applied to a 
test sample comprising the remaining forty-four paired non-failed and failed non-financial South 
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African corporates. This therefore provides the ability for the applicability of the discriminant 
function to accurately predict corporate failure on a hold out sample. 
This will also be performed the other way around where the last forty-four paired non-failed and 
failed non-financial South African corporates will become the learning sample. The resulting 
discriminant function is applied to a test sample comprising the first forty-four paired non-failed and 
failed non-financial South African corporates. 
After having completed this analysis, all discriminant functions will be assessed and their 
classification rates compared a multiple discriminant analysis model run on a sample comprising 
financial data that has been prepared under both IFRS and SA GAAP. This will allow for a conclusion 
to be drawn on whether IFRS only financial information results in improved accuracy for the 
prediction of corporate failure. At the same time a determination can also then be made on whether by 
using an expanded sample of failed firms this will improve upon classification rates. 
a) Analysis of descriptive statistics 
i) Pooled within group correlations 
The correlation matrix sets out below the correlation coefficients for all variables included in the 
model compared themselves and other variables. 























1 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 -0.01 
Rev. -0.05 1 0 0.01 0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 
EBIT/Int 0.06 0 1 0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 
FCF/Debt -0.03 0.01 0.05 1 0.79 0.78 -0.01 -0.1 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 
RCF/Debt -0.11 0.06 0.04 0.79 1 0.97 -0.04 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 0.18 
FFO/Debt -0.12 0.11 -0.12 0.78 0.97 1 -0.02 -0.15 0.03 -0.13 0.18 
Debt/ B Cap -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 1 0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.04 
RCF/Net debt 0.06 0.15 -0.02 -0.1 -0.14 -0.15 0.01 1 -0.17 0.02 -0.22 
EBIT Margin 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.03 0.09 -0.17 1 0.09 0.06 
Debt/ M Cap 0.06 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 0.08 0.02 0.09 1 -0.11 
1 Year Equity 
Price Return 
-0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.18 0.18 -0.04 -0.22 0.06 -0.11 1 
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The correlation matrix demonstrated a strong intergroup correlation (>0.75x<-0.75) shown between 
FFO/Debt, RCF/Debt and FCF/Debt. This is to be expected given that all three credit statistics rely 
upon FFO as a starting point. RCF then reduces this by dividends paid with FCF factoring movements 
in short term and long term operating assets and liabilities, movements in working capital and capital 
expenditure. 
Therefore, in an additional enhanced model test only one of these should be included, therein reducing 
the number of independent credit statistic variables to eight from eleven. It would be recommended 
that FCF be used given that it is more representative for debt serviceability capacity as it most 
accurately demonstrates residual cash flow generation ability to meet debt repayments. This additional 
information content offered is further supported by a lower intergroup correlation between the three 
cash flow metrics of 0.78. 
ii) Samples means 
Analysing the means of the independent credit statistic variables will allow for an assessment of 
variation between observations for failed and non-failed firms. In addition this will also allow for an 
analysis of some key differences between observed means for failed and non-failed firms. 
 





EBITDA Rev. EBIT/ Int 
FCF/ 











1 Year Equity 
Price Return N 
Failed 




1.63x $1,291.01mn 23.87x 43% 108% 138% 225% 84% 25% 31% 7% 
44 
All Grps 
5.41x $694.25mn -154.20x 26% 105% 127% 847% 5% -149% 112% -7% 
88 
It is worth noting that in the table of means above that some of the independent credit statistic 
variables were skewed due to the presence of some outlying observations. Although these outlying 
observations are correctly specified, their presence does result in a material impact on some of the 
means for the independent credit statistic variables.  
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EBITDA Rev. EBIT/ Int 
FCF/ 











1 Year Equity 
Price Return N 
Failed 2.94x $22.75mn -2.96x -23% -19% -13% 27% -25% -9% 63% -47% 44 
Non-
Failed 1.42x $517.63mn 4.31x 13% 43% 59% 34% 38% 6% 24% 2% 44 
All Grps 1.76x $91.47mn 1.80x -2% 19% 28% 31% 5% 3% 38% -16% 88 
The presence and impact of outliers for independent credit statistic variable observations is even more 
clearly evident when substituting means for medians. Medians can be seen to be more representative 
of typically what would be seen for observed financial data for the independent credit statistic 
variables in most failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates. Again, this does not 
take into the account for possibility of extreme values where their occurrence is higher than would be 
commonly expected. 
The most notable outliers in the independent credit statistic variable observations were explained by 
some observations having a very low to negative EBITDA with a relatively high debt level in the case 
of debt/ EBITDA and a very low Interest Expense with a relatively large EBIT loss in the case of 
EBIT/ Interest Expense. Similarly, an extremely low Book Value of Equity or Market Capitalisation, 
tied to a relatively high debt level, impacted Debt/ Book Value of Equity and Debt/ Market 
Capitalisation, respectively. 
The independent credit statistic variable observation outliers were primarily related to failed firms. As 
explained previously in Chapter 4 | G, this is to be expected given the nature of some of the business 
conditions that resulted in ultimate corporate failure and  reflected in the extreme volatility and swings 
in the financial data. 
By excluding outliers the sample would reduce to thirty-three failed firms combined with thirty-three 
non-failed firms with the means provided below for both. 
 





EBITDA Rev. EBIT/ Int 
FCF/ 











1 Year Equity 
Price Return N 
Failed 
6.26x $122.77mn -3.28x -69% 15% 25% 173% -113% -32% 235% -14% 33 
Non-
Failed 
1.65x $1,380.56mn 7.93x 21% 75% 120% 35% 55% 29% 30% 9% 33 
All Grps 
3.96x $751.66mn 2.32x -24% 45% 72% 104% -29% -2% 133% -3% 66 
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The impact of using the sample without outliers on the discriminant function is discussed in detail in 
section c) iv) of this chapter. 
The expressed intention outlined in Chapter 4 | G is to respect the research objectives and to fit the 
model to the data, rather than the other way around. As such, the discussion of the means will focus 
on the original sample and the initial table of means presented at the beginning of this section, despite 
the occurrence of outlying data points. 
The multiple discriminant analysis on the original sample indicated that the most notable material 
differences in the means occurred between failed and non-failed South African non-financial 
corporates for Debt/EBITDA and Revenue. Also worth mentioning, is that these two credit metrics 
are most frequently used by Moody’s Investors Service in their corporate rating methodologies as 
outlined in Chapter 4 | C. 
There also appears to be material differences between the means for failed and non-failed corporates 
when it comes to EBIT/ Interest Expense, Debt/ Book Equity, FCF/Debt, RCF/Net Debt, EBIT 
Margin and Debt/ Market Capitalisation. The mean of the grouping of failed firms also exhibited that 
they were significantly loss making relative to their interest burden. 
Notable exceptions where means did not demonstrate material variances between failed and non-
failed were; FFO/ Debt, RCF/ Debt and Equity price return over the prior year. The first two can be 
explained by these metrics not being reflective of debt servicing capacity and liquidity, where this 
additional consideration was shown to add value through considering cash balances against debt in 
RCF/Net Debt. 
Equity price return over the prior year return may be driven more from a systemic risk perspective, 
rather than a firm risk perspective when it comes to variation in equity price returns. This could be 
expressed that concerns often expressed through equity price returns are often not unique to a 
corporate but rather a sector or the economy at large. 
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However, those corporates carrying more debt are likely to be seen to be more at risk in such instance 
and therefore more likely to see a sharper decline in their equity price. The value however was shown 
when it came to considering these equity price movements against the amount of debt carried by the 
corporate, therein factoring a distance to default characteristic which provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for market-based models as described in Chapter 3 | e). 
The preference to first pair failed with non-failed firms by sector and then by scale of operations could 
skew the explanatory power of the multiple discriminant analysis given the inclusions of non-failed 
firms with revenues significantly exceeding that of their pair failed firm. Although with this said, and 
in line with arguments presented in Chapter 4 | C)ii), this may still represent the substance of 
corporate failure prediction. 
Often firms with larger scale revenue, as measured in this study in millions of US dollars, may 
resemble characteristics of having greater diversity of operations across business units and 
geographies. This consideration provides natural risk mitigation, which can reduce the propensity for 
corporate failure. The research design was also not deemed to be misplaced given that when it came 
to inclusion of the two equity price linked independent credit statistic variables it wouldn’t have made 
sense to pair two firms from different sectors together even if this meant a better alignment of 
scale/revenue. This approach then allowed for comparison of the unique financial risk differences 
between the failed and non-failed corporate rather than financial risks that were endemic to the sector 
within which it operated. 
It is also worth reiterating the point that any exercise attempting a perfect pairing of non-failed and 
failed non-financial South African firms also faces the limitation of a smaller sample of corporates to 
select from when compared to larger equity markets in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The concentration of outliers mainly related to that of the failed firms, however there were some 
unique instances where outliers existed for certain independent credit statistic variable observations.  
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iii) Histograms of independent credit statistic variables 
1. Combined for failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates 
With reference to Appendix E, only a few of the independent credit statistic variables used in the 
sample appeared to conform to a normal distribution. These only included EBIT/ Interest Expense and 
RCF/Net Debt. The remainder of the credit statistic variables were characterised by non-normal 
distribution of data with outliers either resulting in left tailed or right tailed distributions of data. 
However, in the large part, most of the data appeared to be concentrated around the mean with the 
exception of debt/EBITDA and Revenue, however this was expected given the greater degree of 
variability in the data, for failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates. It is worth 
noting that there were no instances of multi-modal distribution of observations. 
2. Grouped by failed or non-failed South African non-financial corporates 
Independent credit statistic variables data for non-failed South African non-financial corporates 
consistently showed a normal distribution of observations with the exception of revenue. This is to be 
expected given the inherent financial stability of their businesses, and hence why they did not find 
themselves in financial distress as opposed to their failed peers. 
At the same time the distribution of observations for failed corporates showed a greater degree of 
volatility and non-normality. This again is not surprising given that volatility of both financial and 
equity market linked data points are often indicative of impending pressures that these corporates will 
face. In the case of these corporates the pressure of these challenges proved overwhelming, ultimately 
leading to failure. 
However, in both the failed and non-failed grouping of South African non-financial corporates there 
were no instances of multi-modal distribution of observations, although there was evidence of fat 
tailing to both the left and right with regard to the distribution of observations. This however is an 
observed characteristic of most financial data.  
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iv) Box and whisker plot of independent credit statistic variables 
1. Combined for failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates 
Given scaling, specifically for Revenue and EBIT/Interest Expense followed by debt/EBITDA, 
Debt/Book Equity and EBIT margin, the initial box and whisker plot of all variables had to be split 
into a further two box and whisker plots in order to be visibility interpretable. The resulting three box 
and whisker plots are provided in Appendix F. As highlighted earlier in section iii) of this chapter, the 
data is characterised by outliers although there appears to be an equal concentration of observations 
either side of the mean for most independent credit statistic variables. Outliers are representative of an 
increased likelihood of the occurrence of extreme left or right tailed event, where both should be 
given consideration in any credit analysis. 
2. By failed or non-failed South African non-financial corporate groupings 
With reference to Appendix F, non-failed South African non-financial corporates have lower 
variability across all independent credit statistic variables, with the exception of revenue. At the same 
time, all independent credit statistic variables for non-failed corporates were characterised by lower 
variability, positive concentration and were skewed positively. Across all independent credit statistic 
variables non-failed corporates were also shown to be more favourably positioned based upon 
appropriate interpretation of the unit of measurement. Revenue was higher, Debt/EBITDA and debt/ 
market capitalisation lower for the spectrum of non-failed corporates. 
The converse of all of the above mentioned for non-failed corporates, was true of failed corporates. 
v) Scatter plot of correlations between sample of independent credit statistic variables 
Appendix G graphically demonstrates the interrelationship demonstrated by upward trending linear 
curves shown between FFO/Debt, RCF/Debt and FCF/Debt. As discussed in section c of this chapter 
it would be advisable to undertake a rerun of the data under an enhanced approach to exclude 
FFO/Debt and RCF/Debt, whilst only including FCF/Debt for the aforementioned reason. 
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b) Analysis of multiple discriminant function 
This section will examine the outputs generated in Statistica through running a multiple discriminant 
analysis. The analysis will result in a discriminant function with coefficients provided for each 
independent credit statistic variable and a constant. These are derived from the canonical scores of the 
raw coefficients that the model generates. Through inputting the various observations for each non-
failed and failed non-financial South African corporate and including the constant, a discriminant or 
z-score can be calculated. If the z-score<0, then the firm is classified as having failed. If the z-score>0 
then the firm is deemed to be non-failed. Classification rates are determined by calculating the 
number of firms correctly classified by the discriminant function and dividing these by the total 
number of observations in the sample. 
The statistical significance of the discriminatory power of the multiple discriminant analysis model is 
assessed through using Wilks’ lambda. The values range from 1, indicating no discriminatory power, 
to 0 indicating perfect discriminatory power. Each value provided indicates the cumulative 
discriminatory power the variables have in combination up until the point of their inclusion. 
The Partial Wilk’s Lamda provides the unique contribution of the respective variable to the 
discrimination between groups. The same measurement scale applied to Wilks’ lambda applies, where 
0.0 indicates perfect discriminatory power and 1 no discriminatory power. 
i) Variables not included in the model 
 







enter p-value Toler. 
1-Toler. 
(R-Sqr.) 
FCF/Debt 0.62216 0.998205 0.142069 0.707243 0.980396 0.019604 
RCF/Debt 0.619684 0.994232 0.458316 0.50039 0.919944 0.080056 
FFO/Debt 0.619248 0.993533 0.514213 0.475436 0.906059 0.093942 
Debt/BV 0.620289 0.995203 0.380831 0.538934 0.980406 0.019594 
With reference to the above table, FCF/Debt, RCF/Debt, FFO/Debt and Debt// BV were excluded due 
to their high Partial Wilks’ Lambda, where all three independent credit statistic variables were above 
0.99, where 1.0 is indicative of no discriminatory power, and 0 is indicative of perfect discriminatory 
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power. Partial Wilks’ Lambda is the unique contribution of the respective variable to the 
discrimination between groups. 
P values for these variables were excessively high ranging from 0.47 to 0.7, where a cut-off of 0.05 or 
5% implies a 95% confidence level, which is applied for most statistical techniques. Notable, was that 
the highest p-value was FCF/Debt which would therefore refute its inclusion in an enhanced sampling 
model as suggested in section a)i of this chapter. 
Tolerance is 1 minus R-Square or the multiple correlation often referred to as the percentage of 
variation explained by an independent variable. Therefore, each variable in isolation explained less 
than 10% of variation in discriminating between non-failed and failed South African non-financial 
corporates, with the lowest percentage of variation being explained by Debt/Book Equity at 1.9594% 
followed by FCF/Debt at 1.9604%. 
The exclusion of these variables could be explained by cash flow information not factoring some of 
the accrual elements, which may provide useful information content with regards to the propensity for 
corporate failure. At the same time book equity may prove meaningless as an input given that it is 
often seen to be an out-dated measure of firm value. 
ii) Variables included in the model 
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (Test Sample) Step 7, N of vars in 
model: 7; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' Lambda: .62328 







(1,80) p-value Toler. 
1-Toler. 
(R-Sqr.) 
Rev. 0.715336 0.87131 11.81581 0.000935 0.969098 0.030902 
Debt/M Cap 0.667387 0.933909 5.66142 0.019724 0.965815 0.034185 
Debt/EBITDA 0.661253 0.942573 4.87411 0.030126 0.97932 0.02068 
1 Year Equity 
Price Return 0.646549 0.964009 2.98676 0.087806 0.93767 0.06233 
RCF/Net debt 0.647921 0.961967 3.1629 0.079129 0.902392 0.097608 
EBIT Margin 0.639825 0.97414 2.12376 0.148945 0.952334 0.047666 
EBIT/Int 0.63565 0.980539 1.58781 0.211303 0.987847 0.012153 
As evidenced in the table above, the Revenue independent credit statistic variable contributes the most 
when it comes to discriminating between independent credit statistic variables, given that it has the 
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lowest Partial Wilks’ Lambda of 0.871310. This is followed by Debt/ Market Capitalisation and then 
Debt/EBITDA. All three independent credit statistic variables have a p-value below 0.05 or 5% at a 
95% confidence level cut-off. Low R-squares are not a concern given they ignore the impact of the 
ability to explain variation through a combination of variables. 
From the initial eleven independent credit statistic variables that were specified for inclusion in the 
multiple discriminant analysis model, only seven independent credit statistic variables were seen 
together in their combination to provide a statistically significant differentiation between the sample 
of failed and non-failed corporates. In order of inclusion based on level of differentiation and addition 
to the Revenue, Debt/ Market Capitalisation and Debt/EBITDA, these included, 1 year equity price 
return, RCF/Net Debt, percentage EBIT margin and EBIT/Interest Expense. 
This is not surprising given the prior mention in the preamble in section b of this chapter where there 
has been a continued focus of the credit community on leverage as measured by Debt/EBITDA and 
interest coverage, as measured by EBIT/ Interest Expense, in assessing the propensity for corporate 
failure. EBIT/ Interest Expense was included despite its high p-value as its addition was seen to 
improve the overall discriminatory power of the discriminant function by Statistica. 
However, what was not expected was the inclusion of a RCF/Net Debt given the prior discussion in 
section b of this chapter around debt being viewed net of cash balances, where cash balances are often 
seen to be transitory in some respects. This could also in part be explained by the historical preference 
of the South African non-financial corporate management community to rely more heavily on surplus 
cash balances rather than committed bank facilities, more commonly seen in the US and Europe, to 
provide liquidity buffers. 
Also to be highlighted are the inclusion of two market-based metrics namely, Debt/ Market 
Capitalisation followed by Equity price return over the prior year. Debt/Market Capitalisation brings 
market model theory in terms of distance to default as explained in Chapter 3 | e) for consideration in 
application in this multiple discriminant analysis model. Equity price return over the prior year also 
provides useful insights into how the equity market is calibrating the residual value of a company in 
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the context of prevailing business conditions. This is presented in the chart below, which shows 
elevated downside risk for failed-firms when compared to their non-failed matched peers: 
 
Revenue, as the strongest differentiator out of the initial eleven independent credit statistic variables 
identified for the model is also not surprising. The usefulness of revenue as a credit failure predictor 
was discussed in Chapter 4 | c) ii where it was also highlighted in the preamble that it is the second 
most common credit metric used by Moody’s Investors Service in its rating methodologies used for 
ranking relative credit risk by sector for non-financial corporates. 
iii) Canonical analysis 
This is used in assessing the ability of the independent credit statistic variables included in the 
discriminant function to discriminate between non-failed and failed non-financial South African 
corporates. The multiple discriminant analysis will attempt to create independent or orthogonal 
discriminant functions, with each function contributing less to overall discriminatory power in line 
with the forward stepwise applied in running the multiple discriminant analysis model. The maximum 
number of discriminant functions that will result will either be the number of independent variables or 
the number of groups minus one, where the smaller of two is selected. In this case given that there are 
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only two groups, failed and failed non-financial South African corporates, this will be the smaller 
number and only one discriminant function will result. 
Roots 
Removed 






Lambda Chi-Sqr. df p-value 
0 0.604417 0.613776 0.623279 39.00276 7 0.000002 
As indicated in the table above only one discriminant function/canonical root was derived for 
differentiating between non-failed and failed South African non-financial corporates. The singular 
discriminant function that resulted is deemed to be statistically significant in its differentiation of 
failed and non-failed firms evidenced through a p-value of 0.000002 or 0.0002% where a result below 
0.05 or 5% which would have been deemed to be statistically significant at a 95% confidence 
threshold level. 
  
Page | 120 
iv) Discriminant function coefficients 
 
Raw Coefficients (Test Sample) for Canonical Variables 
Variable Root 1 
Rev. 0.000504 
Debt/M Cap -0.18426 
Debt/EBITDA -0.03193 
1 Year Equity Price Return 0.449887 
RCF/Net debt 0.088777 





By using the table above and the discriminant function coefficients provided the discriminant function 
derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model is as follows:  
𝑍 = 0.109247 + 0.000504(𝑋1) − 0.18426(𝑋2) − 0.03193(𝑋3) + 0.449887(𝑋4) + 0.088777(𝑋5)
+ 0.019311(𝑋6) + 0.000151(𝑋7) 








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 












 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
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By means of illustration of the application of this discriminant function it will be applied to 1Time 
Holdings Limited. The company announced on 21 August 2012 that it was placing its subsidiaries, 
1Time (Pty) Limited and Jetworx Aircraft Services (Pty) Limited, under business rescues as a result 
of their being in financial distress: 
𝑍 = 0.109247 + 0.000504(177.1) − 0.18426(1.8) − 0.03193(5.9) + 0.449887(−0.7)
+ 0.088777(−0.9) + 0.019311(−0.1) + 0.000151(−4.5) 
𝑍 = −0.72 
The discriminant function has correctly classified 1Time Holdings Limited as having failed. This is 
concluded as Z<0, indicating failure as per the model. Had Z>0, then the firm would have been 
classified as a non-failed firm. 
The assessment of the unique discriminatory power of each independent credit statistic variable on the 
overall discriminant function should not be limited in its extent to the magnitude of impact on the 
final z-score. Such an assessment does not apply in the context of the mechanics of multiple 
discriminant analysis. This relies upon the discrimination functioning as a whole, taking into account 
both additive and subtractive elements for calculation of the discriminant score or Z-score, across 
observations for entire sample. 
Through a typical statistical standardisation process using 𝑧 = 𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
, standardised coefficients allow for 
an easier interpretation of the variables on a comparable scale. The influence of each independent 
credit statistic variable on the overall discriminant function and its unique discriminatory power is 
also then made observable as presented below: 
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Standardized Coefficients (Test Sample) for Canonical Variables 
Variable Root 1 
Rev. 0.593717 
Debt/M Cap -0.4262 
Debt/EBITDA -0.39454 
1 Year Equity Price Return 0.319198 
RCF/Net debt 0.33448 




As shown through the cumulative proportion figure of 1, 100% of variance or 100% of all 
discriminatory power is explained by the above function. In line with in section b) iii of this chapter 
only one root or discriminant function was provided based upon discriminatory power. By 
standardising the coefficients as shown in the table above, the coefficients are weighted according to 
their discriminatory power as already discussed in section b) ii of this chapter, with Revenue having 
the highest weighting and EBIT/Interest Expense the lowest weighting, and therefore the lowest 
discriminating contribution, out of the seven independent credit statistic variables selected by the 
model. 
v) Factor structure coefficients 
 
Factor Structure Matrix (Test Sample) Correlations Variables - Canonical 
Roots (Pooled-within-groups correlations) 
Variable Root 1 
Rev. 0.659662 
Debt/M Cap -0.45609 
Debt/EBITDA -0.39752 
1 Year Equity 
Price Return 0.272286 
RCF/Net debt 0.27377 
EBIT Margin 0.162483 
EBIT/Int 0.153128 
As shown in the table above, no single independent credit statistic variables was shown to have a 
strong correlation (>0.75x<-0.75) with the resulting discriminant function. The combination of the 
seven independent credit statistic variables selected for the discriminant function resulted in greater 
discriminatory power between failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates. 
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However, the significant singular discriminating power of Revenue should not be overlooked. This 
was moderately correlated (>0.65x<-0.65) with that of the overall discriminant function indicating 
that by itself it almost had a similar degree of discriminating power of that of the discriminant 
function, however not sufficient enough to allow for its consideration in a univariate discriminant 
analysis function. 
vi) Means of canonical variables 
 
Means of Canonical Variables (Test Sample) 
Group Root 1 
Failed -0.76856 
Non-Failed 0.768558 
Given that that the means of canonical variables provided in the table above are equivalent, it can be 
said that the discriminant should differentiate equally between failed and non-failed South African 
non-financial corporates. 
vii) Classification Matrix 
 









Failed 79.54546 35 9 
Non-
Failed 86.36364 6 38 
Total 82.95454 41 47 
With reference to the table above, the discriminant function demonstrated a high overall accuracy rate 
of 82.95% for discriminating between failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates. 
This exceeds that of all prior corporate failure prediction models developed in academia to date as 
outlined in Chapter 3 | g) South African research on corporate failure prediction with the exception 
of De la Rey (1981). Although, De la Rey’s model relied on a much smaller sample of twenty-six 
failed corporates and on financial data from corporates experiencing failure between 1972 and 1979 
where accounting standards would not be viewed to be as sophisticated compared to the current IFRS 
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framework. Therefore De la Rey’s finding may not be directly comparable to this model’s findings 
given marked differences in the underlying data used. 
It worth noting the positive bias of the discriminant function, which was weighted towards the 
classification of South African non-financial corporates as non-failed. Forty-seven out of the total 
eighty-eight or 53% of corporates included in the sample were classified as non-failed. 
This is of concern in the context of the Chapter 3 | g) South African research on corporate failure 
prediction where Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and Hamman (2009) outlined considerations for Normalised 
Cost of Failure (NCF). In effect the preference would always be for discriminant functions derived for 
corporate failure prediction to be more biased towards a higher classification rate for failed firms 
rather than non-failed firms. 
The classification function, which allows for classifications independently based on the highest 
achieved score has been provided in Appendix H. Appendix K includes a model output including all 
classification of cases. 
Appendix J provides the Mahalanobis distances and posterior probabilities. Mahalanobis distances 
provides a measure of each case from the centre of the group or the group centroid, where the groups 
are defined as either failed or non-failed South African non-financial corporates. The shorter the 
distance between case and the centroid of either failed or a non-failed grouping, the greater the 
confidence that can be attached to a case belonging to this particular group. Posterior probabilities are 
the probability that an observation will fall into a particular group before the characteristics associated 
with the observation are considered. 
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c) Model enhancement considerations 
This section will attempt to improve and test the robustness of the initial multiple discriminant 
analysis model. 
Firstly, the number of independent credit statistic variables will be reduced to those seen to be the 
most statistically significant at a 95% confidence threshold level or a p-value of 0.05 or 5%. This also 
then aligned with the recommended number of independent variables relative to the sample size as 
outlined in Chapter 3 | h) Multiple discriminant analysis. Although Brown and Tinsley (1983) 
recommended the sample should equate to at least ten times the number of independent variables, 
Tinsley and Stevens (2000) recommended a factor of twenty. This will be reduced to three 
independent credit statistic variables comprising a sample of eight-eight paired failed and non-failed 
firms. This will therefore satisfy the more conservative of the two recommendations, which would 
only require a sample of sixty observations. 
Secondly, the initial sample will be split into two samples comprising twenty-two failed firms. This 
will allow for in sample and out of sample testing. This will be done using both samples 
independently to generate a discriminant function, which will then be run on the other sample. The 
combination of paired failed and non-failed firms have been included in each sample on a randomness 
basis. However, by reversing the learning and testing sample, this will allow for any unique 
peculiarities such as potential sector concentration or exposure to a greater number of outliers to be 
tested. 
Thirdly, a multiple discriminant analysis model will be run to generate a discriminant function which 
excludes independent credit statistic variable observation outliers. The implications for overall 
discriminating ability will also be discussed in length. 
Lastly, a final sample comprising independent credit statistic variable reliant upon both IFRS and SA 
GAAP financial date will be subjected to multiple discriminant analysis. The resulting discriminant 
function and classification rates are then discussed in detail in relation to the initial research objective 
in this regard. 
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i) Revenue, Debt/EBITDA and Debt/ Market Capitalisation only model 
 
Group 

















68.18182 14 30 
Total 
 
80.68182 55 33 
With reference to the table above, by limiting the independent credit statistic variables to the three 
variables, which demonstrated the greatest degree of discriminating power in the initial model, 
namely Revenue, Debt/EBITDA and Debt/ Market Capitalisation, classification accuracy still 
remained high at 80.68%. 
However, what was of even greater interest was the shift in the classification bias of the model 
towards conservatism, where 63% of the firms overall were classified as having failed. This brought 
about a better alignment of NCF consideration as discuss previously in section b) vii of this chapter.  
Therefore this model overall would be deemed to be preferable to the initial model for predicting 
South African non-financial corporate failure given that it would result in a lower NCF but still be 
backed by high classification expectations. Also, an additional benefit to this discriminant function 
would be the lower statistical complexity and easier interpretation, given that it only includes three 
strongly statistically significant independent credit statistic variables versus the initial model’s seven, 
where some of their p-values exceeded 0.05 or 5%. 
Put another way, the preference is always to have a model that is more accurate at classifying failed 
firms as opposed to non-failed firms. The economic consequences of lending to a firm that will fail 
are far more severe than not lending to a firm that will not fail. Therefore Type I errors (incorrectly 
classifying a failed company as healthy) and Type II errors (incorrectly classifying a non-failed firm 
as being financially distressed) are not seen to be asymmetric in there implications on economic 
decision for the credit community. 
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In the case of this model ability to correctly forecast failure has increased to 93% from 79% even 
though the overall accuracy has fallen from 82.95454% to 80.68182%. Of the forty-four firms that 
actually failed the model was able to accurately classify forty-one firms that failed and so would not 
lend to these firms. Conversely, of the forty-four firms that did not fail, the model was able to classify 
thirty of these firms correctly. However, this should not be viewed negatively as the implication 
would be that lenders would have forgone interest income only from fourteen firms but avoided far 
greater loan losses on only three firms. 
 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (IFRS 1 Year) Step 3, N of 
vars in model: 3; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' 







(1,84) p-value Toler. 
1-Toler. 
(R-Sqr.) 
Revenue 0.827438 0.835091 16.58791 0.000105 0.99682 0.00318 
Debt/Mkt Cap 0.743749 0.929057 6.4143 0.01318 0.995199 0.004802 
Debt/EBITDA 0.726445 0.951187 4.31068 0.040931 0.994248 0.005752 
At the same time, as shown above all p-values were below 0.05 or 5 % which would have been 
deemed to be statistically significant at a 95% confidence threshold level.  
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Variable 





















Using the table above and the discriminant function coefficients provided, the discriminant function 
derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model is as follows: 
𝑍 = −0.025141 + 0.000622(𝑋1) − 0.207647(𝑋2) − 0.032260(𝑋3) 








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
The application of the model has been included in Appendix I. 
ii) Splitting the sample in half to create a learning sample and a testing sample 
1. First forty-four observations for a learning sample 
 
Group 

















95.45454 1 21 
Total 
 
90.90909 20 24 
Through using the first forty-four observations for the learning sample the multiple discriminant 
analysis model demonstrated the highest classification rate of 90.90909%, as shown in the table 
above. The increase in classification rate could possibly be explained by the independent credit 
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statistic variables included being better differentiators when it came to predicting corporate failure in 
the sectors that were included in the reduced testing sample. 
























Failed 12.74x $23.56mn -652.63x -95% -25% 11% 293% -73% -50% 172% -22% 
Non-
Failed 
1.30x $1,180.81mn 38.85x 58% 104% 131% 30.5% 54% 40% 30% 7% 
All Grps 7.02x $602.18mn -306.89x -19% 40% 71% 162% -9% -5% 101% -8% 
Although this may be due to sampling bias to some extent given greater sector concentrations. This 
often results in better differentiating power being accorded to certain independent credit statistic 
variables which are more sector specific. This sample showed a greater degree of differentiation 
against some of the independent credit statistic variables when compared to the initial sample of 
eighty-eight observations as illustrated in the table above. 
Outliers remain a feature of the significant variation and skewness of some of the independent credit 
statistic variable observation. Again, and in line with the what was communicated in Chapter 4 | G 
and section a) ii of this chapter, these have been left in the sample to ensure that the model fits sample 
rather than the other way around. 

























Debt/EBITDA 1 0 0.1 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.1 0.02 
Revenue 0 1 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 -0.01 0.16 -0.06 0 0.01 
EBIT/Int 0.1 -0.01 1 0.03 0.01 -0.39 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 
FCF/Debt 0.12 -0.07 0.03 1 0.55 0.49 0.05 -0.1 0.64 0.17 0.02 
RCF/Debt -0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.55 1 0.89 0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 
FFO/Debt -0.06 -0.11 -0.39 0.49 0.89 1 0.01 0 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 
Debt/B.E. -0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 1 0.04 0.07 0.16 -0.06 
RCF/Net debt 0.08 0.16 -0.03 -0.1 -0.01 0 0.04 1 0.03 0.07 0.11 
EBIT Margin 0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.64 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03 1 0.12 0.16 
Debt/Mkt Cap -0.1 0 0.13 0.17 -0.01 -0.09 0.16 0.07 0.12 1 0.05 
1 Year Equity Price 
Return 
0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.16 0.05 1 
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At the same time as shown in the correlation matrix with the exception of RCF/Debt and FCF/Debt 
there are no strong statistical relationships (>0.75x<-0.75) existing between the independent variables. 
The rationale for the relationship between these two variables is for the same reasons as discussed 
earlier in this section in a)i). Worth noting is the relationship between EBIT margin and FFO/Debt 
which showed a moderate degree of correlation (>0.65x<-0.65). This relationship most likely can be 
explained to some extent by the degree of linkage between cash flow from operations, the starting 
point for the calculation of FCF, and EBIT. 
Although this may be due to sampling bias to some extent, this sample showed a greater degree of 
differentiation against some of the independent credit statistic variables when compared to the initial 
sample of eighty-eight observations. 
 
N=44 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (Test Sample- In) Step 7, 
N of vars in model: 7; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' 



















0.564503 0.868993 5.427285 0.025549 0.970261 0.029739 
Debt/Mkt Cap 
 
0.587660 0.834750 7.126685 0.011322 0.924224 0.075776 
Debt/EBITDA 
 
0.566908 0.865307 5.603744 0.023418 0.946544 0.053456 
FCF/Debt 
 
0.555629 0.882872 4.776027 0.035447 0.933712 0.066288 
RCF/Net debt 
 
0.509228 0.963318 1.370823 0.249362 0.933310 0.066690 
EBIT/Int 
 
0.513285 0.955705 1.668523 0.204688 0.965914 0.034086 
1 Year Equity Price Return 
 
0.504291 0.972749 1.008515 0.321962 0.983299 0.016701 
In line with the initial model, only seven variable are included in the model base on their statistical 
significance whereas the remaining four variable deemed not be statistically significant were 
excluded. Revenue, Debt/Market Capitalisation and Debt/ EBITDA featured most prominently as 
measured by the Partial Wilks’ lambda or the unique contribution of the respective variable to the 
discrimination between groups. In addition, the multiple discriminant analysis model also included 
FCF/Debt, RCF/ Net Debt, EBIT/ Interest Expense and One Year Equity Price Return as independent 
credit statistic variables. The initial model also included RCF/ Net Debt, EBIT/ Interest Expense and 1 
Year Equity Price Return for differentiating between failed and non-failed South African non-
Page | 131 
financial corporates. Therefore, the inclusion of FCF/Debt as an independent credit statistic variable, 
was unique to this model. 
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Variable 

































The discriminant function coefficients provided in the table above resulted in the discriminant 
function derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model as follows: 
𝑍 = 0.384024 + 0.000469(𝑋1) − 0.320661(𝑋2) − 0.032632(𝑋3) + 0.183754(𝑋4)
+ 0.106732(𝑋5) + 0.000140(𝑋6) + 0.363845(𝑋7) 








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋4)   𝑖𝑠
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋7) 𝑖𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 
It is worth highlighting that the ordering of the coefficients for the independent credit statistic 
variables is based upon their discriminatory power. The first independent credit statistic variable will 
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always have the greatest discriminatory power, the second independent credit statistic variable, the 
second most discriminatory power and so on. The standard approach for writing out the 
discriminating function is to include the independent variables in order of their discriminatory power, 
as is the case in this study. 
By applying this multiple discriminant analysis model’s coefficients to the test sample or hold out 
sample of the remaining forty-four failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates in the 
original sample resulted in a 77.27273% overall classification rate. 
2. First forty-four observations for a learning sample with four variables 
 
Group 

















95.45454 1 21 
Total 
 
93.18182 21 23 
As shown above by refining the model based on assessing the initial learning sample of only forty-
four South African non-financial corporates to the most statistically significant (p-value <0.05 or 5%) 
independent credit statistic variables, the classification rate improved further to 93.18182%. This was 
done for the same reasons as outlined earlier section a) ii of this chapter. This again could possibly be 
explained by these independent credit statistic variables being more applicable to the sectors that were 
included in this carve out sample. 
 
N=44 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (Test Sample- In) Step 4, N of vars in 
model: 4; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' Lambda: .55044 approx. 



















0.668903 0.822896 8.393598 0.006146 0.995402 0.004598 
Debt/Mkt Cap 
 
0.640900 0.858851 6.409498 0.015492 0.957221 0.042779 
Debt/EBITDA 
 
0.624085 0.881992 5.218108 0.027878 0.969691 0.030309 
FCF/Debt 
 
0.622607 0.884085 5.113414 0.029395 0.948622 0.051378 
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All p-values were below 0.05 or 5 % which would have been deemed to be statistically significant at a 
95% confidence threshold level, with FCF/Debt demonstrating the highest unique contribution. This 
was to be expected though given how this model was specified from the beginning. 
 
Variable 
























Using the table above and the discriminant function coefficients provided the discriminant function 
derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model is as follows: 
𝑍 = 0.228234 + 0.000573(𝑋1) − 0.309994(𝑋2) − 0.032125(𝑋3) + 0.193060(𝑋4) 








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋4)   𝑖𝑠
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
Through application of this multiple discriminant analysis model’s coefficients to the test sample or 
hold out sample of the remaining forty-four failed and non-failed South African non-financial 
corporates in the original sample resulted in a 75% overall classification rate. 
3. Last forty-four observations for a learning sample 
The use in the multiple discriminant model of the two split samples will now be reversed. The last 
forty-four observations will be used for the learning sample or the in sample testing. The first forty-
four observations will in turn then be used for the testing or hold out sample. This will allow for 
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conclusions to be drawn on any unique observed characteristics relating to the sample in relation the 
multiple linear regression model. 
In using these last forty-four observations in the sample to develop a South African non-financial 
corporate failure prediction model, a classification rate of 79.54546% was achieved as shown below. 
 
Group 

















77.27273 5 17 
Total 
 
79.54546 23 21 
The model, like the initial model using the full sample of observations, included Revenue, Debt/ 
Market Capitalisation, One Year Equity Price Return and RCF/Net Debt. Inclusion of FCF/Debt and 
RCF/Debt were unique to this model. 
 
N=44 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (Test Sample- LSL44) Step 6, N of vars 
in model: 6; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' Lambda: .62546 approx. 























0.654082 0.956237 1.693333 0.201207 0.929292 0.070708 
RCF/Debt 
 






0.713806 0.876228 5.226462 0.028068 0.464784 0.535216 
FCF/Debt 
 




0.649239 0.963370 1.406864 0.243139 0.819396 0.180604 
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Variable 






























The discriminant function coefficients provided in the table above resulted in the discriminant 
function derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model as follows: 
𝑍 = −0.04416 + 0.00061(𝑋1) − 0.12952(𝑋2) − 0.21998(𝑋3) + 1.07102(𝑋4) + 0.23254(𝑋5)
+ 0.07332(𝑋6) 








 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋4) 𝑖𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋5)   𝑖𝑠
𝐹𝐶𝐹
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡




 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
The application of this multiple discriminant analysis model’s coefficients were applied to the test 
sample of the first forty-four failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates in the 
original sample resulted in a 81.81818% overall classification rate. 
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4. Last forty-four observations for a learning sample with three variables 
 
Group 

















59.09091 9 13 
Total 
 
75.00000 29 15 
Through refining the model design to only assess the initial learning sample of only forty-four South 
African non-financial corporates using the most statistically significant (p-value <0.05 or 5%) 
independent credit statistic variables, the classification rate reduced to 75%. This was done for the 
same reasons as outlined earlier section a) ii of this chapter. 
 
N=44 
Discriminant Function Analysis Summary (Test Sample- LSL44) Step 3, N of vars in 
model: 3; Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' Lambda: .73229 approx. F 

























0.787971 0.929335 3.04152 0.088842 0.909674 0.090326 
RCF/Debt 
 
0.762940 0.959825 1.67426 0.203110 0.911140 0.088860 
Despite an attempt to refine this model using only those independent credit statistic variables seen to 
statistically significant at a 95% confidence threshold level or having a p-value below 0.05 or 5%, 
only Revenue demonstrated statistical significance. This was to be expected though given how this 
model was specified from the beginning due to less variables in combination offering a lower 
propensity to explain variation uniquely on their own. 
  

























Using the discriminant function coefficients provided in the table above resulted in the discriminant 
function derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model as follows: 
𝑍 = −0.412438 + 0.000731(𝑋1) + 0.684207(𝑋2) − 0.066409(𝑋3) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋1) 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑆 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋2) 𝑖𝑠 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (𝑋3)   𝑖𝑠
𝑅𝐶𝐹
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
This multiple discriminant analysis model’s coefficients when applied to the test sample of the first 
forty-four failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates in the original sample resulted 
in a 77.27273% overall classification rate. 
iii) Using combined IFRS and non-IFRS data 
Through removing the filter of IFRS only data that was applied to the sample this expanded the initial 
sample from forty-four failed firms to fifty-six failed firms with the approximate date of failure 
occurring between February 2000 to December 2015. The addition of a further twelve failed firms 
matched to non-failed firms with both reporting under SA GAAP at the time of failure decreased the 
classification accuracy for corporate failure using a multiple discriminant analysis model on this 
sample. 
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Group 

















73.21429 15 41 
Total 
 
74.10714 57 55 
As shown above the complete IFRS sample resulted in a higher classification rate of 82.95454% 
versus 74. 10714% using both IFRS and non-IFRS financial data. 
Also worth noting is that this was also below all classification rates of 90.90909% and 77.27273%, for 
the learning sample and test sample, respectively, for the split sample using the first forty-four 
observations. This was also below the refined four variable model using this sample selection which 
yielded classification rates of 93.18182% for the learning sample and 75% for the test sample. 
Similarly the classification rate of 74% achieved by using both IFRS and non IFRS prepared financial 
data in the sample was below that of the split sample where the last forty-four observations were used. 
In this instance, the discriminant function resulted in a 79.54546% classification rate for the learning 
sample and 81.81818% for the test sample. Through an attempted refinement of the model to use only 
the three statistically significant independent credit statistic variables from the initial model this 
reduced to a classification rate of 75% for the leaning sample and 77.27273% for the test sample, both 
still above that achieved by discriminant function classification rate of 74% for the IFRS and non 
IFRS prepared financial data sample. 
This was despite the sample comprising IFRS and non-IFRS prepared financial data sample benefiting 
from a larger sample size of fifty-six failed non-financial South African corporates versus the IFRS 
only prepared financial data sample of forty-four non-financial South African corporates. 
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Variable 
Enter/Remove 

































1 22.16992 1 110 0.000007 1.000000 0.832262 22.16992 1 110 0.000007 
Debt/M Cap 
 
2 8.69160 1 109 0.003912 2.000000 0.770799 16.20587 2 109 0.000001 
Debt/EBITDA 
 
3 5.01148 1 108 0.027230 3.000000 0.736618 12.87201 3 108 0.000000 
FCF/Debt 
 
4 2.83776 1 107 0.094987 4.000000 0.717587 10.52773 4 107 0.000000 
RCF/Net debt 
 
5 2.45413 1 106 0.120197 5.000000 0.701349 9.02746 5 106 0.000000 
EBIT Margin 
 
6 3.58588 1 105 0.061025 6.000000 0.678188 8.30406 6 105 0.000000 
1 Year Equity 
Price Return 
 
7 2.72198 1 104 0.101993 7.000000 0.660891 7.62335 7 104 0.000000 
EBIT/Int-(E) 
 
8 1.43570 1 103 0.233587 8.000000 0.651805 6.87784 8 103 0.000000 
It is worth noting as shown in the table above, that there were differences from the original IFRS only 
prepared financial data sample when it came to both the relative ordering of discriminating power and 
inclusion of independent credit statistic variables. 
iv) Excluding outliers from the sample 
As previously discussed in section a) ii of this chapter, outliers were excluded to assess the impact on 
the resulting discriminant function and classification rates. The occurrence of outliers had a material 
impact on the means of the independent credit statistic variables. Through removing these outliers the 
means were subject to a lower degree of skewness and were seen to be more in line with what would 
have normally been expected for observations for independent credit statistic variables for non-failed 
and failed firms. However through the exclusion of outlying observations the effect of extreme events 
was removed and the ability for the discriminant function to consider their occurrence. 
 
Group 

















90.90909 3 30 
Total 
 
81.81818 27 39 
Through excluding the outliers the sample was reduced to thirty-three failed firms that were paired 
with thirty-three non-failed peers. The discriminant analysis model demonstrated a slightly lower 
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classification rate of 81.81818% when compared to the 82.95454% resulting from the sample 
including the outliers. This could in part be explained by a sample that had twenty-two less 
observations with model fit proving to be more challenging for the multiple discriminant analysis 
model. 
It was concerning that there was a marked decrease in the ability to classify failed firms by about 
seven percentage points as result of excluding outliers. This in essence showed that by manipulating 
the sample to exclude outliers, the ability to forecast extreme events, primarily attributed to failed 
firms, was lowered. This is supportive of the rationale behind original approach adopted by the 
research design to not modify the sample for outliers, so that the discriminant function is built upon 
their occurrence, however remote. 
The ability to classify non-failed firm correctly, was four percentage point higher in this model 
compared to the initial model, as would be expected with reduced consideration for outlying 
observations. 
Revenue again demonstrated the greatest degree of variability, followed by debt/ Market 
Capitalisation and then EBIT Margin. Although the means were seen to have been normalised to 
some extent they may not be reflective in reality of what observations could result for independent 
credit statistic variables, in particular for failed firms which tend to exhibit a greater propensity for 
extreme data points. 
 
Variable 




































1.00 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 0.13 0.05 0.29 0.01 
Revenue 
 
-0.08 1.00 0.41 0.10 0.21 0.28 -0.01 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 
EBIT/Int 
 
-0.11 0.41 1.00 0.57 0.64 0.72 0.01 0.13 0.23 -0.10 0.20 
FCF/Debt 
 
0.10 0.10 0.57 1.00 0.26 0.27 0.05 0.00 0.66 0.12 0.11 
RCF/Debt 
 
-0.10 0.21 0.64 0.26 1.00 0.97 -0.08 -0.12 0.12 -0.10 0.54 
FFO/Debt 
 
-0.14 0.28 0.72 0.27 0.97 1.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.06 -0.10 0.49 
Debt/BV 
 
-0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 1.00 -0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.02 
RCF/Net debt 
 
0.13 0.14 0.13 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 -0.00 1.00 0.03 0.07 -0.24 
EBIT Margin 
 
0.05 -0.03 0.23 0.66 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.03 1.00 0.07 0.14 
Debt/Mkt Cap 
 
0.29 -0.05 -0.10 0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.07 1.00 -0.15 
1 Year Equity 
Price Return 
 
0.01 -0.09 0.20 0.11 0.54 0.49 0.02 -0.24 0.14 -0.15 1.00 
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At the same time as shown in the correlation matrix with the exception of RCF/Debt and FFO/Debt 
there are no strong statistical relationships (>0.75x<-0.75) existing between the independent variables. 
The rationale for the relationship between this two variables is for the same reasons as discussed 
earlier in this section in a)i). Worth noting is the relationship between EBIT/ Interest Expense and 
FFO/Debt which showed a moderate degree of correlation (>0.65x<-0.65). This relationship most 
likely can be explained to some extent by the degree of linkage between cash flow from operations, 
the starting point for the calculation of FCF, and EBIT. 
N=66 Discriminant Function Analysis Summary 
(Sample(WithoutOutliers)5) Step 6, N of vars in model: 6; 
Grouping: Failed / Non-failed (2 grps) Wilks' Lambda: .60552 
approx. F (6,59)=6.4061 p< .0000 
Wilks' Partial F-remove p-value Toler. 1-Toler. 
 Lambda Lambda (1,59)   (R-Sqr.) 
Revenue 0.687457 0.880817 7.983244 0.006433 0.968056 0.031944 
Debt/Mkt Cap 0.643673 0.940732 3.717117 0.058675 0.910802 0.089198 
EBIT Margin 0.641266 0.944263 3.482569 0.066991 0.988954 0.011046 
Debt/EBITDA 0.64184 0.943419 3.538498 0.064897 0.875531 0.124469 
Debt/B.E. 0.628628 0.963247 2.25115 0.138848 0.974687 0.025313 
RCF/Net debt 0.619718 0.977096 1.382988 0.244316 0.95777 0.04223 
Only six variables are included here based on their statistical significance. Revenue, Debt/Market 
Capitalisation and EBIT margin featured most prominently as measured by the Partial Wilks’ lambda 
or the unique contribution of the respective variable to the discrimination between groups. It is worth 
noting that only Revenue was statistically significant at a 95% confidence threshold level or having a 
p-value below 0.05 or 5%. 
In addition, the multiple discriminant analysis model also included Debt/EBITDA, Debt/ Book Equity 
and RCF/Net debt as independent credit statistic variables. This overlapped with respect to the initial 
model’s inclusion of Revenue, Debt/Market Capitalisation, Debt/EBITDA, RCF/Net debt and EBIT 
Margin. The notable inclusion in this model was debt/Book Equity. This could be explained by the 
removal of outliers increasing its discriminatory power. 
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Variable 




Debt/Mkt Cap -0.157554 
EBIT Margin 0.298266 
Debt/EBITDA -0.065908 
Debt/BV -0.081173 





The discriminant function coefficients provided in the table above resulted in the discriminant 
function derived from the multiple discriminant analysis model as follows: 
𝑍 = 0.237619 + 0.000451(𝑋1) − 0.157554(𝑋2) + 0.298266(𝑋3) − 0.065908(𝑋4)
− 0.081173(𝑋5) + 0.060045(𝑋6) 




















 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 
By applying this multiple discriminant analysis model’s coefficients to the original sample of non-
failed and failed South African non-financial corporates with outliers included in the observations 
resulted in a 78.41% overall classification rate. This was lower than the original model’s 82.95% 
classification rate.  
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d) Summary 
The initial corporate failure model that was developed demonstrated a high classification rate of 
82.95454%. This was not diminished through the refinement of the model to three independent credit 
statistic variables comprising: Revenue, Debt/EBITDA and Debt/ Market Capitalisation. Accuracy 
only reduced slightly to 80.68182%. However, through only using three independent credit statistic 
variables the degree of complexity in interpreting and applying the model was reduced significantly. 
This also sharply reduced the incidence of Type I errors, or classification of failed firm as non-failed, 
to 6.82% from 20.45%. The revised model was shown to be a lot more accurate at classifying failed 
firms. This meant that in using this model, lenders would be less likely to incur loan losses but at the 
expense of forgoing interest income on loans not made to non-failed firms. However, this is preferable 
given that loan losses will, in most cases depending on interest rates levels and the size of a loan, 
exceed that of interest income. 
The analysis further demonstrated the prevalence of the discriminatory power offered by Revenue and 
Debt/ Market Capitalisation through splitting the initial sample into two, allowing for a learning 
sample and a hold out or testing sample. Classification rates remained above 75% throughout where 
using the first forty-four observations for the testing sample and limiting the independent credit 
statistic variables to Revenue, Debt/Market Capitalisation, Debt/EBITDA and FCF/Debt resulted in 
the highest classification rate in this study of 93.18182%. This was deemed to be a result of these 
independent credit statistic variables having a greater degree of differentiating power for the sectors 
which featured in the sample of non-failed and failed non-financial South African corporates. 
The results of all multiple discriminant analysis models run until this point had relied solely on 
financial information prepared under IFRS. The classification rates achieved were then compared to 
that of multiple discriminant analysis model run using financial information prepared under both IFRS 
and SA GAAP. The accuracy achieved by this model was lower than that achieved in multiple 
discriminant analysis models that had been run using financial information prepared under IFRS only. 
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These provided answers to three of the salient research objectives. The classification of non-failed and 
failed non-financial South African corporates was improved by using an updated sample of failed 
firms, adjusting their financial statements to better align with the requirements of credit analysis, and 
using more uniform financial information prepared under IFRS. 
By excluding outliers there were two noticeable impacts. Firstly, the ability to classify type I errors or 
failed firms as non-failed failed reduced, which was concerning for the economic consequence 
mentioned earlier relating to loan losses. This was attributed to the removal of outliers. Secondly, 
means moved to what would be more customarily observed for independent credit statistic variables 
for non-failed and failed South African non-financial corporates. The overall classification rate was 
not materially impacted.  
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Chapter 6 | Conclusion 
The study focused on four main research objectives in developing a corporate failure model for non-
financial South African corporates using multiple discriminant analysis. This included using a more 
up to date sample of failed non-financial South African corporates reporting under IFRS, and using 
Moody’s Investors Service best practices, which are public knowledge, for assessing South African 
corporate credit risk. In addition the model included credit statistics using equity market price 
movements and liquidity strength as forward-looking predictors of default. 
a) Advantages of updated IFRS data, adjustments to credit statistics and including outliers 
The classification rates in themselves are indicative of the advantages that have been afforded to this 
multiple discriminant analysis model compared to that of previous studies that have been conducted 
on South African corporate failure prediction. There was only one study surveyed in the literature that 
offered higher classification rates, that being the De la Rey (1981) multiple discriminant analysis 
model. 
Therefore it appears, through the accuracy rates achieved, that future studies on corporate failure 
prediction will benefit from improved classification as result of the better quality and the more 
uniform nature in the preparation of financial information. This study added to a growing sample of 
listed failed non-financial South African corporates. The sample is expected to grow as South Africa 
enters what appears to be another recession following the previous recession in 2009. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that future studies consider making credit related financial 
adjustments to data as outlined in Chapter 2 | b) and in line with Moody’s Investors Service best 
practices, which are public knowledge, so that financial information is more reflective of the credit 
risk exposures of non-financial South African corporates. It is also recommended that further 
examination should, at all times, decouple non-financial and financial corporates given the unique 
credit profiles of financial corporates which often can sustain higher leverage and where their 
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systemic importance to the broader South African economy which often underlines a degree of 
implicit Reserve Bank support cannot be overlooked. 
Penultimately the emphasis, of the use of uniform financial data which is broadly comparable across 
financial periods is also an important consideration. There should be due consideration for using 
financial data prepared under different sets of accounting standards as this  can affect the accuracy of 
corporate failure prediction models developed which could be subject to a split sampling effect. As 
new IFRS standards are adopted there should also be an examination on the potential consequences 
when it comes to comparing financial data across time periods and sectors. 
Lastly, the implications of removing outlying data points was considered. The impact of their 
inclusion or exclusion did not appear to have a meaningful difference on the overall classification of 
rate, however it did reduce the ability to classify failure. The ability to classify non-failed firms was 
improved. This was not seen as an ideal trade-off in the model’s classification accuracy. The 
preference being for any corporate failure prediction model to be biased towards the classification of 
failed firms. This is due to the asymmetric nature of loans made to failed firms versus loans not made 
to non-failed firms, as loans losses made on bad loans almost always will exceed interest income 
forgone in not making a loan. 
b) Liquidity analysis as an additional forward-looking predictor of default 
Given the inconsistencies in the financial disclosures provided by the sample of failed South African 
non-financial corporates, this was excluded from the final model. However, as disclosure improves, 
especially when it comes to committed bank facility availability and forward-looking information, this 
should most certainly be considered. The ability for a non-financial corporate’s forecast cash 
resources to support its uses is still seen to be one of the strongest determinants of corporate failure. It 
is suggested that as financial disclosures improve a recommended approach would be to consider this 
through 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
 where this should never be below one and always have a margin of safety 
factored in providing cushioning above one. 
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c) Applicability of equity market data and market model theory 
Equity market price data should be considered in any analysis of corporate failure prediction. The 
applicability of this data was demonstrated in this study given the discriminatory power of debt/ 
Market Capitalisation which is a starting point for the theoretical underpinnings of market-based 
models as was detailed in Chapter 3 | e). Equity markets introduced forward-looking characteristics 
for corporate failure prediction along with the capacity of a non-financial corporate to navigate 
prevailing business conditions versus their debt levels. 
d) Avenues for further research 
With the increasing accountability and transparency that firms are subject to, there appears to be 
improving disclosure around non-financial corporate liquidity positions and the resilience indicated by 
such disclosures. Through combining this with guidance around expectations for operating 
performance in the coming financial year a rough estimate of operating cash flow generation should 
be able to be derived. Liquidity sources through the combination of unrestricted cash balances, 
committed banking facility availability while factoring in covenant headroom to ensure that they are 
there when needed should be assessed against liquidity uses. This could be expressed as a ratio where 
there should always be a minimum coverage ratio exceeding one at all times. 
At the same time future studies, could also consider using improved forward-looking guidance 
through an attempt to generate forecasts of credit metrics to be considered by employing multiple 
discriminant models as a forward-looking indicator of corporate failure. 
There is scope for further analysis of the quality and consistency of financial information and 
ultimately how this affects the accuracy and reliability of corporate failure prediction. This will 
become increasingly important when it comes to the adoption of bellwether accounting standards such 
as IFRS 16 and its lease accounting framework, where its formal adoption will take place starting 1 
January 2019. This will result in an adjustment (referred to in this study) no longer being required as 
all leases, including currently defined operating leases, will be capitalised and reflected on balance 
sheets. 
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Another consideration, would be comparing potential value that could be added in including a greater 
frequency of provision of financial information though comparing the impact of corporate failure 
prediction models that rely only on annual information versus those that rely upon both on interim and 
annual financial information. 
Also of interest would be corporate failure prediction models developed that controls for sector of 
operations, where certain sectors are often deemed to be more inherently risky than others. Although 
it should also be noted that this is often characterised through greater volatility of historic credit 
metrics, but these may not be readily available for newly established or combined entities. At the 
same time, through combining failed firms with non-failed peers this introduces sector considerations. 
Although successfully matching firms with overlapping business profiles and a similar scale of 
operations can be challenging given the relatively small corporate universe in South Africa. 
Currency volatility also often has a significant part to play when it comes to corporate failure 
prediction. This study only touched the tip of this by converting Rand revenue streams into US 
Dollars. This undoubtedly is an area worth exploring and its interlinkage with corporate failure 
prediction in a South African context. 
Similarly, the volatile nature of credit statistics for failed firms often mean that there are both left and 
right tailed outliers across the spectrum of data that is collected. It is worth considering in detail the 
implications of these outliers in developing corporate failure models and what it means for the 
accuracy of predicting further corporate failure events. 
Going concern qualifications expressed by auditors could also be worth incorporating into multiple 
discriminant analysis, although these have not always been present in the context of corporate failure. 
This is a challenging consideration for auditors, where the decision to qualify an audit opinion on the 
basis of a going concern assumption cannot be taken lightly, and can often lead to self-fulfilment of 
the financial failure of a corporate. 
This study could also be further extended to examine the implications of applying backward versus 
forward stepwise analysis when it comes to developing a corporate failure prediction model using 
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multiple discriminant analysis. At the same time an added consideration for further study, which was 
only touched upon in this study, is the concept of Normalised Cost of Failure (NCF) which was 
discussed in detail by Muller, Steyn-Bruwer and Hamman (2009). 
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Appendix A 









Mandatory Weak1 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12 
Restricted Optional2  X           
Optional X   X X  X X   X  





t Cumulative X X X X X X X  X    






Subordinated  X X X X X X       
Preferred       X X X X X X 






< 30 years X            
30 – 59 years    X    X     
>= 60 years   X X  X X X  X X X X 
Irredeemable             
Basket for Non-Financial Corporates A B B B B B C C C C C D 
 
1  Mandatory Weak Triggers include minimum regulatory capital ratios set at low levels.  
2  Restricted Optional is when the issuer has to stop payment on parity or junior securities for more than 6 months before being able to skip 
hybrid coupons.  
3  Optional and Mandatory Strong Triggers includes both optional coupon skip mechanisms and strong or ‘meaningful’ triggers such as 
triggers that would be breached well in advance of a company-wide default.  
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Appendix C 
Operating Lease Sector Multiples 
Sector Lease Multiple  
Aerospace & Defense 3 
Alcoholic Beverage 3 
Apparel 4 
Asset Managers 6 
Automobile Manufacturer  3 
Automotive Supplier 3 
Broadcast & Advertising  4 
Related Building Materials  3 
Business Services 3 
Chemical 3 
Communications Equipment  3 
Communications Infrastructure  5 
Construction  3 
Consumer Durables 3 
Consumer Electronics 3 
Consumer Services 4 
Distribution & Supply Chain Services 3 
Electric Generation & Transmission 
Cooperatives  3 
Environmental Services & Waste 
Management  3 
Equipment & Transportation Rental  3 
Finance Companies 3 
Gaming 4 
Generic Project Finance 6 
Government Owned Rail Network  3 
Healthcare Service Providers  4 
Homebuilding & Property Development  3 
Independent Exploration & Production  4 
Insurance Brokers & Service Companies  4 
Insurers  4 
Integrated Oil & Gas 3 
Investment Holding Companies  3 
Large Global Diversified Media  4 
Lodging & Cruise  5 
Manufacturing 3 
Medical Product & Device  3 
Midstream Energy 3 
Mining 3 
Natural Gas Pipelines 6 
Oilfield Services 3 
Page | 154 
Sector Lease Multiple  
Packaged Goods  3 
Packaging Manufacturers 3 
Paper & Forest Products 3 
Passenger Airlines 5 
Passenger Railway  3 
Pay TV-Cable & Direct-to-Home Satellite 
Operators 3 
Pharmaceutical 3 
Postal & Express Delivery 3 
Privately Managed Airports & Related 
Issuers 6 
Privately Managed Port Companies  6 
Privately Managed Toll Roads 3 
Protein & Agriculture 3 
Publishing 4 
Refining & Marketing 3 
Regulated Electric & Gas Networks 4 
Regulated Electric & Gas Utilities 4 
Regulated Water Utilities  3 
REITs & Other Commercial Property Firms 4 
Restaurant 6 
Retail 5 
Securities Firms  5 
Semiconductor 3 
Shipping 3 
Soft Beverage 3 
Software  3 
Steel 3 
Surface Transportation & Logistics 3 
Technology Hardware 3 
Technology Services 3 
Telecommunications 3 
Tobacco 3 
Trading Companies 3 
Unregulated Power Companies 6 
Unregulated Utilities  6 
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Appendix D 
Moody’s Investors Service National Scale Mapping Table for South Africa 





Baa2 Aa1.za to Aa2.za 
Baa3 Aa3.za to A1.za 




B2 Ba1.za to Ba2.za 
B3 Ba3.za to B1.za 
Caa1 B2.za to B3.za 
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Appendix E 
Normal fit histograms for South African non-financial corporates independent variables sample 
1. Combined for failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates 
Histogram of Debt/EBITDA
Test Sample 12v*88c
Debt/EBITDA = 88*10*Normal(Location=5.4078, Scale=12.8576)


















Page | 157 
Histogram of Revenue
Test Sample 12v*88c
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Histogram of FCF/Debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
FCF/Debt = 88*5*Normal(Location=0.256, Scale=3.7742)





















RCF/Debt = 88*5*Normal(Location=1.0516, Scale=4.6502)
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Histogram of FFO/Debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
FFO/Debt = 88*5*Normal(Location=1.2657, Scale=4.7488)

















Debt/BV = 88*100*Normal(Location=8.4735, Scale=66.9865)
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Histogram of RCF/Net debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
RCF/Net debt = 88*5*Normal(Location=0.0486, Scale=3.8298)


















Histogram of EBIT Margin
Test Sample 12v*88c
EBIT Margin = 88*20*Normal(Location=-1.4897, Scale=13.9327)
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Histogram of Debt/Mkt Cap
Test Sample 12v*88c
Debt/Mkt Cap = 88*2*Normal(Location=1.1171, Scale=2.44)


















Histogram of 1 Year Equity Price Return
Test Sample 12v*88c
1 Year Equity Price Return = 88*0.5*Normal(Location=-0.0737, Scale=0.7211)
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2. By failed or non-failed South African non-financial corporate groupings 
Categorized Histogram: Debt/EBITDA
Failed / Non-failed: Failed Debt/EBITDA = 44*10*Normal(Location=9.1826, Scale=17.4251)















































Failed / Non-failed: Failed Revenue = 44*500*Normal(Location=97.4891, Scale=275.9458)
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Categorized Histogram: EBIT/Int
Failed / Non-failed: Failed EBIT/Int = 44*2000*Normal(Location=-332.2779, Scale=2137.0472
)














































































Failed / Non-failed: Failed FCF/Debt = 44*5*Normal(Location=0.0787, Scale=5.0089)
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Categorized Histogram: RCF/Debt
Failed / Non-failed: Failed RCF/Debt = 44*5*Normal(Location=1.0202, Scale=6.1477)







Failed / Non-failed: Failed










Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed
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Categorized Histogram: FFO/Debt
Failed / Non-failed: Failed FFO/Debt = 44*5*Normal(Location=1.1525, Scale=6.2193)
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Categorized Histogram: Debt/BV
Failed / Non-failed: Failed Debt/BV = 44*100*Normal(Location=14.7007, Scale=94.6479)









































Categorized Histogram: RCF/Net debt
Failed / Non-failed: Failed RCF/Net debt = 44*5*Normal(Location=-0.7442, Scale=4.9278)
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Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed
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Categorized Histogram: EBIT Margin
Failed / Non-failed: Failed EBIT Margin = 44*20*Normal(Location=-3.2258, Scale=19.6368)











































Categorized Histogram: Debt/Mkt Cap
Failed / Non-failed: Failed Debt/Mkt Cap = 44*2*Normal(Location=1.9279, Scale=3.2617)
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Categorized Histogram: 1 Year Equity Price Return
Failed / Non-failed: Failed 1 Year Equity Price Return = 44*0.5*Normal(Location=-0.2222,
Scale=0.887)
Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed 1 Year Equity Price Return = 44*0.5*Normal(Location=0.0748,
Scale=0.4691)
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Appendix F 
Box and whisker plot for South African non-financial corporates independent variables sample 
1. Combined for failed and non-failed South African non-financial corporates  
Box & Whisker Plot

















































































Box & Whisker Plot
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Box & Whisker Plot
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Scatterplot of RCF/Debt against FCF/Debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
RCF/Debt = 0.8019+0.9756*x; 0.95 Conf.Int.




















Scatterplot of FFO/Debt against FCF/Debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
FFO/Debt = 1.0156+0.9769*x; 0.95 Conf.Int.
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Scatterplot of FFO/Debt against RCF/Debt
Test Sample 12v*88c
FFO/Debt = 0.2244+0.9901*x; 0.95 Conf.Int.



















Scatterplot of RCF/Debt against FCF/Debt; categorized by Failed / Non-failed
Test Sample 12v*88c
Failed / Non-failed: Failed RCF/Debt = 0.9421+0.9922*x








Failed / Non-failed: Failed
Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed
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Scatterplot of FFO/Debt against FCF/Debt; categorized by Failed / Non-failed
Test Sample 12v*88c
Failed / Non-failed: Failed FFO/Debt = 1.0751+0.9841*x







Failed / Non-failed: Failed
Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed













Scatterplot of FFO/Debt against RCF/Debt; categorized by Failed / Non-failed
Test Sample 12v*88c
Failed / Non-failed: Failed FFO/Debt = 0.1454+0.9872*x







Failed / Non-failed: Failed
Failed / Non-failed: Non-Failed
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Appendix H 
Classification function table 
 
Variable 
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Appendix I 
Classification of cases 
 
Case 












Failed Failed Non-Failed 
2 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
3 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
4 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
5 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
6 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
7 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 8 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 9 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
10 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
11 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
12 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
13 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 14 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
15 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
16 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
17 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
18 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
19 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 20 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
21 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
22 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
23 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
24 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 25 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
26 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
27 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
28 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
29 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
30 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
31 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
32 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
33 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
34 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
35 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
36 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
37 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
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Case 












Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
39 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
40 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
41 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
42 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
43 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
44 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
45 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
46 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 47 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
48 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 49 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
50 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 51 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
52 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
53 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
54 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
55 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
56 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
57 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
58 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
59 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
60 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 61 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
62 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
63 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
64 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
65 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
66 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 67 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
68 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
69 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 70 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
71 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 72 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
73 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
74 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
75 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
76 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
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Case 












Failed Failed Non-Failed 
* 78 
 
Non-Failed Failed Non-Failed 
79 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
80 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 81 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
82 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
83 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
84 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
85 
 
Failed Failed Non-Failed 
86 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
* 87 
 
Failed Non-Failed Failed 
88 
 
Non-Failed Non-Failed Failed 
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Appendix J 




Squared Mahalanobis Distances from Group Centroids (Test Sample) Incorrect 












Failed 0.73770 2.95651 
2 
 
Non-Failed 2.08718 0.56479 
3 
 
Failed 1.66366 2.69523 
4 
 
Non-Failed 1.45986 1.07822 
5 
 
Failed 15.02395 20.05675 
6 
 
Non-Failed 1.95475 1.84628 
7 
 
Failed 1.04711 1.47162 
* 8 
 
Non-Failed 1.65696 1.66706 
* 9 
 
Failed 23.50103 19.78477 
10 
 
Non-Failed 4.13410 1.66406 
11 
 
Failed 12.03440 17.11728 
12 
 
Non-Failed 2.54635 0.89561 
13 
 
Failed 1.98507 2.60353 
* 14 
 
Non-Failed 1.85006 2.49603 
15 
 
Failed 1.18206 2.49312 
16 
 
Non-Failed 5.60821 0.88078 
17 
 
Failed 28.94421 36.56746 
18 
 
Non-Failed 1.21347 1.13782 
19 
 
Failed 0.96103 3.68839 
* 20 
 
Non-Failed 0.86709 1.32029 
21 
 
Failed 37.65398 46.81110 
22 
 
Non-Failed 2.06980 2.04404 
23 
 
Failed 83.78095 90.56142 
24 
 
Non-Failed 15.26980 6.96405 
* 25 
 
Failed 4.18816 3.52307 
26 
 
Non-Failed 7.54019 2.56086 
27 
 
Failed 4.30316 6.74557 
28 
 
Non-Failed 21.91376 13.33150 
29 
 
Failed 1.13171 3.87984 
30 
 
Non-Failed 10.13336 4.17086 
31 
 
Failed 1.38325 1.95875 
32 
 
Non-Failed 2.86824 1.37190 
33 
 
Failed 1.13622 4.70005 
34 
 
Non-Failed 2.38606 0.15119 
35 
 
Failed 1.13546 2.29897 
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Case 
Squared Mahalanobis Distances from Group Centroids (Test Sample) Incorrect 












Non-Failed 1.14975 0.28300 
37 
 
Failed 0.47033 1.96521 
38 
 
Non-Failed 1.27771 0.47988 
39 
 
Failed 2.29143 3.63170 
40 
 
Non-Failed 2.09873 0.63903 
41 
 
Failed 1.73247 4.32569 
42 
 
Non-Failed 1.89319 0.87238 
43 
 
Failed 9.59267 15.21566 
44 
 
Non-Failed 5.08790 3.15499 
45 
 
Failed 5.13876 8.10401 
46 
 
Non-Failed 9.01683 3.99036 
* 47 
 
Failed 0.93679 0.60693 
48 
 
Non-Failed 1.99483 0.90134 
* 49 
 
Failed 3.31857 1.77363 
50 
 
Non-Failed 7.42431 5.38842 
* 51 
 
Failed 29.52656 26.18622 
52 
 
Non-Failed 1.40191 1.06076 
53 
 
Failed 1.10610 3.12382 
54 
 
Non-Failed 1.51883 1.06395 
55 
 
Failed 0.93560 2.97826 
56 
 
Non-Failed 2.49869 0.39656 
57 
 
Failed 1.45088 2.57922 
58 
 
Non-Failed 11.13921 5.22209 
59 
 
Failed 33.47353 44.39691 
60 
 
Non-Failed 4.08301 1.37644 
* 61 
 
Failed 37.95055 36.19848 
62 
 
Non-Failed 6.07251 3.75916 
63 
 
Failed 0.77150 1.30156 
64 
 
Non-Failed 1.35148 0.28999 
65 
 
Failed 15.02395 20.05675 
66 
 
Non-Failed 18.15278 10.08812 
* 67 
 
Failed 1.39587 1.36463 
68 
 
Non-Failed 1.42718 1.26017 
69 
 
Failed 0.86421 3.01363 
* 70 
 
Non-Failed 0.90095 1.25431 
71 
 
Failed 7.59523 14.49842 
* 72 
 
Non-Failed 1.12243 1.85092 
73 
 
Failed 14.79354 22.36772 
74 
 
Non-Failed 1.02167 0.93711 
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Case 
Squared Mahalanobis Distances from Group Centroids (Test Sample) Incorrect 












Failed 1.76698 2.52720 
76 
 
Non-Failed 6.09338 1.68798 
77 
 
Failed 0.62523 2.34011 
* 78 
 
Non-Failed 1.35704 2.84170 
79 
 
Failed 0.65157 3.86207 
80 
 
Non-Failed 26.36901 15.58249 
* 81 
 
Failed 1.79775 0.46595 
82 
 
Non-Failed 8.89232 3.20608 
83 
 
Failed 83.53243 90.46166 
84 
 
Non-Failed 6.09476 1.70742 
85 
 
Failed 3.73571 6.07410 
86 
 
Non-Failed 3.92560 1.92946 
* 87 
 
Failed 3.32649 0.22466 
88 
 
















Failed 0.752019 0.247981 
2 
 
Non-Failed 0.318387 0.681613 
3 
 
Failed 0.626161 0.373839 
4 
 
Non-Failed 0.452439 0.547561 
5 
 
Failed 0.925284 0.074716 
6 
 
Non-Failed 0.486445 0.513555 
7 
 
Failed 0.552865 0.447135 
* 8 
 
Non-Failed 0.501261 0.498739 
* 9 
 
Failed 0.134921 0.865079 
10 
 
Non-Failed 0.225305 0.774695 
11 
 
Failed 0.926996 0.073004 
12 
 
Non-Failed 0.304625 0.695375 
13 
 
Failed 0.576697 0.423303 
* 14 
 
Non-Failed 0.580051 0.419949 
15 
 
Failed 0.658256 0.341744 
16 
 
Non-Failed 0.085982 0.914018 
17 
 
Failed 0.978366 0.021634 
18 
 
Non-Failed 0.490545 0.509455 
19 
 
Failed 0.796357 0.203643 
* 20 
 
Non-Failed 0.556408 0.443592 
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Case 












Failed 0.989835 0.010165 
22 
 
Non-Failed 0.496780 0.503220 
23 
 
Failed 0.967398 0.032602 
24 
 
Non-Failed 0.015476 0.984524 
* 25 
 
Failed 0.417621 0.582379 
26 
 
Non-Failed 0.076586 0.923414 
27 
 
Failed 0.772275 0.227725 
28 
 
Non-Failed 0.013505 0.986495 
29 
 
Failed 0.798036 0.201964 
30 
 
Non-Failed 0.048280 0.951720 
31 
 
Failed 0.571445 0.428555 
32 
 
Non-Failed 0.321221 0.678779 
33 
 
Failed 0.855933 0.144067 
34 
 
Non-Failed 0.246488 0.753512 
35 
 
Failed 0.641471 0.358529 
36 
 
Non-Failed 0.393321 0.606679 
37 
 
Failed 0.678620 0.321380 
38 
 
Non-Failed 0.401574 0.598426 
39 
 
Failed 0.661533 0.338467 
40 
 
Non-Failed 0.325228 0.674772 
41 
 
Failed 0.785265 0.214735 
42 
 
Non-Failed 0.375098 0.624902 
43 
 
Failed 0.943294 0.056706 
44 
 
Non-Failed 0.275588 0.724412 
45 
 
Failed 0.814969 0.185031 
46 
 
Non-Failed 0.074935 0.925065 
* 47 
 
Failed 0.458861 0.541139 
48 
 
Non-Failed 0.366619 0.633381 
* 49 
 
Failed 0.315945 0.684055 
50 
 
Non-Failed 0.265427 0.734573 
* 51 
 
Failed 0.158402 0.841598 
52 
 
Non-Failed 0.457459 0.542541 
53 
 
Failed 0.732797 0.267203 
54 
 
Non-Failed 0.443384 0.556616 
55 
 
Failed 0.735231 0.264769 
56 
 
Non-Failed 0.259021 0.740979 
57 
 
Failed 0.637416 0.362584 
58 
 
Non-Failed 0.049333 0.950667 
59 
 
Failed 0.995772 0.004228 
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Case 












Non-Failed 0.205334 0.794666 
* 61 
 
Failed 0.294000 0.706000 
62 
 
Non-Failed 0.239272 0.760728 
63 
 
Failed 0.565872 0.434128 
64 
 
Non-Failed 0.370343 0.629657 
65 
 
Failed 0.925284 0.074716 
66 
 
Non-Failed 0.017424 0.982576 
* 67 
 
Failed 0.496094 0.503906 
68 
 
Non-Failed 0.479137 0.520863 
69 
 
Failed 0.745492 0.254508 
* 70 
 
Non-Failed 0.544055 0.455945 
71 
 
Failed 0.969279 0.030721 
* 72 
 
Non-Failed 0.590069 0.409931 
73 
 
Failed 0.977841 0.022159 
74 
 
Non-Failed 0.489432 0.510568 
75 
 
Failed 0.593900 0.406100 
76 
 
Non-Failed 0.099508 0.900492 
77 
 
Failed 0.702126 0.297874 
* 78 
 
Non-Failed 0.677505 0.322495 
79 
 
Failed 0.832751 0.167249 
80 
 
Non-Failed 0.004527 0.995473 
* 81 
 
Failed 0.339415 0.660585 
82 
 
Non-Failed 0.055038 0.944962 
83 
 
Failed 0.969664 0.030336 
84 
 
Non-Failed 0.100320 0.899680 
85 
 
Failed 0.762999 0.237001 
86 
 
Non-Failed 0.269321 0.730679 
* 87 
 
Failed 0.174954 0.825046 
88 
 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Approximate date of 
failure Industry/Sector 
1Time Holdings Ltd 1TM 21 August 2012 Airlines 
Afgem Ltd AFG 31 August 2009 Other Mined Minerals 
Africa Cellular Towers Ltd ATR 01 June 2012 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
African Brick Centre Ltd ABK 03 November 2011 
Non Wood Building 
Materials 
AG Industries Ltd AGI 03 December 2010 
Non Wood Building 
Materials 
Aludie Ltd ALD 23 May 2007 Security Services 
Amlac Ltd ALC 07 October 2003 Auto Parts 
APS Technologies Ltd APE 13 April 2006 Specialty Pharma 
Beget Holdings Ltd BEE 27 May 2011 Application Software 
Best Cut Ltd BCH 27 May 2011 Packaged Food 
Bioscience Brands Ltd BIO 08 November 2013 Specialty Pharma 
Brikor Ltd BIK 12 July 2013 
Non Wood Building 
Materials 
Bryant Technology Ltd BRY 25 January 2001 
Communications 
Equipment 
CCI Holdings Ltd CCG 16 April 2007 Application Software 
Country Foods Ltd CFO 01 April 2009 Packaged Food 
Dialogue Group  Holdings Ltd DLG 13 February 2012 IT Services 
Diamond Core Resources Ltd DMR 11 February 2008 Other Mined Minerals 
DNA Supply Chain Investments Ltd DNA 14 November 2005 Logistics Services 
Dorbyl Ltd DLV 19 November 2012 Auto Parts 
DTH Dynamic Technology 
Holdings Ltd DTH 27 May 2010 Application Software 
EC-Hold Ltd ECH 30 November 2005 Infrastructure Software 
Exxoteq Ltd EXO 12 June 2007 Exploration & Production 
Incentive Holdings Ltd ICT 16 April 2007 Other Financial Services 
JCI Ltd JCD 16 April 2013 Precious Metal Mining 
Kimberley Consolidated Mining Ltd KCM 08 November 2010 Base Metals 
Marshall Monteagle Holdings 
Societe Anonyme MTE 25 February 2011 Other Financial Services 
Millionair Charter Ltd MLL 16 April 2007 Logistics Services 
Pals Holdings Ltd PAL 16 March 2009 
Apparel, footwear, and 
Acc Design 
Pinnacle Point Group  Ltd PNG 30 September 2014 Homebuilders 
Queensgate Hotel & Leisure Ltd QHL 18 February 2013 Lodging 
Rentsure Holdings Ltd RNT 06 June 2007 Life Insurance 
Retail Apparel Group  Ltd RAG 16 April 2007 Specialty Apparel Stores 
Samrand Development Holdings Ltd SMR 05 December 2012 Real Estate Services 
Sea Kay Holdings Ltd SKY 05 October 2012 Homebuilders 
Shawcell Telecommunications Ltd SWL 16 April 2007 Telecom Carriers 
Stocks Hotels & Resorts Ltd SCH 16 April 2007 Lodging 




Approximate date of 
failure Industry/Sector 
Terexko Ltd TRX 16 April 2007 Restaurants 
Terrafin Holdings Ltd TRF 16 April 2007 Logistics Services 
Tiger Wheels Ltd TIW 20 April 2009 Auto Parts 
Tigon Ltd TGN 16 April 2007 Other Financial Services 
Top Info Technology Holdings Ltd TOT 16 April 2007 IT Services 
Viking Investments & Asset 
Management Ltd VKG 16 April 2007 Investment Companies 
Wesco Investments Ltd WES 06 July 2009 Automobiles 
William Tell Holdings Ltd WTL 22 October 2012 Wood Building Materials 
Zaptronix Ltd ZPT 08 October 2013 
Measurements 
Instruments 
HALOGEN HLDGS SOC ANON HAL 11 September 2009 Precious Metal Mining 
Ububele Holdings Ltd UBU 26 August 2014 Packaged Food 
B&W Instrumentation & Electrical 
Ltd BWI 01 August 2013 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold 
Resources Ltd WGR 07 May 2013 Precious Metal Mining 
First Uranium Corporation FUU 15 February 2012 Precious Metal Mining 
Pamodzi Gold Ltd PZG 17 September 2009 Precious Metal Mining 
Alliance Mining Corporation Ltd ALM 04 September 2010 Mining Services 
Square One Solutions Group  Ltd SQE 19 May 2010 Infrastructure Software 
Sanyati Holdings Ltd SAN 04 June 2012 Engineering Services 
African Cellular Towers ATR 04 December 2015 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
Masonite Africa MAS 23 September 2013 Wood Building Materials 
Chemical Specialities Ltd  CSP 17 March 2015 Paints & Coatings 
Total Client Services Limited  TCS 18 July 2014 IT Services 
Quantum Property Group QPG 27 August 2012 
Multi Asset Class Own & 
Develolp 
Great Basin Gold Ltd   GBG 20 November 2012 Precious Metal Mining 
Erbacon Investment Holdings 
Limited 
ERB 13 June 2013 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
Protech Khuthele Holdings Limited PKH 28 July 2014 
Transport Infra 
Construction 
Alert Steel Holdings Limited AET 15 May 2014 Iron & Steel 
Evraz Highveld Steel & Vanadium 
Ltd EHS 13 October 2013 Steel Producers 
Firestone Energy Ltd  FSEO1 17 September 2015 Gold Mining 
The Waterberg Coal Company 
Limited WCC 17 September 2015 Coal Mining 
Moulded Medical Supplies Limited  MUM 14 June 2004 Health Care Supplies 
Zarara Energy Limited ZRR 10 January 2013 Biotech & Pharma 
Omega Alpha International Limited OAI 22 February 2006 Application Software 
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